CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

SURPLUS DUPLICATE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

A quarterly review of current developments
in Soviet Central Asia and
Kazakhstan.

The area covered in this Review embraces the five S.S.R. of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. According to Soviet classification "Central Asia" (Srednyaya Aziya) comprises only the first four of these, Kazakhstan being regarded as a separate area.

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.

PRICE : SEVEN SHILLINGS & SIXPENCE

Vol. VI. No. 2.
1958

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W.3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of current developments in the five Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as these are reflected in Soviet publications, together with the historical background necessary in order to make such a picture intelligible.

In addition, the REVIEW analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to Soviet Central Asia.

The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus sixpence postage.

Distribution Agents:

Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,
46 Great Russell Street,
LONDON W.C.1.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

CONTENTS

	Page
Both Sides of the Medal	121
History	
Turkmenistan, 1868-1917	125
Russian Military and Civilian Settlements, 1824-1917	143
Political and Cultural Affairs	
Preparations for the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists - Leningrad 1960	152
A New Historical - Ethnographic Atlas of Central Asia and Kazakhstan	156
Economics	
Budgets, 1956-58	159
Industry	
Building Materials Industry	171
Developments in the Oil Industry of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 1956-57	180
Book Reviews	
The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russia and Central Asia. By Thomas G. Winner	190
Democratic Institutions in the World To-day. Ed. Werner Burmeister	192
News Digest	
Administrative and Territorial Changes	193
Agriculture	194
Fuel and Power	195
Industry	197
Irrigation	199
Natural Conditions	201
Political and Cultural Affairs	201
Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia	
Relations between Britain, Russia and Afghanistan, 1872-80	205
Recent Soviet Publications on Afghanistan	229
News Diary : Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Persia	238

Vol. VI, No. 2.

1958

Maps

Tsarist Central Asia	facing page 144
The Fergana Valley	,, ,, 184
Russian Advance in Central Asia	,, ,, 206
The Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan	at end

Cartoon

A kolkhoz agrotechnical study group ..... at work	facing page 194

Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SV	Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

Corrigendum

Vol. VI, No. 1, p. 109, line 3 : for "1,433,000 tons" read "433,000 tons".

BOTH SIDES OF THE MEDAL

Recently two important studies on the present situation in Soviet Central Asia have been published, one in the United Nations ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR EUROPE(1), and the other by Klaus Mehnert, the editor of OSTEUROPA(2). Both these studies are based on information obtained from Soviet writing supplemented by short visits to the area; both represent serious attempts to arrive at the truth: both are convincing in the evidence and arguments which they present. Yet they produce entirely different impressions on the impartial reader. The scope of the studies is admittedly different: the first deals almost entirely with economics, while the second is mainly concerned with political and cultural considerations. But the conclusion to be derived from the first is that not only has Soviet Central Asia made considerable material progress since the Revolution and more particularly since 1950 but, to quote from the study itself "the revolution in cultural patterns already carried out in Central Asia. . . contributes to make the long term economic prospects in the region favourable in spite of the difficulties which are bound to arise when the arrival of the large post war generations on the labour market necessitates heavy outlays in directly productive investment". Some indication of the impression created by this study can be found in the abridged version of it published in FAR EAST TRADE, Vol.XIII, No.3 (March 1958), under the title of "The Challenge of Central Asia". This brushes aside certain qualifications included in the E.B.E. study and presents a picture of a flourishing economy of a kind which to the ordinary reader would suggest political stability and a standard of living and education very high by comparison with those of neighbouring countries.

The picture presented by the other article of political and cultural conditions prevailing in the area is of an entirely different kind: the political control of the region is in the hands of the Central Government; its economy is entirely subordinated to the needs of the Union as a whole; there is strong resentment by the local population of the russification being carried out by means of settlement and cultural regimentation; and so farfrom

---

(1) ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR EUROPE, Vol.IX, No.3 (Geneva, 1957). "Regional Policy in the Soviet Union: The Case of Central Asia."

(2) SCHRIFTENREIHE OSTEUROPA: RUSSLAND STUDIEN. Gedenkschrift für Otto Hoetzsch (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart). "Die Sowjetpolitik in Turkestan" by Klaus Mehnert.

stifling nationalist sentiment, the Soviet decision to split up the broadly homogeneous Turkestan into five separate republics has done much to encourage it.

The Editors of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW have always been conscious of the contradiction inherent in considerable material progress achieved in an area whose population must, in the nature of things, resent the methods by which such progress has been brought about. Their aim is to present to their readers both sides of the medal - the achievements of the Soviet Government in numerous fields of material activity, and the phenomenon of peoples being forced to adopt a way of life which runs counter to their own culture and civilization. The reasons why these two apparently incompatible phenomena can exist side by side are many and various and it is the aim of the Review - an aim not necessarily fulfilled - to keep these reasons constantly before the eyes of its readers.

As the Editors pointed out in the last issue, an obvious but unavoidable limitation of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW is to be found in the fact that its contents are based almost exclusively on one source of information, namely, Soviet publications. The Editors have been conscious of this limitation from the beginning and in an early issue (Vol.II, No.1, 1954) they thought it advisable to explain in some detail the nature of the source material from which the contents of the Review were made up. Broadly speaking the conclusions reached in that article about the qualities and defects of Soviet source material remain valid today; but there are certain changes, as well as certain unfulfilled hopes, to which it may be helpful to draw attention.

The main change in source material is that of quantity: the amount of literature on Central Asia now available is far greater than it was four years ago. Although the number of newspapers and periodicals has not greatly increased, they can now be much more regularly and quickly obtained. In 1954 it was not possible to obtain the many interesting studies published by the Central Asian Universities and Academies of Sciences; the 2nd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia had only reached the letter L; the 1954 edition of the Great Atlas and its accompanying gazetteer had not appeared; and the very few books published on Central Asian subjects were often impossible to obtain in this country. Most of the academic publications are now available, the Atlas and even the long-postponed volume 40 of the Encyclopaedia have now been published; and the number of books is steadily increasing. There is even a welcome tendency to publish new editions of valuable books which have become out of date, an example being Murzayev's SREDNYAYA AZIYA (Central Asia), a new and revised edition of which was brought out last year.

In our 1954 article it was stated that "generally speaking books published in Central Asia at present constitute a less valuable source of

material than those published in Moscow, although with the advance of education this situation may change". The situation most certainly has changed, but although there has probably been some advance in education, this does not seem to be the cause. The Institute of Oriental Studies in the Moscow Academy of Sciences nowadays concerns itself relatively little with the affairs of the eastern republics of the Soviet Union. Indeed, at the Conference of Soviet orientalists held in Tashkent in June 1957, Mukhitdinov, the then First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, made it clear that in spite of what Gafurov had said previously, studies relating to the eastern republics should not be regarded as oriental studies but as integrated in the study of Soviet history, economics and culture. By far the most valuable topographical works on Central Asia are nowadays printed in the republics themselves. They include a number of excellent economic geographies with informative, although often very badly printed, sketch-maps and illustrations. There is also a large number of books of less permanent value on administration and economic subjects, the purpose of most of which appears to be propaganda.

Our earlier article naturally did not refer to source material on the Borderlands of Central Asia as this series had not then been even contemplated. The amount of new material on these areas has only quite recently started to increase. The preponderance of Soviet literature on Persia and Afghanistan is nowadays to be found in Central Asian academic and other periodicals, while that on the Middle East, on Western China and on the Indian subcontinent emanates principally from Moscow. Another point which emerged from the Tashkent Conference of June 1957 was that henceforward the eastern republics were to concern themselves far more than in the past with the so-called "colonial and semi-colonial east" and it may therefore be expected that the Arab countries too will begin to feature in Central Asian publications. It is not yet known whether the new Oriental Institute founded in Tashkent in September 1957 and that recently reported as having been set up in Baku in March 1958, are going to produce journals, but it seems likely that they will do so. The latter institute seems to be specially concerned with Arabic studies.

In 1954 CAR recorded the opinion that much of the available material on Central Asia was unequal in quality and seemed to lack objectivity. It expressed the hope that conditions in this respect might improve. It is much to be regretted that no such improvement seems in fact to have taken place. The Soviet understanding of the word 'objective' remains entirely different from the Western. 'Objective' in the sense in which it is used in the inside cover of CAR is, of course, not the Communist sense but the accepted English and Western sense of that which is "actual, practical, uncoloured by one's own sensations or emotions". In order to arrive at results which can satisfy this exacting definition, a large part of Soviet material, and

particularly historical material, has to be subjected to a process of sifting and refining which often leaves nothing but dross. Moreover, there are many subjects a knowledge of which is essential to the creation of a coherent description of human activities in Central Asia, but which are never treated in Soviet publications at all.

Time and time again the staff of the Review have tried to construct from Soviet publications a credible picture of the byt, the way of life, of both rural and urban indigenous communities in Central Asia with their social traditions and civilization stretching far back into history, only to be confronted by stereotyped and unlikely portraits of model Soviet men and women despising the simple faith and doughty deeds of their forefathers and glorying in socialism and materialism. The impression which the Soviet press and literature steadily try to convey is that the peoples of Central Asia are as a whole well contented with their lot, are delighted that their ancient homelands should be overrun with more and more non-Asians and have no desire for that genuine self-determination and nationalism which the Soviet Government has recently begun to champion and to advocate for the Arab countries of the Middle East. Only a few reactionary intellectuals are occasionally exposed and held up to ridicule for objecting to the russification of their languages and culture and for wondering whether Lenin's precepts about the status of nationalities were being faithfully observed.

The position regarding literature on the borderlands is no more reassuring. During the past few years a number of so-called historical studies have appeared in the Central Asian republics which have been concerned with the pre-Revolutionary history and that familiar topic "British colonialism in Afghanistan and Persia". By comparison with some of these the earlier writings of such established scholars as Reysner are seen to be seriously lacking in appreciation of British iniquity. A good example of this will be found in the latest treatment of the Panjdeh incident of 1885 which is dealt with elsewhere in this issue. The explanation of this increased violence in dealing with Anglo-Russian relations in the Tsarist period is of course to be found in the newly felt need to provide additional reasons for the great love which the peoples of Central Asia are supposed to have cherished for the Russians ever since they were first conquered and colonized by them.

It should not be assumed from the foregoing that there is not still a large amount of factual information to be derived from Soviet publications. This is particularly true of newspapers, periodicals and books which are published and presumably circulate locally. While, however, it is possible by exercising due discrimination to produce reliable accounts of the material developments which are reported, readers of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW should bear in mind that there is a whole range of intangible subjects which cannot be treated because they are not treated in Soviet publications or only in a way which does not command any degree of credibility.

HISTORY

TURKMENISTAN 1868-1917

KRATKIY OCHERK ISTORII TURKMENISTANA (1868-1917)
By A. Karryyev and A. Roslyakov, Ashkhabad, 1956

For the student of Central Asian history the appearance of a history of the people now occupying the republic of Turkmenistan, however restricted in scope and period, is something of an event. The scope of the present work is defined by the authors as stretching from "the beginning of the Union of Turkmen lands with Russia to the great October Socialist Revolution." "In order", they continue, "to acquaint the reader with the processes which led up to the union of Turkmenistan with Russia", the first chapter contains a brief account of Russo-Turkmen relations from the earliest times.

Since 1945 the task of the Soviet Central Asian historian has grown much more difficult. Previously, while admitting some advantages for the Russian conquest of Central Asia, he was able to dwell on the achievements of early Central Asian heroes and at the same time expatiate at length on the iniquities of Tsarist civil and military administration. Now, however, much good has to be found in the Tsarist administration, and the tribal heroes have become feudal and reactionary to a man. At the same time, the earlier notion that all was misery and stagnation in Central Asia before the coming of the Russians has also been abandoned and considerable account has now to be taken of the flourishing trade which existed between the Khanates and Muscovy. Since the present history pays careful attention to all these requirements, it is not surprising that the result is, for Western historians, somewhat sterile and in some respects even suspect. The unequal nature of the work is particularly evident in its documentation. Thus, while the broad chronology and particularly that of the military operations, is generally supported by Tsarist records and histories, the descriptions of the various occasions on which the Turkmens asked for their country to be incorporated in the Russian Empire are seldom supported by any kind of reference, except to obscure archives which, to say the least of it, are difficult of access to Western historians.

As in the case of recent histories of other republics, great emphasis is placed on the security, the increased material prosperity and ultimate political advantages which the Turkmen gained from subjugation to Russia. The

"greater evil" which would have resulted from the conquest of Central Asia by Britain is abundantly stressed, and Tsarist military operations are excused on the ground that they were necessary to keep Britain out. The fact that if Britain had annexed Turkmenistan, it would now be as free and independent as India, Pakistan and many other former British possessions is naturally not mentioned.

The need to excuse Tsarist Russia, to denigrate Britain, and above all to extol the Soviet régime naturally results in some startling versions of historical events both before and after the Revolution. Some of the former such as the Pende (or more properly Panjdeh) incident are easy to disprove from collateral sources. Others, such as the emergence of advanced left-wing political groups among the Turkmens just before the Revolution, are less easy to counter although they place a heavy strain on the credulity of the reader. The same must be said for other features of the history, such as the accounts of agrarian conditions prevailing before the Revolution and of the activities of the Jadid movement just after. An interesting and in many respects more convincing account of many features of Tsarist rule over the Turkmens is to be found in Lord Curzon's RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.

The following summary of this history of Turkmenistan is mainly concerned with the broad historical outline. It omits, as far as possible, the political views expressed by the authors.

. . .

I. Early Relations with the Russians - II. 1886-1904 - III. 1905-1907 - IV. 1907-1917.

I. Early Relations with the Russians

The first chapter traces the history of Russian-Turkmen relations and points out that connections between the two peoples have existed from ancient times. Until the nineteenth century trade provided the main connection between the Russians and the peoples of Central Asia. Commercial links were not even broken by the invasion of Chenghiz-khan and the domination of the Mongols in Russia and Central Asia, and were further strengthened in the middle of the sixteenth century by Russia's annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan'. The ancient caravan routes across Turkmenistan to Mangyshlak also made diplomatic relations between Russia, Khiva, Bukhara and the Balkh possible. With the increasing sea trade of Europe with India and China and the consequent abandoning of the

ancient trade routes across Central Asia and Persia, trade with the state of Muscovy grew in importance for the peoples of Central Asia, and in particular for the Turkmens who viewed trade with Russia very favourably. As a result of this, economic, political and cultural relations between the Turkmens and the Russians continued to develop and produced among the Turkmens a movement in favour of union with Russia. One of the first manifestations of this movement was the acceptance by a considerable part of the Mangyshlak Turkmens of Russian subjection in the last quarter of the seventeenth century; and yet others inhabiting the shores of the Caspian accepted Russian domination at the beginning of the eighteenth century. During the reign of Peter the Great numerous expeditions were sent out to study Central Asia and in particular the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. These expeditions were continued after Peter's death and towards the middle of the nineteenth century grew more and more frequent. Trade between Russia and Central Asia continued to increase and Turkmen tribes were constantly asking to be accepted as Russian subjects. After the Russo-Persian war of 1804-13 it was decided to construct naval bases not only on the northern and western shores of the Caspian but also on the eastern, Turkmen, shore. In 1840 a permanent naval patrol of the Persian and Turkmen shores was instituted and soon after this a Russian naval base on the island of Ashur-Ada was built.

The second chapter, which is entitled "The Union of Turkmenistan with the Russian Empire", begins the main burden of the History. Expansion of Tsarist Russia in Central Asia progressed particularly rapidly in the sixties of the nineteenth century. This for a number of reasons. First, the abolition of serfdom gave rise to rapid capitalist development, and the Russian government began to look on Central Asia as a new market. Secondly, owing to the civil war in America imports of American cotton had to be drastically reduced and Central Asia began to be regarded as a useful source of this raw material. Thirdly the newly acquired territory would provide land for the peasants who had been freed but for whom there was not enough land at home; finally, the Tsarist government feared that if Russia did not annex Central Asia, Britain would. The union of Turkmenistan was begun with the establishment of a Russian protectorate over the khanates of Khiva and Kokand and the emirate of Bukhara, for within the confines of the last two there lived a considerable number of Turkmens. While consolidating their position in the Central Asian khanates the Russian forces moved deeper into Turkmenistan from the shores of the Caspian, and in 1869 the town of Krasnovodsk was founded which was to provide a base for the further penetration of Russian forces into the country. Between 1869 and 1872 detachments reconnoitred the territory as far as Kyzyl-Arvat, Balkhan, the Sarykamysh valley, Bami and the river Atrek; and in 1874 the "Administration of the Transcaspian Military Otdel" (administrative division) was established with its centre in Krasnovodsk. At first the Turkmen tribes of the Caspian

shores were cooperative and friendly towards the Russians; their attitude changed, however, when the army began to seize their property - camels and other livestock - and some of them started to resist the Russian forces. The Akhal-Tekkes, too, at first showed themselves well-disposed towards the Russians, and the Russian command aimed at maintaining friendly relations with them. In 1875 a deputation of Tekkes presented a petition to be accepted as Russian subjects, hoping thereby to gain some protection against the marauding Persians and other raiders from Khiva and Bukhara. The Russians, however, rejected this opportunity of peacefully annexing the Akhal-Tekkes, for they refused to give any definite reply to the deputation, and the Tekkes took this as a refusal to accept them as subjects. As a result anti-Russian feeling increased considerably among both the aristocracy and the people. The more reactionary section of the aristocracy began to fear that the Russians would curb their power and reduce their wealth; the Muslim clergy, too, were in favour of resisting the infidels; and many of the ordinary people who had already suffered from Russian levies and requisitionings started to look upon them as new invaders. It was decided not to let the Russians into the Akhal oasis after all, and in order to resist attack the fortress of Geok-Tepe was built.

Military action on the part of the Tsarist army against the Tekkes began with small clashes between 1877 and 1878 in western Turkmenistan and in the region of Kyzyl-Arvat. The first attempt to storm the fortress of Geok-Tepe failed and the Russians lost more than 450 men killed and wounded. It was reported that the Tekkes showed an incredible resistance fully worthy of the best European armies. The blow of defeat was all the greater to the Russians since it came at a critical moment in the struggle between Russia and Britain for domination in Central Asia. It became increasingly important that Russia should gain possession of the Akhal oasis and the Russian Minister of War, Milyutin, declared: "Unless we occupy this position the Caucasus and Turkestan will always be divided from one another, for the space between them is even now the scene of British intrigues and in the future may provide a channel through which British influence will reach to the shores of the Caspian Sea". With this in mind it was decided to make another attack on Geok-Tepe under the command of the famous General Skobelev. In the May of 1880 detachments were sent to reconnoitre the territory round the Akhal oasis and to establish bases and provide stores of provisions, and the settlements of Khodzha-Kala, Karry-Kala and Bami were occupied. At this time there was not complete unanimity in the Tekke camp. Most of the population, headed by the khan of Akhal and Merv and his son were in favour of continuing armed resistance to the Russians. A part of the population, however, attempted to migrate to the Murgab oasis, the lower reaches of the Tedzhen, or the desert. They were forcibly brought back to Geok-Tepe and their property was confiscated. The siege of Geok-Tepe began on the 23rd December 1880 and lasted about three weeks. On the 12th of January 1881 a mine was exploded under the

walls after which the Russians stormed the fortress, and in spite of heroic fighting on the part of the Tekkes overcame them. Soon after the fall of Geok-Tepe the Russian forces occupied the aul of Ashkhabad.

In Merv, at this period, British intelligence agents were stirring up the population against the Russians. Besides this, a group of British officers were sent to Serakhs to get supplies of arms, ammunition and gunpowder for the citizens of Merv and also to construct fortifications there. Anti-Russian feeling was increased by the presence in Merv of the leaders of the Geok-Tepe resistance. The provocation did not produce the desired results, however. For according to a Russian soldier by the name of Kidyayev who was prisoner there, Russian influence was constantly growing among the Merv Tekkes and there was a generally felt desire for voluntary union with Russia. So great was this desire that under pressure from the popular masses the influential Merv feudal lords were obliged to ask the Russian authorities if their tribes might become Russian subjects. This offer was accepted and an agreement was drawn up according to which the Turkmens undertook never under any pretext to raise arms against the Russians and in everything obey the orders of the Russian leaders; they also undertook not to receive the agents of other governments, to stop the slave trade, and to cease raiding and robbing caravans to Merv and other places and the inhabitants of neighbouring countries. As a result of the voluntary acceptance of subjection on the part of the inhabitants of the Merv oasis Russia annexed the fertile and populous territory of south-eastern Turkmenistan without any military operations.

The British government was extremely alarmed at the Russian annexation of Merv and did its utmost to prevent Russian forces from moving further into the Pende oasis and Serakhs. In 1884 a British agent known as Siyah-Push attempted to set the inhabitants of Merv and Iolatan' against the Russians. He managed to attract an eminent Merv khan to his side - Kadzhar-khan - and incited him to seize power and start a war against the Russians. The attempt however failed owing to the pro-Russian attitude of the population, and a similar attempt in Iolotan' also failed. In 1884 the Saryks of the Iolotan' oasis also voluntarily accepted Russian domination and soon after the Pende (Panjdeh) oasis was annexed. In order to prevent the Russians from moving still further to the south the British incited the Afghan emir to occupy the valley of the Kush. An army consisting of British and Afghan troops seized territory in the region of the Kush and Pende intending to continue operations in the direction of Tash-Kepri. In 1885 a detachment under the command of Colonel Alikhanov set off to occupy Tash-Kepri and forestall the British. At this juncture the British General sent a letter to Alikhanov to the effect that diplomatic relations with Russia would be broken off if he attempted to capture Tash-Kepri. No notice was taken of this and on the 18th of March 1885 a battle took place between the Russian and Anglo-Afghan

armies in which the latter was beaten. With this the union of Turkmenistan with Russia was completed and in 1887 the final boundary between Afghanistan and the Transcaspian oblast, which exists to this day, was established.

/This account of the Panjdeh incident differs markedly from British official accounts, and even from previous Soviet accounts. The bare facts are that by agreement between the British and Russian governments a joint Anglo-Russian Commission was to have met on the spot to arrange a mutually agreeable frontier line. The British Commission under Sir Peter Lumsden was dispatched in the autumn of 1884 but the Russians postponed the arrival of their Commissioner until the following spring. In November the Russians pushed forward to Pul-i-Khatun within 12 miles of the Afghan outposts at Aq-Tepe in Pandjeh. After some exchange of insulting messages between the Russian and Afghan commanders, the Russians attacked and defeated the Afghan forces holding Panjdeh. The Russians then occupied the Panjdeh oasis. Enquiries showed that although the Russians had advanced almost to within range of the Afghan base, the Afghans had moved the bulk of their forces across the river to meet them. There was in fact provocation on both sides.

Although the authors speak of the "Anglo-Afghan Army" as an army consisting of British and Afghan troops, there were in fact no British troops present. The description of the incident contained in the Soviet Encyclopaedia, 2nd Edition, 1950, speaks only of "a conflict between Afghan and Russian forces". NOVAYA ISTORIYA STRAN ZARUBEZHNOGO VOSTOKA (Vol.II, 1952), says that "in the struggle at Tashkepri (1885) the Afghan Army was defeated by Gen. Komorov. The British agents provocateurs took no part in the battle and were the first to flee". - Ed. CAR./

II. 1886-1904

As Turkmen territory was incorporated into Russia new administrative units had to be created. Until 1880 there existed the Mangyshlak and Krasnovodsk pristavstvos (counties) which were then united in the Transcaspian otdel (administrative division) which in its turn was subject to the Caucasian military okrug (circuit). After the incorporation of the populous Akhal-Tekke oasis in 1881 the Transcaspian oblast was formed which consisted of three uyezds (districts) - the Mangyshlak, the Krasnovodsk and the Akhal-Tekke. In 1884 the Merv uyezd was included in the Transcaspian oblast; and to this uyezd in the same year were added the pristavstvos of Iolotan' and Serakhs. At the same time the Tedzhen okrug was created. In 1885 the Pende

pristavstvo was joined to the Merv uyezd and in the following year the territory of the Atek Turkmens, which had been incorporated with Russia, became the Atek pristavstvo and was included in the Akhal-Tekke uyezd. In 1890 the Transcaspian oblast ceased to be subordinate to the Caucasian military circuit and was included in Turkestan. By this time the oblast had been divided into five uyezds: Mangyshlak, Krasnovodsk, Ashkhabad, Tedzhen and Merv. The Krasnovodsk uyezd contained two pristavstvos - Chikishlyar and Karakala - and a region outside the pristavstvos directly subordinate to the head (nachal'nik) of the uyezd. The Ashkhabad uyezd also contained two pristavstvos - the Durun and Atek - and a region outside the pristavstvos later known as the Eastern Region. The Merv uyezd had two rayons (regions) - Otamysh and Tokhtamysh, which included the territory in the lower reaches of the Murgab populated mostly by Tekkes, and three pristavstvos - Iolotan', Pende and Serakhs. The Tedzhen uyezd at first encompassed only the territory in the lower reaches of the Tedzhen, populated by Tekkes, but in the nineties two pristavstvos were included - the Atek from the Ashkhabad uyezd and Serakhs from the Merv uyezd, and the former territory of the uyezd became the Tedzhen rayon outside the pristavstvos. This administrative division was preserved until the Revolution.

Seventy-five per cent of the population of the Transcaspian oblast consisted of Turkmens (256,000); then came the Kazakhs who mainly inhabited the Mangyshlak uyezd and part of the north of the Krasnovodsk uyezd; these consisted of over 57,000 people (17 per cent of the population of the oblast). The rest of the population consisted of Russians, Persians, Armenians, Azerbaydzhanis etc., who lived for the most part in the towns or railway settlements. After the union the population rapidly increased owing to immigration.

Russian administration was entirely in military hands in the Transcaspian oblast, and even the most elementary forms of self-government by the natives were ruled out. The aristocracy, however, was given a limited part in the administration. The head of the oblast was at the same time commander of the troops on his territory, and the heads of uyezds and pristavstvos were also army officers. Turkmens were hardly ever appointed as heads of uyezds or even of pristavstvos; but there were a number of Turkmens among the helpers of the pristavs (heads of the pristavstvos), and the lowest aul administration - starshinas (elders), yasauls (policemen), emins (tax-gatherers), mirzas (secretaries to the elders) and others - consisted entirely of Turkmens (and Kazakhs on the Mangyshlak peninsula) who were supposedly chosen by the people and then confirmed by the head of the uyezd and the oblast. In fact the aul elders were chosen by the heads of the uyezds and the pristavs, and then chose themselves helpers from amongst their friends and relatives.

The highest judicial power in the oblast - the Ashkhabad court - and the military courts were entirely under Russian control. In the auls the local

system of law was preserved which was based on the Shariat and on adat (Muslim law and customary law) and over which presided the local aul administration and the aristocracy.

In 1880 the construction of the Transcaspian railway, which was to be of such strategic value to the Russians, was begun. Construction progressed most rapidly between 1885 and 1886 when the railway was taken across the eastern Kara-Kum and a temporary bridge was built over the Amu-Dar'ya. Work was directed by military engineers, and a number of Turkmens were employed. With the gradual annexation of Turkmenistan, Russian settlements made their appearance, at first in the new ports on the Caspian Sea, and then inland at railway stations, uyezd centres and military fortifications. For example Kizyl-Arvat grew up as a railway station with important railway workshops in 1881, Ashkhabad began to develop in 1882 and Merv and Tedzhen in 1884 and 1886. These settlements mostly contained a population of soldiers and railway workers and until the nineties could not be called towns in the proper sense of the word.

After the liberation of the serfs in 1861 capitalism developed rapidly in Russia, drawing into its orbit border regions such as Central Asia. In Turkmenistan this process was greatly facilitated by the Transcaspian railway, and the initiation of steam navigation on the Amu-Dar'ya. Via the port of Krasnovodsk and the railway a stream of Russian goods flowed into Central Asia, in exchange for which the Transcaspian oblast sent agricultural products, fish, and mineral oil. "Krasnovodsk soon became one of the most important ports of the Middle East" [this claim would be hard to sustain even today. - Ed. CAR]. The rapid development of trade relations between Central Asia and Russia led to the construction of a network of roads and the improvement of the old caravan routes which linked the furthest regions of Turkmenistan with the railway and the ports on the Caspian. In spite of the attempts of the Tsarist government to keep Central Asia as a source of raw materials and hinder further economic development, industry started, on a small scale, to grow. The most important industrial enterprises at this period in Turkmenistan were the railway workshops and depots in Kizyl-Arvat, Krasnovodsk, Kazandzhik, Ashkhabad and Merv, and a depot and ship-repairing workshop in Chardzhuy. As well, a number of small factories were concerned with the processing of agricultural products, and there were comparatively important factories in Bayram-Ali equipped with the most up-to-date machinery of the time; other factories tended to be extremely primitive and the number of workers fluctuated from 10 to 30 people who worked from two to four months a year. The numerous factories connected with the food and building-material industries were even smaller.

As far as concerns the native population of the oblast after their subjection to Russia, they remained as before divided under various khanates and

states. Only half of the Turkmens who had accepted Russian domination lived in the Transcaspian oblast; of the rest about 140,000 were subject to the khan of Khiva, and about 120,000 were under the emir of Bukhara. The Turkmens of the middle reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya were subject to Bukharan officials, and their aristocracy, far from attempting to free themselves, allied itself with the Bukharan leaders. On the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya in the region of Khalach, Pal'vart and Karabekaul, the situation was a little different and the Turkmen aristocracy preserved a certain degree of independence. As Bukhara was drawn into the Russian capitalist system the economy began to change and develop; for example, after the construction of the Transcaspian railway a Russian town known as Novyy Chardzhuy (now Chardzhou) sprang up not far from the old Chardzhuy. And when steam navigation started on the Amu-Dar'ya in 1877 Novyy Chardzhuy and Kerki became important ports. As well as this, Kerki became an important centre for trade with Afghanistan. But on the whole social and economic development among the Turkmens of the middle reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya was slower than in the Transcaspian oblast. And development was slowest of all among the Turkmens who were subject to the khanate of Khiva. This was due to the remoteness of the regions inhabited by Turkmens from the main road and waterways, and to the fact that no effort was made to interfere with the traditional economic and social life of the tribes.

With the growth of trade and industry in the oblast the immigrant urban population increased. For example the number of immigrants in 1882 amounted to 2,003; by 1890 this figure had risen to 16,351[1] and the number continued to increase, for as time went on the population of towns and villages, which had hitherto consisted of soldiers and railway workers, was augmented by the addition of merchants, craftsmen and labourers. Towards the beginning of 1905 Ashkhabad had 36,814 inhabitants, Merv 7,111, Kizyl-Arvat 4,733 and Bayram-Ali 3,433. Apart from the Russians, the town workers consisted of Persians, Azerbaydzhanis, Georgians, Armenians, Dagestanis etc. Russian immigrants did not only come to the towns but settled in the country on land which had in many cases been taken away from the native population. Between 1888 and 1893, mainly in the frontier regions of Turkmenistan, 11 immigrant villages grew up; later between 1894 and 1898 eight villages were founded in the Ashkhabad uyezd. The oblast, however, did not receive so many immigrants as other parts of Turkestan.

As the towns grew so did the demand for food, which gave a stimulus to

---

(1) The Tsarist encyclopaedia published in St.Petersburg in 1902 gives the number of immigrants for 1891 as 21,787; the lapse of a year would hardly account for the discrepancy in the figures.

agriculture, fruit-growing etc. The greatest strides, however, were made in cotton cultivation which became a particularly important crop after annexation of Turkmenistan owing to the ever-increasing demands of Russia's textile factories. Until the union of Turkmenistan with Russia only small crops of cotton had been sown with which to satisfy local needs. From 1890 to 1904 the area under cotton increased from 900 to 31,340 desyatins and the amount of cotton gathered increased from 60,000 to 897,010 puds(1). Although the implements of agriculture remained technically very primitive, efforts were made after the annexation to introduce more productive varieties of wheat and cotton, and the irrigated area was increased, especially in the Murgab oasis. While Russian influence stimulated agriculture and industry it caused the number of craftsmen in the traditional skills to diminish and produced a deleterious effect on the mining industry. For example the Iolotan' Saryks /a Turkmen tribe - Ed. CAR/ started to trade raw wool to the merchants instead of the traditional koshmas and woven, woollen goods. The art of weapon-making almost died out, and only a few crafts such as carpet-making were able to adapt themselves to the new markets and continued to develop.

The History continues with an account of the formation of so-called bourgeois and proletariat classes in Turkmenistan together with a description of the system of land tenure current after the union.

The old system of holding the land in common persisted until the beginning of the twentieth century; and to a certain extent it ensured that the peasants were not deprived of their land since according to the laws neither water nor land could be bought or sold. But after the union in the southern regions of Turkmenistan this system was gradually replaced by the mulk system whereby land represented private property and could, with certain limitations, be sold and inherited. Most of the peasants were obliged to hire the irrigated land from the bays and in return gave up half to three-quarters of their harvest. A large area of uncultivated land was appropriated by the Russian government and rented out; but much of this land was not in fact uncultivated but was merely lying fallow, so that the peasant had to pay the state one-tenth of his harvest for the use of land which he had already been farming. Impoverished peasants, whose numbers increased considerably after the annexation, hired themselves out to wealthy neighbours or took work in the towns or on the railway. For this reason, and also owing to the development of cotton-growing and commerical agriculture, the system of taking seasonal work in towns became gradually more common 15 to 20 years after the union, although before it had been almost unknown in Turkmenistan. The system of

---

(1) 1 desyatin = 1.1 ha.
1 pud = 16 kgm.

hiring labour in many parts of Turkmenistan, however, remained very closely connected with old clan customs and was often to be found under the guise of "giving aid to a kinsman"; and the custom of paying for the use of a well, or the bride-price of a wife by giving labour instead of money persisted for a long time.

In 1882 the first Russian school was opened at Kizyl-Arvat and by 1904 the Transcaspian oblast boasted two high schools - one for boys and one for girls - with 830 pupils, a technical school for railway workers, a school of market-gardening and 41 elementary schools of various types. There were no Turkmen pupils in the high schools but amongst the 2,189 pupils of elementary schools there were 162 Turkmens and 31 Kazakhs. In the main towns various other social amenities such as public libraries, clubs and hospitals were founded.

The revolutionary movement which started in Russia in 1901 and resulted in strikes and demonstrations produced repercussions in Turkmenistan. In November 1900, July 1902, December 1903 and December 1904 there were strikes and disturbances among the dockers, railway workers, and factory workers: /the majority of these were Russians - Ed. CAR/. And in 1903 and 1904 there were disturbances among the peasants and refusals to pay taxes. Marxist propaganda started to penetrate the Transcaspian oblast through social-democrats who had been sent there as administrators or in a military capacity, for politically unreliable recruits were often drafted to garrisons as remote from the centre of the country as possible. Various illegal leaflets and other publications were distributed in the main towns and factories and by 1903, after the second convention of the RSDRP, Marxist propaganda was gaining ground in Turkmenistan and had penetrated almost all the towns on the railway line. The most important disseminator of Marxism in Turkmenistan was the Baku Bolshevik Committee of the RSDRP, which had at its disposal experienced professional revolutionaries and illegal printing presses. The first illegal political groups were started in Turkmenistan between 1891 and 1902, but little is now known about them as they were short-lived. The first strong and capable social-democrat groups, which later became party organizations of the RSDRP, appeared in Turkmenistan between 1903 and 1904.

The chapter ends with the following summary of the situation in the oblast by the end of 1904: "In this way, Turkmenistan, like the whole of Central Asia after the union, began to be drawn into the system of Russian capitalism although at the same time remaining a backward agricultural country . . . Particularly backward were the Turkmen regions of Khiva and Bukhara where life continued in the same way as in the Middle Ages. The towns of the Transcaspian oblast were the centres of small-scale industries, and a characteristic feature of their population was the considerable semi-proletarian stratum. In the Turkmen and Kazakh auls pre-capitalist relations predominated

almost universally, the tribal social organization persisted and the communal ownership of water and land remained unaltered.

Commercial agriculture rapidly developed, particularly in connection with cotton-growing, but the transformation of the bays into a bourgeois class and the peasants into the proletariat was only beginning in the period 1886-1904. ."

III. 1905-1907

Although Turkmenistan was politically extremely backward and society was on the whole organized in the most primitive way, the revolutionary events in Russia between 1905 and 1907 aroused sympathy and emulation among the Turkmens. From February 1905 railway strikes began to take place. The first to make a move were the workers in the Kizyl-Arvat repair workshops who conducted two short strikes on the 5th and 7th of February for economic reasons. The strikes soon affected the whole railway and the authorities, frightened by the scale of the movement, were obliged to allow the workers to arrange meetings for the discussion of their needs and demands. Those of the workers who agreed with this plan tried to give the movement a purely economic significance and were content with sending petitions to the management about their condition. But those who were more politically aware, led by the social-democrats, continued the strikes on political as much as on economic grounds. Strikes continued in Kizyl-Arvat until the 28th of February, and were followed in May by disturbances among the non-proletarian section of the population - waiters, shop-assistants, bakers, etc., and among the peasants. In the first half of 1905 disturbances occurred in the Serakhs pristavstvo; the peasants rose against members of the aul administration, seized water by force and cut down trees on state land. In western Turkmenistan there were instances of refusal to pay taxes. But it was not easy, owing to language difficulties, for the Russian workers with revolutionary sympathies to establish relations with the peasantry. In the second half of 1905 the old RSDRP organizations in Turkmenistan were consolidated and new ones formed in the big towns and workers' settlements; this process was helped by the Baku committee of the RSDRP, which sent a contingent of party workers into Turkmenistan. According to the decisions of the third convention of the RSDRP arms were distributed to the workers and fighting squads were formed in Ashkhabad and Kizyl-Arvat, the people were called upon to prepare for an armed rising and the dissemination of propaganda among the soldiers was intensified. The Bolsheviks of Turkmenistan were able to unite workers of various nationalities in party organizations - Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians - and began to disseminate revolutionary propaganda among the Turkmen peasants.

The rest of the chapter is devoted to a detailed description of the strikes, disturbances and demonstrations which continued until 1907. The continued un-

rest during this period caused the Governor-General of Turkestan to report to St.Petersburg that "the Transcaspian oblast, particularly Ashkhabad, has gradually become an important, and undoubtedly, dangerous, centre of revolutionary activities". After the armed rising in Russia at the end of December 1905 the government took severe measures to curb the movement. In Turkmenistan mass searches and confiscations were carried out, trades unions were persecuted, newspapers suppressed etc. The movement, however, continued. At the beginning of 1906 revolutionary meetings, demonstrations and strikes were still being held; and by this time there were five RSDRP organizations in Turkmenistan and four illicit printing presses. But with the new wave of repressions on the part of the Tsarist government in 1907 the majority of the social-democrat organizations were suppressed, revolutionaries were exiled or imprisoned, and the movement was forced to abate its activities.

IV. 1907-1917

The last chapter of the History is divided into three sections, the first of which is entitled "Turkmenistan During the Period of the Stolypin Reaction". As a result of the Tsarist chauvinistic attitude towards the oppressed nations there arose a wave of local nationalism; at the same time the pan-Islam movement gained force. While formerly the most reactionary feudal-clerical groups upheld the pan-Islam movement, from 1907-8 pan-Islam ideas began to be propagated by the Jadids to whom the nascent local bourgeoisie looked for their ideology. In Turkmenistan the first pan-Islamists among the local population were Tatar nationalists who were particularly numerous in Krasnovodsk. Later in 1909 and 1910 pan-Islam groups were formed among the Persian and Azerbaydzhani merchants who tried to establish close connections with the Turkmen bays and the local clergy.

Among the Turkmen nationalist-pan-Islamists there were two main groups. One, consisting mostly of the old feudal aristocracy and the Sufi clergy, and connected mainly with nomadic and semi-nomadic animal husbandry, could not reconcile themselves to the new order of things and were in favour of separating Turkmenistan from Russia and giving allegiance to Afghanistan, Persia or Turkey, as a vassal khanate. The other half of the Turkmen bays, who were connected mainly with cotton-growing and who had been drawn into the Russian economic system, were discontented with the low position of the nascent Turkmen bourgeoisie by comparison with that of the Russian bourgeoisie; this faction toyed with the idea of allying the country to foreign powers but yet were reluctant to make a break with Russia and Russian capitalism. Most of the nascent Turkmen bourgeois intelligentsia - the Jadids - belonged to this group. Imitating the Tatar and Uzbek Jadids the Turkmen bourgeois nationalists began to found "new method schools" through which pan-Islam ideas were disseminated.

The years from 1908 to 1911 produced industrial development mostly in western Turkmenistan. On the Cheleken peninsula, oil production rose from 19.6 thousand to 217 thousand tons during these four years; and the number of workers employed increased from 285 in 1905 to 2,000 in 1911. At the same time there was a considerable rise in the production of salt, coal and building materials in western Turkmenistan, which became an important mining centre inhabited by the majority of the proletariat of the oblast. The fishing industry also developed rapidly in this region and became more and more concentrated in the hands of capitalist firms. In the rest of the oblast, however, little industrial development took place. What development there was, was limited to the construction of a few cotton ginneries in the Turkmen regions of Khiva and Bukhara and the building of mills in Tedzhen. On the other hand the stream of goods transported by the Transcaspian railway continued to grow.

Cotton-growing also continued steadily to increase, and while from 1907 the annual yield in the Transcaspian oblast was over one million puds, from 1910 it never fell below two million, more than half of this was grown in the Merv uyezd. But agricultural implements remained extremely primitive, and such up-to-date machinery as existed was usually owned by the Russian immigrant farmers.

In 1909 the Tsarist government decided to sell the communal land, which was tantamount to transferring the agricultural population to the system of private ownership, and which resulted in the concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy who could afford to buy it. The important Turkmen bays not only bought up the land, but obtained a monopoly of the state land which they rented from the government and then let to the peasants in return for three-quarters of their harvest. The use of hired labour, particularly seasonal, became more and more common, and during the cotton harvest a number of workers would come from Afghanistan and Persia.

Commercial agriculture and capitalist relations developed not only in the cotton-growing regions of the oblast; in the Ashkhabad uyezd considerable successes were achieved in market-gardening and viticulture; in the lower reaches of the Tedzhen the area under grain was extended and the grain exported to the cotton-growing regions of Central Asia, and flour-mills were constructed in Tedzhen itself. The economic development of Turkmenistan after the 1905-7 revolution resulted in the formation of new social classes in Turkmen society - the bourgeois and proletariat. It was mostly an agricultural bourgeois and an agricultural proletariat and in their mutual relationships there were many survivals of the patriarchal period, but their appearance marked the beginning of the transference to the capitalist stage of development. The growth of capitalism in the Turkmen auls, however, was not consistent in every region. In certain regions - the Merv and Ashkhabad

uyezds - and in connection with certain activities, cotton-growing and fishing, it came about more rapidly, in others it was much less noticeable. This was true too of the population concerned with livestock-breeding. In some places, for example the Merv uyezd, animal-husbandry was adapted to the new conditions and to commercial agriculture; in others (in the Mangyshlak and Krasnovodsk uyezds) the old nomadic habits and methods persisted and the population became increasingly impoverished. In the Turkmen regions of Khiva and Bukhara agriculture developed more slowly than elsewhere; nevertheless, cotton yields increased and, in the middle reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya, production of silk and Karakul wool rose. The most remarkable change between 1908 and 1911 was the development of trade and the use of money in the Turkmen regions of Khiva; during this period the first cotton-ginneries and cotton merchants made their appearance in the khanate. But these changes in its economy did little to alter the old social structure.

The peasants' discontent with the Russian colonizers (landlords and capitalists) increased after the first Russian revolution of 1905-7. This discontent sometimes resulted in open resistance to administrative measures.

In spite of the fact that the Transcaspian oblast did not receive many immigrants during the Stolypin reaction (between 1908 and 1910 eight new settlements grew up making a total of 5,316 immigrants), the peasants continued to suffer from the seizure of land and water by the Tsarist administration. For example, after 1905 a number of cotton plantations were created on the land round the middle reaches of the Murgab and bordering the Tedzhen between Tedzhen and Serakhs. The planters - Russians, Armenians and even foreign capitalists - established powerful pumps on the rivers and drew off the water to their plantations, so that the Turkmen auls situated in the lower reaches of the river suffered considerably. On the Tedzhen there were 10 plantations with an irrigated area of 3,500 desyatins. In theory planters were only allowed to take water during the flood period, but in fact it was drawn off as long as the fields had need of it.

The second section of the chapter is entitled "Turkmenistan During the New Rise of the Revolutionary Movement" and consists mostly of an account of the symptoms of the new upsurge of revolutionary feeling in the Transcaspian oblast between 1912 and 1914. One of the most important of these was the series of strikes on the Cheleken peninsula between 1913 and 1914 which were, it is claimed, led by the Cheleken bolshevik organization. There were no important peasant risings during this period but all was by no means quiet. Tsarist officials more than once reported that the peasants of the Tedzhen uyezd might stage a revolt, and there were a number of armed conflicts in the Turkmen regions of the khanate of Khiva. At the beginning of 1912 the khan's government, led by the chief minister Islam-Khodzha (Khojah), decided to increase taxation. This project greatly added to the discontent among the

peasants and also among the sc-called nukar or vassals, who were also to suffer under the new dispensation. Armed risings, led by the aristocracy took place against the khan. The Khivan army was unable to quell the disturbance unaided, but finally succeeded with the help of the Russian army and the leaders of the Turkmen peasants who betrayed the movement and came to an agreement with the khan's government.

The third and last section is headed "Turkmenistan During the Years of the First Imperialist World War: The Second Russian Revolution", and starts with a brief account of the economic hardships endured by the Turkmens as a result of the war. The suffering entailed gave rise to increased discontent and produced opposition among the natives both to the war and to the Tsarist regime. In 1915 and 1916 economic strikes took place in the main towns, but the development of the workers' movement in the Transcaspian oblast was impeded by the government's suppression of the bolshevik organizations. During the war years the Turkmen peasants showed considerably more opposition to the regime than before, which manifested itself in the open flouting of the authorities. At the same time the feudal and clerical aristocracy turned to Turkey for support. Turkish agents appeared in the oblast and mullas began to call for the expulsion of the Russians from the country, and to advocate preparations for a "holy war" and the collection of money for the sultan of Turkey. This pan-Islam propaganda had no success among the more advanced Turkmens; but in the more backward areas, mostly among the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, the pan-Islam leaders were able to raise armed revolts in support of their doctrines.

In Khiva certain Uzbek and Turkmen leaders, making use of the popular discontent to further their own ends, raised a new revolt against the khan in 1915; the rising was headed by a Yomut by the name of Dzhunaid-khan and by the chief of the Sufi clergy in northern Turkmenistan - Khan-Ishan. Dzhunaid-khan and his supporters did not openly put forward anti-Russian opinions, but they were nevertheless supported by Turkish agents. In 1916 he succeeded in capturing Khiva, but was soon forced to relinquish it by the advancing Russian soldiers, and finally fled to Afghanistan.

In the second half of 1916 Turkestan and other parts of Russia experienced a wave of opposition to the new edict which obliged the non-Russian peoples to provide workers for the construction of roads and fortifications at the rear of the Russian army. In the Transcaspian oblast active resistance was shown to this conscription. Agitators of the Ashkhabad uyezd went from aul to aul persuading the population not to give up any of their men; and those who were in favour of obeying the edict were threatened with death. In Serakhs the formation of a mounted force of men to fight the Tsarist armies was begun. By 1916 the movement was universal in the Transcaspian oblast. In spite of its lack of organization it was the first of its kind in the history of the Turk-

mens and revealed a considerable heightening of political awareness among the peasants. They were not however yet ripe for independent and organized action, and as in 1916 there were no bolshevik organizations left in the oblast and no adequate link between the town proletariat and the peasants, the lead was taken by the Turkmen bays who tried to quieten the insurgents. It would be better, they said, to send a petition to the Tsar asking for the conscription to be stopped. In the Merv, Ashkhabad, and most of the Tedzhen uyezds the bays succeeded and resistance was curbed; but the Turkmens did not escape from conscription. On the other hand, the History maintains, the most "reactionary circles of the Turkmen feudal lords, closely connected with the German and Turkish intelligence", attempted to help the attack of the Turkish army on the Caucasian front by organizing anti-Russian risings in Central Asia. These people, together with the Sufi Ishans succeeded in raising "anti-Russian feudal-nationalist" revolts with the aim of driving Russian, Armenian and other non-Muslims out of Turkmenistan. These insurrections were dealt with severely by the Tsarist government, and even tribes who had not taken part suffered punishment.

The news of the victory of the February revolution in Russia gave rise to mass meetings and demonstrations over the whole of the Transcaspian oblast; and in spite of the attempt of the provisional government to maintain the old Tsarist administration the soldiers and workers, supported by the peasants, managed to obtain the removal from office of the head of the oblast and a number of other officials. Even during the first days of the revolution links between the revolutionary workers and soldiers and peasants were formed. At the beginning of March soviets of workers' deputies, and soldiers' soviets and committees were created in the Turkmen towns, which later united to form soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies. In Turkmenistan, however, as in the rest of Russia, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries enjoyed a majority in the soviets. The Turkmen bourgeois nationalists, seeing that the peasants were starting to form ties with the Russian revolutionary proletariat, and that the aristocracy was losing its influence, created "Turkmen executive committees" which were closely connected with the Provisional Government and which enabled the aristocracy to regain some of its waning power.

The chapter ends with a short criticism of the Provisional Government but stops short of an account of the October revolution. A brief epilogue is added describing the economic and cultural progress of Turkmenistan since 1917.

The union or conquest of Turkmenistan (the History uses both expressions) is considered to have been, on the whole, a progressive step for the Turkmens. From their point of view such a union was desirable because the Russians brought comparative peace to the hitherto warring tribes. "One of the main

reasons why the Turkmens were attracted by union with Russia was the systematic ruin of the peasants by the feudal wars and raids. The struggle between the disunited Turkmen tribes against neighbouring feudal plunderers . . . rarely ended successfully. The continual feudal internecine wars forced the Turkmens persistently to seek Russia's protection. . ." Later this view is again put forward: "The Turkmen population of the Atrek and Murgab oasis, who were subjected to the cruel oppression, robbery and arbitrary rule of the Persian, Kurdish and Afghan feudal lords, preferred to link their fate with that of Russia. . ." It is interesting to note in passing that, according to a number of English(1) and Russian sources, the Turkmens were a rapacious tribe who periodically brought devastation into neighbouring countries and who fully provoked the return attacks.

Television expands in Central Asia

A television centre, the first in the republic has been opened in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan.

KP. 16th March 1958

A television mast has been put up in Katta-Kurgan and the town linked with the Tashkent television network.

PV. 5th March 1958

Misuse of industrial credits

The Kirgiz branch of the State Bank issued credits to industrial enterprises amounting to 7m. rubles in 1955, 21m. in 1956 and 13½m. during the first ten months of 1957. The money was to have been spent on new machinery, overhaul, and the extension of automation but many of the enterprises it seems have either misspent the funds or having obtained new equipment have not put it into service.

SK. 19th January 1958

---

(1) O'Donovan, THE MERV OASIS, London 1882. Marvin, THE RUSSIANS AT MERV AND HERAT, London 1883. F.H. Skrine and E.D. Ross, THE HEART OF ASIA, London 1889.

HISTORY

RUSSIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS, 1824 - 1917

A description of the origin, character and ultimate fate of Russian fortresses and other settlements between Orenburg and Tashkent from 1824 to 1917 has recently appeared in TRUDY SAGU, Istoricheskiye Nauki, 1957. The material for this subject, hitherto rarely touched on, has been drawn to a large extent from pre-Revolution sources, and for the descriptions of the aspects and interiors of the fortresses contemporary paintings and drawings have been made use of. The author, G.N. Chabrov, gives in chronological order an account of each of the fortresses and their origins and describes the settlements which grew up around them. He divides the article into three parts, each describing a separate period. The first deals with the fortifications constructed between 1824 and 1869 which were intended to defend the eastern frontiers of the Orenburg kray (district) and protect the nomad Kazakhs from the khanates of Khiva and Kokand; the second describes what became of these forts when they started to lose their military importance in the sixties owing to the gradual establishment of order in the steppe; and the third part remarks briefly on the effect which the completion of the Orenburg - Tashkent railway produced on them. The following summary contains some of the chief points made in this 8,000 word article.

First period: 1824-69

Between 1824 and 1869 more than fifteen fortresses were built in the Kazakh steppe; in addition, in the sixties a number of other Russian settlements sprang up either connected with already existing towns or side by side with the fortifications. The first period begins with the founding of the first outpost south of Orenburg Ak-Mogila (White Grave) in 1824 and ends in the sixties when the fortresses lost much of their former military importance and began to develop into ordinary towns and trading centres.

The most important Russian outposts on the eastern frontiers of the empire in the eighteenth century were the town of Orenburg and the fortress of Orsk.

In 1739, between the building of the Orsk fortress and Orenburg, the Orenburg fortified line was constructed; this consisted of a series of forts which were to prevent the nomads of the Lesser Horde, who inhabited the territory between the Ural and the Emba rivers, from invading the regions between the Volga and the Urals. At the beginning of the nineteenth century (1810-22) another small fortified line was built to the south of Orenburg with its centre in the town Iletsk, and two years after, in 1824, the outpost of Ak-Mogila was constructed to the south-east of Orenburg on an old caravan route leading from the Central Asian steppes into western Siberia. These fortifications fully protected Orenburg from possible attacks by the nomads from the south and south-east.

Soon after this it became necessary to construct new fortifications a long way south of Orenburg in order to ensure the safety of the rear of the forces sent to fight the khanate of Khiva. In 1839 the Emba fort was built at the confluence of the rivers Aty-Yashki and the Emba, and about 165 km. to the south-west of it another named Ak-Bulak. When, however, Perovskiy - the Governor of Orenburg - saw that the Khiva campaign had failed completely he decided to abandon both forts. No more new fortifications were built in the steppe either by the Siberian or the Orenburg vedomstvo (department) until 1845 when General Obruchev, Commander of the Independent Orenburg Corps, again raised the question. It was decided to build new fortified points near the winter and summer grazing grounds of the Kazakhs. However, the area intended for the new fortifications was extremely unfavourable for permanent settlement; the Ural-Emba plateau, bounded to the east by the Ural-Mugodzhar mountain range, was mostly desert, and settlements had to be established in the valleys of the few steppe rivers. The fortifications were therefore constructed on the banks of the rivers Irgiz and Turgay. On the right bank of the Irgiz the Ural'sk fort was built for which all the materials had to be brought from Orenburg. The fort rose up from a sandy hill amidst almost entirely barren steppe. The second fortified point, named Fort Orenburg (later to be renamed Irgiz), was built on the right bank of the river Turgay also on a hillock. Constant communication was maintained between the garrisons of the two forts and a certain amount of trade was conducted. Both forts were built mainly of sun-dried brick and were extremely unattractive to look at.

In 1847, not far from these two forts, yet another was built. This was Fort Kara-Butak situated on a confluent of the river Irgiz; it was small but particularly strongly fortified. On one of the corners of the high wall made of local stone was a high, round tower. Kara-Butak was important as an intermediary point linking the other two forts with the Orenburg line and with Kos-Aral - a very small fort on the shore of the Aral Sea built for the defence of the fishing company which had grown up there. In 1847 the foundations of a future Syr-Dar'ya fortified line were laid along the lower reaches of the Syr-Dar'ya. The locality was better than much of the steppe for the establishment

Tsarist Central Asia
International boundary.
Province boundary.
Uyezd boundary
135 0 135 270 405 540 km
Index to Uyezds.
1 Mangishlak
2 Krasnovodsk
3 Ashkhabad
4 Tedzhen
5 Merv
6 Kalta-Kurgan
7 Amu Dar'ya
8 Kazalinsk
9 Perovsk
10 Chimkent
11 Auliye-Ata
12 Dzhizak
13 Tashkent
14 Samarkand
15 Namangan
16 Skobelev
17 Osh
18 Andizhan
19 Pishpek
20 Przheval'sk
21 Vernyy
22 Kopal
23 Dzharkent
24 Lepsinsk
25 Zaysan
26 Ust'Kamenogorsk
27 Semipalatinsk
28 Pavlodar
29 Karkaralinsk
30 Akmolinsk
31 Atbasar
32 Omsk
33 Kokchetav
34 Petropavlovsk
35 Turgay
36 Kustanay
37 Irgiz
38 Aktyubinsk
39 Ural'sk
40 Lbishchensk
41 Gur'yev
42 Temir
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
AKMOLINSK
TOMSK
URALSK
TURGAY
SEMIPALATINSK
HUNGRY STEPPE
SEMIRECHENSK
SYR DAR'YA
AMU DAR'YA
KHIVA
SAMARKAND
FERGHANA
BUKHARA
PROVINCE
TRANSCASPIAN
KARA KUM
KYZYL KUM
SINKIANG
PERSIA
AFGHANISTAN
Petropavlovsk
Omsk
Kustanay
Kokchetavsk
Atbasarsk
Akmolinsk
Pavlodar
Orenburg
Orsk
Ural'sk
Aktyubinsk
Temirsk
Turgay
Irgiz
Gur'yev
Emba
Ural
Kazalinsk
Syr Dar'ya
Fort Perovsk
Fort Alexandrovsk
Kungrad
Turkestan
Auliye-Ata
Chimkent
Tashkent
Pishpek
Issyk-Kul'
Vernyy
Kopal
Dzharkent
Kulzha
Lepsinsk
Sergiopol
Zaysan
Ust'Kamenogorsk
Semipalatinsk
Karkaralinsk
Lake Balkhash
Khiva
Krasnovodsk
Kokand
Namangan
Andizhan
Margelan
Fort Naryn
Aksu
Kashgar
Katta-Kurgan
Dzhizak
Samarkand
Bukhara
Geok-Tepe
Ashkhabad
Merv
Tedzhen
Amu Dar'ya

J P - 1957

of settlements, although even here sand predominated and there were no forests whatever, so that all building materials had to be brought from Orenburg. The first fort was built in the area known as Raim and was itself called Fort Raim. Initial attempts to establish civilian settlements in these forts were made in 1849 when at the direction of Obruchev four soldiers' families moved into Fort Kara-Butak, thirteen into the Ural'sk fort, twenty-one into the Orenburg and twenty-five into the Raim. Life was hard for the settlers for it was almost impossible to cultivate any crops and most of the wheat used had to be brought from Russian territory.

In 1853 the fortress Ak-Mechet' was captured from Kokand and renamed Fort Perovsk. It became one of the most important fortifications of the Syr-Dar'ya line and united the following five fortified points: the Aral fortifications (the name given in 1851 to the Raim fort), Fort No.1 or Kazaly, Fort No.2 (Karmakchi), Fort Perovsk and Fort No.3. This last was constructed on the site of the Kokand fort of Kamysh-Kurgan on the right bank of the canal Kuvan-Dar'ya. By 1855 only three remained: Fort No.3 was abolished and the Aral fortress transferred to Fort No.1 - Kazaly. Fort No.1 was situated on the right bank of the Syr-Dar'ya at a point where the trading caravans were habitually ferried across the river. The fort protected both the ferry and the Aral fleet which was transferred there at the same time as the Raim fort. Fort No.2 was built in 1853 at the confluence of the Kara-Uzyak and the Dzhaman-Dar'ya and was of no great importance. The sandy and forest-less country of the valley of the Syr-Dar'ya, without towns or villages, created considerable difficulties in the building of barracks, depots, infirmaries etc. The only building materials were reeds and sundried brick; everything else had to be brought from Orenburg more than fifteen hundred kilometres away.

A contemporary water-colour entitled "The Former Citadel of Fort Perovsk" gives some idea of what the fortress looked like. On a high hill stands the inevitable feature of all the fortifications - the temporary church - a small building of sun-baked brick with an earthern roof. Beside it hang three bells on pillars At the foot of the hill can be seen the former fortress mosque used as the office and dwelling place of the Commander of the Syr-Dar'ya line, General A.L. Danzas. In front of the mosque is a small square, round which have been grouped one-storeyed clay barracks with earthen roofs, officers' quarters and other buildings. In front of one of the houses a little garden surrounded by a fence has been laid out. Other pictures show the fortress garden which is well planted with trees and bushes; in the corner of the garden is a high decorative mound with steps leading to the summit. In another part of the garden stands a small house with a terrace leading on to a round space containing garden benches. The garden was laid out in 1858 and evidently planted with fully-grown fruit trees such as apple, pear, apricot, and almond, and with vines. Two other pictures portray the life of the

garrison; they are called "The Fort Bazaar" and "A Festival for the Kirgiz given by the Commander of the Line".

At the beginning of the sixties a civilian settlement sprang up at Fort Perovsk, whose first inhabitants were local merchants and the families of soldiers stationed in the fort. Gradually a suburb appeared around the walls of the citadel. Fort No.1 - Kazaly - soon after its foundation became one of the most lively points of the Syr-Dar'ya line, for it lay directly on a caravan route from Bukhara to Orenburg, and also constituted the headquarters of the Aral fleet. A civilian population began to make its appearance in the fort at the end of the sixties. It consisted then for the most part of Bukharan and Russian merchants.

The town of Vernyy (now Alma-Ata) was founded in 1854 when a fort named Zailiy was built in the valley of the river Almaatinka. The fort renamed Vernyy in 1855, was provided with a strong garrison.

In 1858 regular postal communication between the fortresses of Orsk and Ural'sk was established, which testifies to the growth of civilian life and the beginning of passenger transport in the steppe. However, a regular post link between Orenburg and the southern frontiers of Russian possessions was not organized until after 1869. In spite of these signs of a certain degree of peace and order in the steppe, the Russians continued to construct fortifications. In 1861 the Dzhulek fort was built on the right bank of the Syr'Dar'ya about 100 km. higher than Fort Perovsk. It was intended to strengthen the Syr-Dar'ya line and protect the Kazakh nomad regions against Kokand. The Kokand fort of Dzhulek was not used at this point, but a new fort was built beside it. In 1862 another fortification with the name of Emba was constructed at an elevated point between Kazaly (now Kazalinsk) and Orsk in order to act as an intermediary post for the defence of the western part of the steppe. Surrounded by a high rampart and a deep moat the barrack buildings had particularly thick walls and narrow window embrasures for better protection. The Emba post and that of Aktyubinsk, built in 1869, were the last steppe fortifications.

A new stage in the struggle with Kokand began in 1864 and that year the towns of Turkestan, Chimkent and Auliye-Ata, which had previously contained strong Kokand fortifications and garrisons, were occupied by the Russians. The occupation of these towns made it possible to link the Syr-Dar'ya line with the line of fortifications in Semirech'ye, and thus create a closed line of fortifications on the southern and eastern frontiers of the Kazakh steppes. The rapid advance of Russia into the northern regions of the fertile oasis were looked upon with anxiety by Britain, and it became necessary to justify Russian expansion in this area. This was done by V. Dolinskiy(1) who wrote in 1865 of the three towns already mentioned: "The region of Turkestan occupied

by the Russian detachment has from time immemorial formed a part of the Kirgiz /Kazakh - Ed./ possessions and was even the customary residence of the Kirgiz khans; only through unfavourable circumstances has it up to now been unable to free itself from the rapacity of neighbouring Kokand." This territory indeed from ancient times had been Kazakh land, seized by Kokand comparatively recently. But the Tsarist government was also moved by predatory considerations to occupy these towns, surrounded as they were by country, fertile and well-cultivated, and rich in mineral wealth.

These conquests put new and hitherto unknown problems before the military authorities, for they had to deal here not with fortifications in a barren and uninhabited steppe, but with large towns. The needs of the garrisons were provided for by using the old fortifications of the towns and building new ones where necessary. The citadel of Turkestan, for example, was strengthened by the construction in the north-eastern part of an earthen rampart surrounded by a moat. Additional fortifications were carried out too in the citadel of Auliye-Ata. But Chimkent's citadel was left as it was since it was favourably situated on a hill.

The occupation of Turkestan was used to construct the Kokand line - the last fortifications on Central Asian territory. The Syr-Dar'ya line, extended to Turkestan, then continued eastwards to Vernyy, where the Kokand line ended. From Vernyy the network of fortifications turned north to the towns of Kopal, Sergiopol' and Semipalatinsk. Thus the fortified line begun in Semirech'ye in 1847 was finished in 1864.

Second period: 1869-1906

The second period begins in the late sixties when the various settlements lost much of their former military importance and began to develop into ordinary towns. At this time the division of settlements between the Turgay oblast in the north and the Syr-Dar'ya oblast in the south was accomplished. The character and rate of development of the settlements during this period depended on economic rather than on military considerations. Proximity to a caravan route or the newly created post route between Orenburg and Tashkent naturally hastened the development of certain towns. This post route was for a number of years very important economically, for it was the main artery linking Central Asia with Russia. The first two settlements to be connected were Orenburg and Kazalinsk. Two years later a postal link was organized between Vernyy and Chimkent. On contemporary evidence it took twenty-four days under favourable conditions to cover the 1,900 km. between Orenburg and Tashkent, although a courier with urgent mail could do the distance in twelve to fifteen days, or even in special cases nine. From 1868 to 1872 the service was run by the local Kazakh population. From Kazalinsk to the south the route ran

parallel to the Syr-Dar'ya, in places following the bank itself (as far as Perovsk); from Perovsk the road led to Turkestan, and thence to Tashkent via Chimkent. Between Kazalinsk and Tashkent there were more than thirty post stations. The building of post stations was begun at the end of the sixties; the ordinary stations were built at actual settlements, but some were also situated on remote parts of the route and were provided with means of defence; summer stations in the steppe sometimes consisted of only two or three tents. However, the economic importance of the post route gradually diminished. First of all the itineraries of the trade caravans changed owing to the inclusion of Khiva in the Russian Empire, and after 1873 went from Orenburg via Kungrad to the Gulf Mertvyy Kultuk on the Caspian Sea. Then towards the end of the eighties competition from the Transcaspian railway began to make itself felt, and the quantity of goods transported via the route fell sharply.

Also characteristic of the second period in the history of steppe settlements was the increasing number of new buildings erected in the Syr-Dar'ya oblast. The first of the surveys of the oblast published in 1886 reports that when the Russians first occupied the shores of the Syr-Dar'ya they found practically no buildings, so that not only was it necessary to construct fortifications but houses and the usual out-buildings as well. This and the scarcity of building materials gave the houses in Russian towns of the period a character all of their own; the houses of sun-baked brick were single-storeyed with flattish roofs which needed re-greasing every year; there were comparatively few roofs of sheet-iron. Even in Turkestan and Chimkent the Russian parts of the town were little better than suburbs, and consisted mostly of government buildings; they contained a very small number of permanent inhabitants, who were occupied for the most part in government service, trade or industry.

The post route and the newly organized building programme brought about a number of changes in the former steppe fortifications and southern towns. In Aktyubinsk, for example, the most northerly town after Orenburg, a civilian population began to appear only four years after its foundation. In 1880 it became the main town of the Turgay oblast, and in 1901 was linked with Orenburg by the railway; this caused the number of its inhabitants to rise to roughly 6,000. But the fortress of Orenburg and the settlements named Orenburg and Kara-Butak, situated a little way away from Irgiz, were off the post route and therefore their development suffered and they remained simply intermediary posts. In the lower reaches of the Syr-Dar'ya, Karmachki and Dzhulek gradually lost their importance; but the bigger towns of Perovsk and Kazalinsk continued to develop, although very slowly. From 1867 Perovsk was the main town of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast although it still boasted only two noteworthy buildings and preserved the usual gloomy aspect of steppe fortifications. The review of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast for 1885 remarked that the Russian

settlement in Perovsk was developing very slowly owing to the fact that the town stood off the beaten track of trade routes, was not favourably situated from the point of view of natural resources, and the Russian traders living there suffered from competition from the Bukharan merchants. As a result the town became more Asiatic than Russian, not only as regards its inhabitants but also in its architecture, which was predominantly in the local style. During the period 1886 to 1899 only three new settlements sprang up in the whole of the Perovsk uyezd (county): Novoastrakhan, Dzhulek (around the station of the same name) and Skobolevo. All these settlements were small with the number of inhabitants varying from 105 to 414. In 1912 two more were built - around the stations of Tartugay (afterwards Gerasimovo) and Tyumen'-Aryk.

Kazalinsk developed a little more rapidly than Perovsk, but as in the other steppe towns there was not much scope for economic growth. Its development was partly retarded by the floods which regularly swept over the country of the lower reaches of the Syr-Dar'ya where it was situated. The abolition of the Aral fleet in 1883 struck the first blow at the prosperity of Kazalinsk; and with the construction of the Transcaspian railway the trade caravans stopped coming; after this, in the words of one of the contemporary inhabitants, the town began to stagnate, and with it the corner of northern Turkestan for which it served as a centre.

In Kazalinsk some of the private houses were built of stone brought from the ancient town of Dzhankent (sic) (? Dzharkent) situated not far away. The outer part of the town consisted mostly of clay houses and a few windmills. N.N. Karazin(2) was struck by "the abundance of windmills and green plantations" among which "the town coquettishly hides itself". He goes on to say: "The masts of ships can be seen rising up, and in the distance the river winds away like a strip of steel." Behind the houses were kitchen gardens and the streets were lined with trees. The population was very small: besides the 108 people who made up the families of the Ural Cossacks, 12 retired soldiers, 20 merchants with their salesmen, and a dozen workmen lived in the outer town. In 1887 the population was augmented by the immigration of Ural Cossacks who had refused to submit to the new Polozheniye (statutes) of 1875 enforcing general military service. In 1898 the population numbered 8,000, of which Ural Cossacks and other Russian elements made up not more than 3,000.

Russian settlements did not spring up round the towns in this part of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast till 1887 when the Novoastrakhan settlement appeared in the Perovsk uyezd with 82 inhabitants. In the forts of Karmachki and Dzhulek no civilian life established itself. In the middle sixties Karmachki was a military intermediate point where only the garrison of roughly a hundred lived; there was not a single merchant nor a single shop. Dzhulek was equally sparsely populated and differed from the other forts only in its well-built

church and the strength of its fortifications. On the most southerly section of the post route were the ancient towns of Turkestan and Chimkent. In 1872 Turkestan became the uyezd town of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast. According to the general plan drawn up by the engineering department of the Turkestan military circuit in 1875, it is evident that the majority of buildings were situated behind the walls of the old citadel. The Russian part of the town had straight and fairly wide roads, and in front of the houses were small, neatly-kept gardens. The houses were of unbaked brick and for the most part roofed with sheet-iron. The main square was planted with two rows of trees and contained a church and some shops.

Chimkent too became a uyezd town of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast in 1867. As in Turkestan the garrison lived within the walls of the citadel, and the small civilian population settled round the citadel hill. In 1885 there were only 62 Russian houses, and in 1904 only six houses of brick; the others were of clay or frame types.

Third period: 1906-17

The opening of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway in 1906 marks the beginning of the third period. The railway hastened the development of many of the towns through which it passed and encouraged Russian immigration, which had hitherto been very limited. It did not however bring much change to the northern towns. From Orenburg to Kazalinsk for example the line only passed through Aktyubinsk.. The town of Kazalinsk was more than 11km. away from its station where railway workers formed the only settlers, and Fort No.2 - Karmachki - was also off the line; in 1907 its population in all was only 700. Nor did the population of Perovsk increase much although the railway passed through it. Dzhulek, which had a population of 250 in 1907, Turkestan whose population in the Russian part of the town was 422, and Chimkent were all by-passed; Dzhulek was 3km. from the station, Turkestan two, and Chimkent even further. It is thus evident that even the opening of the railway did not revitalize the settlements of the Perovsk and Kazalinsk uyezds of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast. Only the southern part of the oblast, where new Russian settlements rapidly grew up on land taken from the local population, was extensively colonized. The uyezds of Auliye-Ata and Chimkent received most of these settlements (38 and 37 respectively), and in the Tashkent uyezd there were 16.

The fortresses and other military posts between Orenburg and Tashkent undoubtedly played an important part in protecting the local Kazakh population from the assaults of Khiva and Kokand, and in conquering and annexing Central Asia. But after they had lost their former military importance and had turned

into small towns their prosperity depended almost entirely on their proximity to caravan trade routes, the post route and the railway. Most of them, owing to unfavourable soil and climate, remoteness from large towns and from the vital lines of communication, were destined to remain - until the development of modern industry - lifeless, drab and provincial.

Notes

(1) OB OTNOSHENII ROSSII K SREDNEAZIATSKIM VLADENIYAM I OB USTROYSTVE KIRGIZSKOY STEPI. By V. Dolinskiy, St.Petersburg, 1865, p.7.

(2) OT ORENBURGA DO TASHKENTA. By N.N. Karazin, St.Petersburg, 1886, p.7.

Criticism of Turkmen trade union organization

Although the trade union organization in Turkmenistan has grown in recent years and at the beginning of 1958 numbered 234,860 workers, its work is far from satisfactory. This was stressed at the first trade union conference held in Ashkhabad at the beginning of March, when it was pointed out that the Trade Union Council has not reorganized its work in accordance with the requirements of the December plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, that it allows formalism to creep into socialist competition drives, and makes no attempt to implement decisions or check the fulfilment of inter-enterprise agreements.

TI. 6th March 1958

State Conservatoire for Turkmenistan

The Council of Ministers of Turkmenistan has approved a project for the construction of a State Conservatoire in Ashkhabad. This will consist of a group of buildings and will include an auditorium seating 500 and living quarters for 300 students. All the teaching and practice rooms will be soundproofed.

TI. 23rd March 1958

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

PREPARATIONS FOR THE XXV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ORIENTALISTS - LENINGRAD 1960

The XXV International Congress of Orientalists which is to be held in Leningrad in 1960 is the first to be held in Russia since the Congresses started in 1873. Its importance is not lost on the Russians, nor should it be underestimated by the rest of the world. "The XXV International Congress of Orientalists," writes the leading article in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No.6 of 1957, "can and must be a new landmark in the development of world oriental studies."

Post-war Russian participation in the Congresses on any scale dates from the XXIII Congress held at Cambridge in 1954. In 1957, twenty-three Soviet orientalists attended the XXIV Congress at Munich at which it was decided to hold the next Congress in Leningrad. Some comments on the Munich Congress were published in the same number of SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE mentioned above (pp.186-9). While valuing the Congress as an opportunity for contact between orientalists and for developing oriental studies in general, the writer comments adversely on certain features: firstly, that there were no representatives from the Asian Communist countries, and few from such independent Asian countries as India and Burma; secondly, that "most of the papers and addresses. . . were devoted to problems of ancient history and mediaeval studies, chiefly to their various linguistic aspects. Very few papers dealt with questions of the political and economic history of eastern countries. Problems of the modern East, and, in particular, of the national-liberation movement, were dealt with only by scholars from the socialist countries"; thirdly, that some papers dealt with subjects that were abstruse and without scientific interest, such as "Where is the Virgin Mary buried?" or "The rearing of pigs in Indonesia"; and finally that some papers bore "a missionary character" which was particularly displeasing to the delegates from the East. These criticisms may be taken as pointers which are to be found in the editorial article mentioned above (SOV.VOST.1957, No.6, pp.3-7).

"It is exceptionally important," says this article, "that. . . /the Congress/ should both creatively develop the best of the traditions of international gatherings of orientalists and also reflect the very great qualitative changes which are beginning to show in oriental studies with the decay of the colonial system and with the achievement of national independence by several peoples of the East. . ."

The traditions worthy of preservation and development are listed by the writer as follows: firstly, "scientific cooperation between orientalists of all countries irrespective of their race, nationality, religion, or political convictions"; secondly, "the all-round study of oriental problems in all their aspects - philological, historical, and economic. In the present state of oriental studies with their specialization, such an approach is the most effective"; and thirdly, the division of the Congresses into sections with a regional basis.

The new features to be introduced, or in some cases developed, are: firstly, that the Congress should be truly international, that is, that scholars from eastern countries should be widely represented. "Today, truly scientific studies on the East are impossible without taking into consideration what has been achieved in a particular field by the scholars of that country. Thus, it would be difficult today to imagine a work on the history of China which did not make use of Chinese historical researches, or a work on Persian literature which did not take into account the achievements of Persian philologists"; and secondly, that emphasis should be given to the modern East. "Of great interest would be the consideration of the many unsolved problems connected with the struggle of the peoples of the East for their national cultural traditions, for national independence, and the building of a new life. The scholarly discussion of current oriental problems would help make such a highly qualified gathering as the Congress still more effective. This will necessitate the advance announcement to the Congress participants of questions to be raised for scholarly discussion and the prompt publication of theses and prospectuses."

The tasks before Soviet orientalists in preparing for the Congress continues the leading article, are twofold. "Firstly, <u>everyday scientific work</u> the results of which can be reported on at the Congress, and secondly, <u>measures to be taken especially</u> in preparing for the Congress."

On the first point, the writer gives a summary of the main ideas underlying Soviet oriental studies since the Revolution: "Soviet orientalists will come forward at the Congress. . . with the results of many years' work by scientific institutes and universities, such as those of Moscow and Leningrad and the republics of the Soviet East. It is appropriate here to dwell on the general development of Soviet orientalism. The chief characteristics of the early period were the retreat from the ideas of bourgeois orientalism, the assimilation of Marxist-Leninist methodology and the application of the theories of Marxism-Leninism to the study and solution of concrete oriental problems. This was accompanied by the reorganization in the 1930s when the Academy of Sciences's Oriental Institute was founded in Leningrad on the base of the Asiatic Museum. Characteristic of the following period in the development of Soviet oriental studies were

their "actuality" and increased emphasis on current problems, and the greater attention given by research to real life and to the study of the complex problems of the modern East. The organization of these researches, which was interrupted by the Second World War, took place in the 1950s when the Institute of Oriental Studies was reorganized and transferred to Moscow, and oriental centres were created in the republics of the Soviet East. . . Having overcome the failings pointed out by the XX Party Congress, Soviet oriental studies are now rising to a new stage in their development.

By relating their researches to the present orientalists studying the ancient and mediaeval history of the East are able to distinguish the most important national traditions of the given people, to study the roots of those social institutions which have lasted until today, and to determine what today is a survival from the distant past and hinders progress, and what is progressive, truly popular, and worthy of support and future development. Scientific researches which are based on the critical study of primary sources and which consider a phenomenon in its origin and historical development make it possible to solve correctly many actual modern problems. It is essential to combine the various branches and aspects of oriental studies in order to develop them further. Profound philological analysis gives a firm foundation to eastern historical research, and the strictest historicism makes philological researches truly scientific.

"The activity of Soviet orientalists is informed by the notion that science should serve society. Soviet oriental studies are characterized throughout by their militant anti-colonialism, which is expressed in sharp, scientifically based, criticism of the apologists of imperialism and racism; and by the spirit of true internationalism, which finds expression in respect for the merits, and national traditions of the peoples of the East.

"Soviet orientalists base themselves in their work on the profound mutual influence of Eastern and Western culture both in the past and in the present, and they firmly support the principle that the advanced socialist countries should give every kind of disinterested help to the under-developed countries of the East. Soviet orientalists see in the peoples of the East who have thrown off, or who are throwing off, the yoke of age-old dependence, active and consistent fighters for peace. . ."

Such are the ideas underlying Soviet oriental studies today, as given in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, which may be expected to inform the conduct of the 1960 Congress in Leningrad. Of the special measures to be taken in preparation for the Congress, the journal lists the following: between 1958 and 1960 to hold meetings of Sinologists, Indianists, Iranologists, and Turkologists, at which foreign scholars should participate; in 1959 to hold the second all-Union Congress of Orientalists, and the second all-Union congress on eastern philology;

to create a Co-ordination Committee for contacts with orientalists of the people's democracies; to organize a sector of ancient eastern philology and semitology at the Leningrad branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies (Soviet backwardness in these fields were commented on - Ibid. p.188); to publish "basic Marxist works on all branches of oriental studies, and in particular on current affairs in eastern countries" as well as new material and source material; finally, it is urged, an all-Union Society of Orientalists should be created as soon as possible. (SOV.VOST.1957, No.6, pp.6,188-9.)

The leading article on the Leningrad Congress concludes as follows: "The new life of the peoples of the East which is unfolding before our eyes cannot but inspire orientalists who love the culture of the hoary, but now rejuvenated East, and cannot but have a salutary effect on the forthcoming XXV International Congress of Orientalists. With regard to the tradition of scientific cooperation among orientalists. . . this tradition will grow stronger at future congresses. In this respect the Leningrad Congress must be a model.

"The Congress is a great and solemn event for orientalists of the whole world and is the realization of vast creative scientific effort. Three years in which to prepare for the Congress is not a long time, and in order to insure that it will be of a high standard, much. . . organizational, research and publishing work must be done. . . It is the duty of all Soviet scholars, oriental institutions and organizations to take an active part in the work, the successful completion of which will result in a further improvement in Soviet oriental studies and in their attainment to a worthy place in world orientalism."

State lottery for Kazakhstan

The Kazakh Council of Ministers have decided to start a lottery in the first quarter of 1958. There will be 630,000 cash prizes worth 18000,000 rubles, and 4,500 prizes of Volga and Moskvich cars, motorcycles, radiograms, pianos, cameras, carpets etc. The total sum of all the prizes is 45m.rubles.

Tass, 23rd December 1957

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

A NEW HISTORICAL-ETHNOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

In 1954 the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR suggested to the Institute of Ethnography that it should compile a historical and ethnographic atlas of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This atlas is the subject of three short articles in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA, institut etnografii, 1957, No.26, which describe its projected plan and the sources at the disposal of its compilers. The source material, it appears, is to be found in the museums of Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Samarkand, Khiva, Fergana and others in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. These collections were mostly acquired at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, and during the Soviet period; but so far they have been little studied. Other sources include the archives of the Russian Geographical Society, the Emigration Department (Pereselencheskoye Upravleniye), the regional archives of the statistics committees of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship, and the archives of the Academies of Science of the Central Asian republics in which the records of ethnographic expeditions, both pre-Revolution and Soviet, are kept. Considerable material on the subject appeared in periodicals and material in the form of maps showing the distribution of population and different tribes is also available; some of these maps date back to the Middle Ages. Most of the material, however, was collected after the union of Central Asia with Russia, and is therefore of nineteenth century origin. The compilation of the atlas, apart from providing detailed information on subjects hitherto little touched upon, will reveal the gaps in the study of Central Asia.

According to the projected structure the atlas is to be divided into two parts: the first will contain general information on Central Asia and Kazakhstan; the second will deal with each republic separately. The first part will consist of introductory articles and the main archaeological material as follows:

(a) Maps showing the distribution of tribes and peoples from the earliest times to the Middle Ages.

(b) Maps showing different linguistic groups.

(c) Archaeological maps, illustrations and typological tables showing the economy, life and culture of the tribes and peoples of antiquity and the Middle Ages.

(d) Ethnographic maps showing historical continuity and devoted to the following subjects - Agriculture; Irrigation; Livestock-breeding; Hunting; Fishing; Trades and Crafts; Settlements; Dwellings; Clothes and Ornaments; Means of Transport; Tools; Food; Family Customs; Beliefs and Rites; Handicrafts; Decorations; Development of Music, etc. This list is not necessarily complete and may be lengthened. A special section will be devoted to the elaboration of each of these themes and will contain a short essay on the subject, illustrations and typological tables and a series of maps. The map which embraces Central Asia and Kazakhstan as a whole will show the culture patterns of the various peoples and regions.

The second part of the Atlas will contain six sections devoted to the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, Turkmens, Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks; material will be included showing the national peculiarities in the culture and life of each people. The subjects of the illustrations, tables and maps will be basically the same as in the general part of the Atlas, but will be worked out in more detail and with a larger number of tables showing the various aspects of economy and way of life of the people in question. As a result, not only the national features of each different culture will emerge, but the peculiarities of local ethnic groups who have preserved their own characteristics or who have not yet merged with the surrounding population - for example the Turks in the Fergana Valley, or the Yagnobs and Lokays in Tadzhikistan.

An important place in the second part of the Atlas will be given to maps concerned with dialect and terminology. Two aims will be borne in mind during the compilation of the regional section of the Atlas: (a) To shed light on the ethnic development of the peoples of Central Asia from the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries and from the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century (i.e. while it was under the rule of the Uzbek khans and after its incorporation into Russia), and in particular to elucidate the question of the national consolidation of these peoples on the eve of the Revolution, and the presence or absence amongst them of the rudiments of a bourgeois society. (b) To follow the development of the peoples of Central Asia after the Revolution.

It is also suggested that the Atlas should provide information on the culture of the Central Asian peoples who live outside the confines of their

own territory, for example the Kirgiz of eastern Uzbekistan, or the Uzbeks of southern Kazakhstan, and also of the Central Asian peoples who live abroad.

Kirgiz graduates

Graduates from the Kirgiz State University this year numbered 374. The lawyers among them will be employed by the judiciary and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the physicists are to be sent into industry and scientific-research establishments.

SK. 19th March 1958

New telephone link for Ashkhabad

A telephone link has been established between the towns of Ashkhabad and Rostov; calls can now be made direct without having to go through Moscow.

TI. 13th March 1958

Union for Uzbek film workers

A Union of Workers of the Uzbek Film Industry has been formed. L.Faysiyev has been appointed Chairman and V.A. Kostyri Secretary.

PV. 26th February 1958

Kazakhs should have more science and instruction in their cinemas

Hardly any scientific or instructional films are shown at the Alma-Ata cinemas, and on the rare occasions when they are featured it is usually in the daytime when none of the workers can attend. The town council, it is suggested, ought to provide at least one special cinema where such films could be regularly seen.

KP. 7th January 1958

ECONOMICS

CENTRAL ASIAN BUDGETS

1956 - 58

The following article shows the proposed budgets for the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan for 1958. Budget fulfilment figures for 1956 and 1957, where available, are also given, these should be studied in relation to the figures for the 1955-56 budgets given in CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.137-43.

The all-Union budget(1) for 1958 is:

Revenue	 642,965,172,000	rubles
Expenditure	 627,742,125,000	"

The Union budget(2) for 1958 is:

Revenue	 326,354,076,000	rubles
Expenditure	 311,131,029,000	"

Total for revenue and expenditure of the constituent republics is 319,732,907,000 rubles of which the Central Asian republics account for 35,927,079,000 rubles.

Percentages of revenue to be retained by the republics from all-Union:

	Turnover tax	Forestry & agricultural & kolkhoz income tax	Bachelors & small families tax	Direct taxes	State loan
Uzbekistan	34.2	100.0	40	50	80
Tadzhikistan	63.7	100.0	40	50	80
Kirgizia	77.3	100.0	40	50	80
Turkmenistan	81.2	100.0	40	50	80
Kazakhstan	100.0	100.0	40	50	80

(1) Includes republican and local budgets
(2) Central government only

I. Budget Fulfilments for 1956 and 1957 and the State Budgets for 1958

Republic	1956		1957 (1)		1958	
	Revenue	Expenditure	Revenue	Expenditure	Revenue	Expenditure
Uzb.	4,901,789,000	4,795,039,000	8,096,139,000	7,846,540,000	8,605,762,000	8,589,376,000
Tadzh.	1,587,684,000	1,525,362,000	2,208,471,000	2,142,126,000	2,454,510,000	2,384,280,000
Kirg.	1,621,017,000	1,579,775,000	2,537,874,000	2,507,013,000	2,760,004,000	2,747,818,000
Turk.	1,455,688,000	1,429,602,000	2,396,282,000	2,173,196,000	2,621,888,000	2,608,844,000
Kaz.	11,328,001,000	11,256,004,000	15,871,001,000	15,603,005,000	19,862,937,000 (2)	19,717,477,000 (3)

(1) 1957 figures are in all cases provisional.
(2) The supplementary grant of 3,121,811,000 rubles from the Union budget is included in this figure.
(3) This figure appears in Article 1 of the Budget Law in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 26.1.58; in Article 8 of the Federal Budget Law in PRAVDA of 21.12.57 it is given as 19,596,761,000 rubles.

II. Republican Budgets for 1958

Republic	Revenue	Expenditure
Uzb.	5,376,204,000	5,359,818,000
Tadzh.	1,660,390,000	1,590,160,000
Kirg.	1,872,792,000	1,860,606,000
Turk.	2,443,339,000	1,825,822,000
Kaz.	18,845,310,000	18,699,850,000

III. Uzbekistan

No data is given on the composition of revenue in the Budget Law published in PRAVDA VOSTOKA on 19th January 1958 beyond the total from state and co-operative enterprises and organizations which is 6,833,101,000 rubles.

(a) Expenditure

National economy	4,319,796,000 rubles	(1)
Social-cultural measures	3,740,732,000 "	(2)
Administration	281,056,000 "	
Reserve fund	247,792,000 "	

The proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "National Economy" is as follows:

CNE (Council of National Economy) industries	1,299,405,000 rubles	(3)
Agriculture	1,824,481,000 "	(4)
Development of the Golodnaya Step'	389,101,000 "	
Transport and communications	155,174,000 "	
Extension of electricity, gas and water supplies	420,468,000 "	
Other branches	624,368,000 " (Of this sum, 318,361,000 rubles is assigned to the Ministry of Ores & Geological Prospecting, and 136,607,000 rubles to the Ministry of Construction.)	

The proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "Social-Cultural Measures" is as follows:

Education	2,166,785,000 rubles	(5)(8)
Public health	1,030,279,000 "	(6)
Physical culture	13,633,000 "	
Social security	525,935,000 "	(7)

Notes

The corresponding figures for:

	1956	1957
(1)	1,589,051,000	4,030,785,000
(2)	2,874,227,000	3,461,299,000

	1956	1957
(3)	-	1,644,276,000
(4)	-	1,636,329,000
(5)	1,772,032,000	2,040,963,000
(6)	867,735,000	948,158,000
(7)	220,765,000	458,107,000

(8) The proposed distribution of this figure is as follows:

Maintenance of schools and kindergartens	1,451,710,000	(Of this sum 40m. is to be spent on the building of new schools; this represents an increase of 20m. over the 1957 figure.)
Universities and technikums	394,125,000	(To be divided between 20 VUZ and 81 technikums.)
Scientific research	183,675,000	
Clubs and libraries	54,122,000	
Printing	40,680,000	
Art	41,118,000	

(b) Capital investment

The total sum of capital investment is 3,571,000,000 (i.e. 22 per cent more than in 1957)(1)

Proposed distribution is as follows:

Agriculture	1,018,000,000
Heavy industry	1,410,000,000(2)
Light industry	296,000,000
Construction of power stations	265,000,000
Transport and communications	107,000,000
Housing	550,000,000
Ministry of Construction (for equipping building organizations)	350,000,000

The total sum invested in "Building and Installation Work" is 208m.rubles, i.e. 20 per cent above the 1957 figure.

Notes

(1) Capital investments in 1957 amounted to 2,900,000,000 rubles, i.e. 11 per cent or 331m. more than in 1956.

(2)

Ferrous metallurgy	.....	375,000,000
Oil and gas industry	.....	325,000,000
Coal industry	.....	231,000,000

(c) Oblast budgets

Andizhan	.....	237,637,000 rubles
Bukhara	.....	222,359,000 "
Fergana	.....	317,581,000 "
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	.....	255,869,000 "
Kashka-Dar'ya	.....	180,396,000 "
Khorezm	.....	141,854,000 "
Namangan	.....	197,648,000 "
Samarkand	.....	425,603,000 "
Surkhan-Dar'ya	.....	155,789,000 "
Tashkent	.....	468,520,000 "
Tashkent City	.....	626,302,000 "
Total given	.....	3,229,558,000 "

Of the total expenditures of the local budgets it is planned to assign
77.8 per cent (i.e. 2,506,750,000) to
Social-cultural measures and
16.9 per cent (546,482,000) to National economy.

IV. Tadzhikistan

No data is given in the Budget Law on the composition of revenue(1), but the total sum from state and cooperative enterprises is 2,122,755,000 rubles.

(a) Expenditure

National economy	.....	1,159,370,000 rubles(2)
Social cultural measures	.....	1,024,996,000 "(3)
Administration	.....	108,201,000 "

The proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "National Economy" is:

Industry and building	.....	444,400,000 rubles (A supplementary sum of 314m. is to be provided by industrial enterprises and economic organizations.)
Agriculture and irrigation	.....	494,242,000 rubles (An additional 56,100,000 is to be provided by the enterprises.)
Housing	.....	146,350,000 rubles

The proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "Social-Cultural Measures" is:

Education	.....	655,260,000 rubles
Public health	.....	253,469,000 "
Physical culture	.....	6,502,000 "
Social security and state insurance	...	109,765,000 "

Notes

(1) The following data is given for:

	1956	1957
Turnover tax	723,909,000	917,779,000
Deductions from profits	300,576,000	349,437,000
Income tax from co-operative organizations	24,606,000	
Kolkhoz income tax	36,402,000	
Direct taxes	38,877,000	

The figures for:

	1956	1957
(2)	566,548,000	1,060,099,000
	(i.e. 37.7 per cent of budget expenditure)	
(3)	834,428,000	956,325,000
	(55 per cent of budget expenditure)	

(b) Capital investment

Total capital investment amounts to 855m. (i.e. 28 per cent more than the 1957 figure). Of this sum 37 per cent is assigned to the development of industry and 33 per cent to the further development of agricul-

ture and irrigation; 146,300,000 rubles are to be devoted to domestic housing. Capital works will also be financed by "non-centralized sources".

(c) Oblast budgets

No oblast budgets are given but the total budget of local rayon executive committees is 794,120,000 rubles; of this sum .... 100,488,000 rubles or 12.6 per cent, is to be spent on financing the development of national economy, and ..... 644,890,000 rubles or 81.2 per cent, on social-cultural measures.

V. Kirgizia

Total sum of revenue from state and cooperative enterprises and organizations is 2,311,000,000 rubles.

(a) Revenue

Turnover tax	.....approx.	1,450,000,000 rubles (i.e. 77.3 per cent as against 43.6 per cent in 1957 of total returns.)
Deductions from profits	.....	404,000,000 rubles (Of the total profits of 724m., 320m. is to be retained by the enterprises for capital investment.)
MTS earnings	.....	142,000,000 rubles
Direct taxes	.....	297,000,000 "

(b) Expenditure

National economy	.....	1,440,831,000 rubles
Social-cultural measures	.....	1,104,919,000 "
Administration	.....	125,241,000 "

Proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "National Economy":

Industry and building	.....	925,000,000 rubles (Of this sum 273m. are to be provided by the enterprises.)

Agriculture	692,000,000 rubles (Budget appropriations amount to 550m.)(1)	
Transport, communications and road repair	119,600,000	"

Proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "Social-Cultural Measures":

Social security	187,000,000	rubles
Academy of Sciences	30,000,000	"

Note

(1) The proposed distribution of this figure is as follows:

MTS	275,000,000
Sovkhozes	130,000,000
Irrigation	151,000,000
Purchase of agricultural machinery	117,700,000

(c) Oblast budgets

Dzhalal-Abad	144,685,000	rubles
Frunze	228,941,000	"
Frunze town	125,731,000	"
Issyk-Kul'	108,030,000	"
Tyan'-Shan'	70,120,000	"
Total given	887,212,000	"

VI. Turkmenistan

Total revenue from state and cooperative organizations is 2,370,333,000 rubles.

(a) Revenue

Turnover tax	1,378,698,000	rubles
Deductions from profits.....	341,528,000	"
MTS earnings	251,000,000	"
Kolkhoz and cooperative income tax	241,190,000	"
Direct taxes	134,924,000	"

(b) Expenditure

National economy	1,549,162,000	rubles
Social-cultural measures	889,812,000	"
Administration	98,857,000	"

Proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "National Economy" includes a total for agriculture and irrigation of ..... 557,851,000 rubles; a further ..... 166,336,000 " is to be provided by the enterprises. The allocation for irrigation alone is 331,169,000 rubles. MTS are to receive 198,583,000 ", and a further ..... 95,826,000 " is to be provided by the stations.

Proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "Social-Cultural Measures":

Education and training of cadres	382,913,000	rubles
Public health and physical culture	258,284,000	"
Social security	138,540,000	"
Scientific research	36,031,000	"

(c) Capital investment

Total sum of capital investment excluding oil drilling is ..... 1,391,000,000 rubles.

Proposed distribution is as follows:

CNE	701,500,000	rubles
Oil industry (excluding drilling)	539,000,000	"
Chemical industry	56,500,000	"
Food and light industries	67,500,000	"

(d) Oblast budgets

Ashkhabad	185,749,000	rubles
Chardzhou	162,134,000	"
Mary	157,347,000	"
Tashauz	128,590,000	"
Ashkhabad town	149,202,000	"

VII. Kazakhstan

There is no complete data on the composition of revenue beyond the following figures and even these are provisional.

(a) Revenue

Total revenue from state and cooperative enterprises and organizations	15,063,226,000 rubles	(of this sum turnover tax accounts for 10,537m.rubles)
Deduction from profits	1,556,000,000 "	
Direct taxes	1,049,000,000 "	
MTS earnings	612,000,000 "	
State loans	112,000,000 "	

(b) Expenditure

National economy	13,568,141,000 rubles	(a further 6,901,952,000 rubles to be provided by the inclusion of profits resulting from amortization and the fuller utilization of internal resources)
Social-cultural measures....	5,102,695,000 "	
Administration	467,726,000 "	

Proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "National Economy": (1)

Financing CNE enterprises...	4,755,000,000 rubles	(an additional 3,404m. rubles to be provided by the enterprises)
Heavy industry	4,600,000,000 "	(an additional 2,892m. rubles to be provided by the industry)
Consumer goods industry.....	733,000,000 "	
Agriculture	5,442,000,000 "	(a further 1,824m. to be provided by the enterprises out of their own funds)

Proposed distribution of expenditure under the heading "Social-Cultural Measures":

Education, training of cadres, scientific research etc.	.....	2,422,000,000 rubles
Public health	.....	1,391,000,000 "
Social security	.....	1,258,000,000 "

Note

(1) The provisional 1957 figures are:

Industry	.....	5,002,000,000
Agriculture	.....	3,284,000,000

(b) Capital investment

Total sum of capital investment is ..... 11,593,000,000 rubles (Of this sum 9,039m. rubles to come out of the budget.)

Proposed distribution is as follows:

Agriculture	.....	4,183,000,000 rubles
Communications	.....	33,000,000 "
Road building	.....	120,000,000 "
Road maintenance and repair.		310,000,000 "
Road transport	.....	390,000,000 "
Water transport	.....	38,000,000 "
Irrigation	.....	313,200,000 "
Housing	.....	2,050,000,000 " (i.e. 17.3 per cent over the 1957 figure)

The total for "Building and Installation Work" is... 7,070,000,000 rubles

Republican Ministries and Departments are to receive ..... 930,000,000 rubles and

Union-Republican Ministries. 4,433,200,000 "

(c) Oblast budgets

Alma-Ata	181,365,000	rubles
Alma-Ata town	326,468,000	"
Akmolinsk	222,513,000	"
Aktyubinsk	193,472,000	"
East-Kazakhstan	310,264,000	"
Gur'yev	175,975,000	"
Dzhambul	240,193,000	"
West-Kazakhstan	183,767,000	"
Karaganda oblast	419,780,000	"
Kzyl-Orda	143,635,000	"
Kokchetav	218,381,000	"
Kustanay	267,334,000	"
North-Kazakhstan	186,584,000	"
Pavlodar	214,607,000	"
Semipalatinsk	209,278,000	"
South-Kazakhstan	355,171,000	"
Taldy-Kurgan	211,745,000	"
Total given	4,060,532,000	"

Sources

1. Pravda Vostoka, 18th, 19th and 21st January 1958.
2. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 21st, 22nd and 23rd January 1958.
3. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 10th and 12th January 1958.
4. Turkmenskaya Iskra, 23rd and 24th January 1958.
5. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 25th and 26th January 1958.
6. Pravda, 21st and 22nd December 1957.

Death of eminent Kazakh citizens

Mukan Imanzhanov, the Kazakh writer and playwright died on 18th March aged 42 years. KP. 19th March 1958

Prof. S.A. Amanzholov, a leading Kazakh turcologist, died on 29th January aged 55 years. KP. 30th January 1958

INDUSTRY

BUILDING MATERIALS INDUSTRY

1955 - 57

To meet the growing need for building materials in Central Asia and Kazakhstan a large number of new factories are being constructed both in big towns and in the provinces where they satisfy local demands. Press reports on the construction of these factories between 1955 and 1957 are far from unsatisfactory; in many instances a factory may be reported as started but no further mention is made either of its progress or its completion. It is hoped, nevertheless, that the following tables will give a general idea of the extent of developments in this field over the past two years. Unless a specific statement is made dates in the column headed "under construction" refer not to the date on which construction began, as these are generally not given, but to the date on which the report appeared in the newspaper. The table includes furniture and glass factories, but does not cover quarries, or factories manufacturing iron or steel products.

Situation	Product	Production Figures	Completed	Under Construction	Projected
Yumalak (not traceable)	Reinforced concrete products	22,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Oct. 1955	
Angren	Reinforced concrete products	5,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Oct. 1955	
Kuva (Fergana oblast)	Bricks	3,000,000 bricks per annum	Nov. 1955		
Almalyk	Reinforced concrete products	15,000 cu.metres per annum	Jan. 1956		
Tashkent ?	Reinforced concrete products	15,000 cu.metres per annum	-	May 1956	
Tashkent	Brick blocks	not given	-	Sept.1956	
Yangi-Yul' rayon	Bricks and tiles	not given	June 1956		
Chirchik	Asphalt	21,900 tons per annum	July 1956		
Kuybyshev rayon	Bricks	2,000,000 per annum	Nov. 1956		
Akhunbabayev rayon (Fergana oblast)	Bricks	2,000,000 per annum	-	Nov. 1956	
Tashkent	Hollow bricks	60,000,000 per annum	-	Dec. 1956	
Tashkent	Dry plaster	not given	-		Projected in Dec.1956
Kokand	Hollow bricks	60,000,000 per annum	-	Dec. 1956	
Kuybyshev	Tiles	1,000,000 per annum	-		Projected in Feb.1957
Kuvasay (Fergana oblast)	Binding materials	not given	-	Feb. 1957	
Dzhalal-Kuduk (not traceable)	Alabaster	not given	-	Dec. 1957	
Bulak-Bashi (Namangan oblast)	Lime	not given	-	Dec. 1957	
Andizhan	Furniture	not given	-		Projected in Dec.1957

Dzhizak (Golodnaya Step')	Building materials	100,000 cu.metres silicate products; 250,000 sq.metres plaster slabs; about 70,000 sq.metres porous clay slabs, per annum			Projected

II. T A D Z H I K I S T A N

Situation	Product	Production Figures	Completed	Under Construction	Projected
Leninabad	Small reinforced concrete products	5,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Sept.1955	
Moskov rayon (Kulyab oblast)	Reinforced concrete products	not given	Nov. 1955		
Kulyab	Stone blocks	6,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Feb. 1956	
Regar	Bricks	not given	July 1956		
Stalinabad	Reinforced concrete products & concrete (combined factories)	not given	1956(concrete factory)	1956(reinforced concrete factory)	
Stalinabad	Wooden products for building	not given	Aug. 1956		
Kurgan-Tyube	Bricks	5,000,000 per annum	-	Aug. 1956	
Parkhan (2 factories)	Bricks	8,760,000 per annum	-	Sept.1956	
Stalinabad	Furniture	not given	Dec. 1956		
Dalverzin' Step'	Reinforced concrete products	not given	Feb. 1957		
Dalverzin' Step'	Wooden products	not given	-	Feb. 1957	
Khodzhent (Reorganization & extension of existing small factory)	Reinforced concrete products	not given	-	June 1957	

Situation	Product	Production Figures	Completed	Under Construction	Projected
Kok-Yangak (Dzhalal-Abad oblast)	Cement	not given	Dec. 1955		
Kurmenty (Issyk-Kul' oblast)	Cement	not given	Feb. 1956		
Frunze oblast	Large silicate blocks for walling and silicate tiles	not given	-	Feb. 1956	
Tash-Kumyr (Dzhalal-Abad oblast)	Bricks	8,000,000 per annum	-	May 1956	
Dzhalal-Abad oblast (Lenin rayon)	Bricks	not given	July 1956		
Osh	Asphalt - concrete	not given	-	Oct. 1956	
Frunze	Reinforced concrete products	Variously reported as 20,000 or 15,000 cu.metres per annum	First part completed Nov. 1956		
Kirgiz combine of building materials	Large rolled blocks for partitions	400,000 sq.metres per annum	-		Projected for 1958-59
Kirgiz building materials combine	Plaster partition blocks	75,000 sq.metres per annum	-		Projected in 1956
Voroshilovskoye (Frunze oblast)	Asphalt - concrete	not given	June 1957		
Kyzyl-Asker (Frunze oblast)	Reinforced concrete products	40,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Aug. 1957	

IV. T U R K M E N I S T A N

Situation	Product	Production Figures	Completed	Under Construction	Projected
Ashkhabad	Reinforced concrete products	30,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Begun in May 1955	
Ashkhabad	Glass	not given	Oct. 1955		
Chardzhou	Furniture & wooden construction materials	not given	-	Jan. 1956	
Ashkhabad	Concrete and mortar	36,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Mar. 1956	
Bezmein (near Ashkhabad)	Reinforced concrete products	35,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Aug. 1956	
Bezmein	Cement	not given	-		Projected for Sixth 5-Year Plan
Kizyl-Arvat	Stone wall materials	not given	1956		
Krasnovodsk	Building materials	(plaster-boiling workshop 10,000 tons p.a.)	1st part (plaster boiling workshop) July 1957		
Krasnovodsk	Reinforced concrete products	not given	Oct. 1957		
Nebit-Dag	Reinforced concrete products	not given	Oct. 1957		
Ashkhabad	Silicate products	60,000,000 bricks, 60,000 cu.metres of gas-silicate products, 15,000 tons of lime, per annum	-	To be started 1957	To be finished 1960
Cheleken	Asphalt - concrete	73,000 tons per annum	July 1957		
Ashkhabad	Reinforced concrete products	not given	-		Projected for 1957

Situation	Product	Production Figures	Completed	Under Construction	Projected
Dzhambul	Bricks	not given	-	Mar. 1955	
Dzhambul	Plaster	not given	-	Mar. 1955	
Balkhash	Reinforced concrete products	not given			Projected in 1955
Pavlodar oblast	Reinforced concrete products	30,000 cu.metres per annum	-	May 1955	
Semipalatinsk	Reinforced concrete products	not given	-	June 1955	
Kustanay	Wooden products	not given	-	Aug. 1955	
Kustanay	Slag-blocks	not given	-	Aug. 1955	
Kustanay	Reinforced concrete products	not given	-	Aug. 1955	
Aktyubinsk	Hollow slag-blocks	1,000,000 per annum	Oct. 1955		
Aktas (near Karaganda)	Bricks	131,400,000 per annum (factory fully automatic)	Nov. 1955		
Alma-Ata	Reinforced concrete products	75,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Dec. 1955	
Turkestan	Bricks	28,000,000 per annum	-	Dec. 1955	
Mirgalimsay (S. Kazakhstan oblast)	Reinforced concrete products	not given	Jan. 1956		
Pavlodar	Concrete and mortar	not given	Feb. 1956		
Akmolinsk oblast	Reinforced concrete products	36,000 cu.metres per annum	-	Mar. 1956	
Near Ural'sk	Sand-lime building blocks	Equivalent to 6,000,000 bricks pa	-	Mar. 1956	
Semipalatinsk	Cement	not given	-	Apr. 1956	
West-Kazakhstan oblast	Bricks	28,000,000 per annum	-	Apr. 1956	
West-Kazakhstan oblast	Silicate brick	not given	-		Projected for 1957
Mar'yevka (N. Kazakhstan oblast)	Lime (2 factories)	not given	-		Projected for Sixth 5-Year Plan

Mar'yevka	Reed press-board	200,000	sq.metres per annum	-		Projected
Petropavlovsk	Furniture		not given	-		Projected for Sixth 5-Year Plan
Pavlodar rayon	Wall-blocks	80,000	cu.metres per annum		May 1956	
Pavlodar rayon	Concrete		not given	May 1956		
Pavlodar rayon	Wooden products		not given	-	May 1956	
Pavlodar rayon	Reinforced concrete products		not given	-	May 1956	
Karaganda	Reinforced concrete products		not given	May 1956		
Ust'-Kamenogorsk	Reinforced concrete products		not given	-	May 1956	
Ust'-Kamenogorsk	Pipes for reinforced concrete supports of high voltage transmission lines		not given	-		Projected in 1956
Ust'-Kamenogorsk	Railway sleepers	50,000	per annum	-		Projected in 1956
Ust'-Kamenogorsk	Large silicate blocks	100,000	cu.metres per annum	-		Projected in 1956
Chimkent	Cement		not given	-	Aug.1956	
Munayli-Mola (Gur'yev oblast)	Asphalt and concrete	70,000	tons of asphalt-concrete mixture per annum	Aug. 1956		
Kzyl-Kuginskiy rayon (Gur'yev oblast)	Bricks		not given	Sept.1956		
Alma-Ata	Reinforced concrete products	100,000	cu.metres per annum	-	Sep.1957	
Fort Shevchenko	Blocks from shell-rock		not given	Nov. 1956		
Akmolinsk	Reinforced concrete products	50,000	cu.metres per annum	1st part (capacity of 25,000 cu.metres p.a.) completed 1957		

Situation	Product	Production Figures	Completed	Under Construction	Projected
Karabas (Near Karaganda) Other similar factories also under construction here - no details given.	Reinforced concrete products	20,000 cu.metres per annum	Jan. 1957		
Pavlodar	Aerated and other types of concrete products	not given	-	Jan. 1957	
Petropavlovsk	Reinforced concrete products	not given	June 1957		
Karaganda	Reinforced concrete products	not given	-		Projected

In addition to specific reports on the construction of new factories there are a number of vague references to other projects which are not described individually. According to KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 18.3.55, for example, in Temir-Tau factories producing reinforced concrete parts and wall-blocks were being built. They were to provide 20,000 tons of wall material a year. And KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 21.5.55 reports that factories, each manufacturing 20,000 cu.metres of reinforced concrete products a year, were to be built in Aktyubinsk, Kustanay, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Petropavlovsk. In July 1955 it was reported that during 1955 and 1956 Kazakhstan was to build 85 factories for the manufacture of reinforced concrete products, with an average productivity of 866,000 cu.metres a year; and in November of the same year it was stated that in Karaganda 20 building material factories were then under construction.

According to PRAVDA VOSTOKA, in 1955 factories were being built in Nukus and Namangan for the manufacture of reinforced concrete products; and before the end of the Sixth Five-Year Plan several large brick factories will have been put into operation in the Andizhan oblast. In 1956 PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported that in Tashkent, Samarkand, Fergana and other towns construction of factories for the manufacture of reinforced concrete products was continuing, and that at a number of quarries there were similar factories. And in 1957 it was mentioned that in the Fergana oblast eight brick factories and four lime-kilns had been built, and more brick factories were to be constructed in the Molotov and Kirov rayons.

In KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 21.1.55 mention is made of two factories for the manufacture of reinforced concrete blocks which were to have been put into operation in Frunze and Osh that year. In 1956 brick factories were constructed in the Tyan'-Shan' oblast; and the construction of similar factories was begun in the Moskov and Shaartuz rayons in Tadzhikistan in 1957. In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia efforts are being made to use more reeds and reed pressboard as building materials and to increase their production. In 1955 the large-scale production of reed pressboard was started in Kazakhstan. There are now 50 factories and workshops for its production; and according to KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 21.11.57, 17 more were in the process of construction during 1957, but only one was completed. In the Moskov and Shaartuz rayons of Tadzhikistan too, production of reed pressboard blocks is being extended.

Finally, according to KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 24.12.57, a new self-propelling combine for the manufacture of reinforced concrete products is being constructed in the Stalinabad factory for these products. The combine will produce 20,000 cu.metres of hollow slabs and other building materials a year and will raise production in the factory six times. It is to be completed by the end of 1958.

Source Central Asian Press

INDUSTRY

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

1956 - 57

I. Introduction - II. Exploration for Oil and Natural Gas - III. Developments in Oil and Natural Gas Producing Areas - IV. Oil Refining.

The following article brings up to date the article "Oil Resources of Central Asia and Kazakhstan" in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV,No.3. Readers will find the recently published SW sheet (Turkmenistan) of CARC's new map of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan helpful in locating existing oilfields and new deposits in Turkmenistan and the Bukhara oblast.

I. Introduction

As a result of the decisions taken at the XXth Party Congress (February 1956) greater attention is to be given to prospecting for crude oil in Soviet Central Asia and the adjoining territory of Kazakhstan. During the Sixth Five-Year-Plan (1956-60) financial support for oil prospecting is to be trebled by comparison with the Fifth Five-Year Plan, i.e. 477m. rubles as against 153m. rubles. The richest deposits so far located are those in the west of Turkmenistan. The extent of oil prospecting in this region was more than doubled during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55). Next in importance are the deposits in the south-west of Kazakhstan, while those in the other republics are of minor importance.

II. Exploration for Oil and Natural Gas

A. Seismographic and geologic exploration work and exploratory wells

Turkmenistan

The desert areas of western Turkmenistan are very similar to those of Azerbaydzhan - insofar as geological conditions of oil deposits are concerned.

Soviet geologists believe that in the future an oil industry comparable with that of the Baku region will be developed in western Turkmenistan (RAZVEDKA I OKHRANA NEDR, 1957, No.11, p.39).

Various geophysical methods, such as gravimetry, magnitometry electric resistivity tests, seismic prospecting, etc., have now been employed in Turkmenistan for some years. It is known that "wild cat" drilling gives only about 5 per cent of positive results; with the combined utilization of geophysical and geological data, however, the percentage of satisfactory results obtained from the exploratory drilling rises to 35 per cent. A complex use of geophysical and geological prospecting methods have led to the discovery of new oil deposits in the Fergana Valley and in Turkmenistan, in particular at Kotur-Tepe. The first oil was struck at Kotur-Tepe in a well which had been spudded in in accordance with the data obtained by a detailed seismic investigation. (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 13.7.57.)

Prospecting for oil is advancing deep into the Kara-Kum desert. At Bakhardok several wells have been drilled. Preliminary data indicate favourable results. In the vicinity of Kizyl-Arvat the first exploratory well has been spudded in. Over 30,000 metres should have been drilled in new oil areas in 1957, which marks a threefold increase over 1956. Drilling is being organized in Kamyshdydzh hill in the southern part of the Caspian depression. (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 19.6.57.)

At Kyzyl-Kum, in an area situated 8 km. west of the Kum-Dag oilfield, (Ashkhabad oblast) a large natural gas deposit is being developed.

A considerable number of geological, hydro-geological and geophysical groups are prospecting for oil and natural gas in Turkmenistan and in the adjacent areas of Uzbekistan. As a result of geophysical research, some interesting data were obtained recently; these indicate favourable structural conditions for exploratory drilling operations in new areas of the Caspian depression which is regarded as a promising area. The recent geophysical material also contributed to the selection of a number of areas in the central part of the Kara-Kum desert, in the Kopet-Dag plain (Ashkhabad oblast) and other districts, in which structural and exploratory drilling will be soon organized. Prospects are particularly good in south-western Turkmenistan, where the large Kyzyl-Kum natural gas deposit is situated.

The rhythm of the exploration work, however, is far from being satisfactory: in 1956, for instance, only two new areas - Ankarem and Kotur-Tepe (near Nebit-Dag) were being explored in Turkmenistan. In the light of the recent research work achieved by the Institute of Geology of the Academy of Sciences of the Turkmen SSR, the prospects for the discovery of oil in south-eastern Turkmenistan (Gaurdak area) are promising. Also, in the Kara-Bogaz

Gol area and in the Krasnovodsk peninsula geophysical prospecting continues. In connection with the construction of the Kara-Kum canal south-eastern Turkmenistan is now being developed. Paleogene, jurassic and cretaceous deposits are of a considerable interest in this area.

During the past few years, geological and geophysical prospecting has been considerably intensified in Turkmenistan and in the western regions of Uzbekistan. The exploration areas now include those of the Bukhara-Khiva depression, the Kopet-Dag hollow, the foothills of the Pamir depression, the Kara-Kum platform and the Kara-Bogaz-Gol plain.

As a result of geophysical, and particularly seismic prospecting, two promising structures were found north of Darganata (Chardzhou oblast), in which area exploratory drilling has been organized. The Kamyshildzhik and Gorgan-Dag structures - located south-west of the Kum-Dag oilfield - are still more promising. The Turkmenburneft (Turkmen Oil Drilling Organization) has begun drilling operations in these areas. (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 28.5.57.)

Kazakhstan

One of the reasons for the relatively slow development of the Emba oil region (Gur'yev oblast) - rich in crude oil reserves - is its insufficient geological study. Up to the present, no large scale geological map of this vast territory has ever been made. Geological research work in the Emba region is being carried out by a small group of members of the All-Union Geological Research Institute (VNIGRI) and by the recently organized Petroleum Institute of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences at Gur'yev. The former Institute has undertaken considerable prospecting in the Mangyshlak peninsula.

In the south Emba region more than 800 salt dome structures have been encountered by Soviet geologists. The area situated between the Ural and Volga rivers is also of some interest for prospectors. This is an area of 225,000 sq.km. and like the Emba region is covered with salt domes. On an average, one dome is found in every 750 sq.km. The total number of salt domes in this large area is estimated at about 300, the majority of which are likely to contain oil. Test drilling in domes in the Emba region shows that two out of three yield oil in commercial quantities.

Numerous natural gas indications, including some strong gushers, are known in Kazakhstan; the most promising gas-fields are: Novokazanskiy, and the Novobogatinskoye zones (Gur'yev oblast). (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 22.2.57.)

At present, exploration for petroleum is being organized on a wider scale in the Ural-Emba territory. The search for oil in several new areas, such as

Balkhash, Ala-Kul, Ili, and the Chu-Sary depression, in south-eastern Kazakhstan is being planned. Geological conditions are considered favourable for the discovery of 'big oil' in Kazakhstan according to A. Bogaryrev, Minister of Geology and Sub-Soil Protection of Kazakhstan. (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 11.12.57.)

Geological and geophysical prospecting carried out during the past few years has confirmed the existence of large oil and natural gas resources in a number of areas in the Caspian region and in Central Asia. The discovery between 1955 and 1958 of oil and gas deposits in mesozoic formations may contribute towards the further expansion of the Soviet oil industry in these territories, because, as Russian geologists point out, during the last fifteen years large oil reserves have been found in such strata in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Kuwait, Iraq and - to a lesser extent - in Iran, whose geological structure is somewhat similar to that of Central Asia and the Emba (Caspian) region.

Uzbekistan

Prospecting in the Bukhara oblast resulted in the discovery of natural gas and oil deposits at Dzhar-Kak, Karaulbazar, Satelan-Tepe and Gazhda. At Dzhar-Kak, south-east of the town of Bukhara in the Kyzyl-Kum sands, an oil flow was obtained from a test well. This new oil and natural gas deposit is situated a few kilometres from the railway line. (RAZVEDKA I OKHRANA NEDR, 1957, No.11, p.40.)

Recently several new oil deposits have been struck in the Fergana Valley, namely: Sokh, Rishtan, Areval, western Pal'vantash. In the western Pal'vantash area seismic prospecting led to the finding of paleogene crude oil reserves at a depth of 2,000 metres. This is an interesting find as earlier oil was usually looked for at depths varying between 500 and 1,000 metres.

B. Discoveries of oil and gas in exploration areas

Turkmenistan

Recently a rich oil deposit was struck at Kotur-Tepe situated 17 km. west of Nebit-Dag. The first oil flow was obtained from No.3 deep exploratory well in 1956. No.5 well was completed on 15.6.57; the No.8 well reached a depth of 1,158 metres - the zone of volcanic mud - and drilling was discontinued. No.9 well attained a depth of 1,100 metres. Four drilling rigs are in operation at Kotur-Tepe. This find confirms the hypothesis made by Russian geologists, according to which Turkmenistan possesses prolific crude oil and natural gas reserves.

Kazakhstan

Two new oil-bearing areas were discovered in Kazakhstan in 1955, namely Tazhigali and Teren'-Uzyak, and one more - Tyulyus - in 1957. All these areas are situated in the Gur'yev oblast. The areas of Teren'-Uzyak and Koshkimbet (also discovered in 1955) are situated near the Caspian coast. At Teren'Uzyak, which lies 5-7 km. from the sea, 57 wells were in operation in October 1957. Large crude oil reserves were discovered at Tazhigali, 15 km. south-west from the Karaton oilfield. The No.2 well was yielding an average daily production of 20 tons of oil in July 1957. Ten more wells were brought into operation in this area in 1957.

Uzbekistan

As a result of several years of geological prospecting carried out by the Sredaznefterazvedka (Central Asian Oil Exploration Organization), a new oil deposit was found in the Bukhara oblast, at Dzhar-Kak. Oil was struck in two wells drilled to a depth of 1,200 metres, 60 kilometres south-east of the town of Bukhara. The first exploratory well completed at Karaulbazar yielded oil from lower cretaceous formations, while at Dzhar-Kak oil was struck in the upper jurassic strata. "These discoveries may be of major importance for the further prospecting for petroleum in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics", concludes PRAVDA VOSTOKA 12.12.57.

A few other new oilfields have been brought into production in 1957 in Uzbekistan; these are Severnyy-Sokh, Zapandnyy Pal'vantash and Lyal'-Mikar (the first two in the Fergana Valley and the third in the Surkhan-Dar'ya area). Exploration work is continuing in the Khartum region (Andizhan oblast) and also at Khangiz (Fergana oblast).

Kirgizia

At the Izbaskent field, in the eastern part of the Fergana Valley, which was brought into production in 1956, new oil-bearing horizons were found in 1957. Three exploratory wells yielded oil in commercial quantities from the tenth Bukhara horizon (Altay stage - paleogene formations), at a depth of 2,000 metres. At Izbaskent, oil is usually obtained from an average depth of 2,200 - 2,300 metres. The exploration of the ninth and tenth horizons is being continued to a depth of 2,700 metres. In the eastern part of Izbaskent oil was found in the fifth and the third horizons. A new oil deposit was encountered in the east Maylisu area (Fergana Valley) in 1956 and brought into production in 1957.

Fergana Valley
Scale 1 : 1.000.000
Canals.
Main roads.
Towns with population of under 10.000
" " " " between 10.000 and 50.000
" " " " " 50.000 and 100.000
" " " over 500.000
J.P. 1956.
Specialy drawn for the Central Asian Research Centre. - 1956. - J.P.
KAZAKH S. S. R.
KIRGIZ S. S. R.
UZBEK S. S. R.
TADZHIK S. S. R.
CHATKAL' RANGE
KURAMA RANGE
ALAY RANGE
Iskander
Gazalkent
Chirchik
Sary-Agach
Keles
Chukur-Say
Tashkent
Yangi-Bazar
Parkent
Kuylyuk
Kirda
Yangi-Yul'
Molotovo
Toy-Tyube
Chavlisay
Angren
Syr Darya
Il'ich
Soldatskoye
Ak-Kurgan
Pskent
Akhan-Garan
Syr-Dar'inskiy
Buka
Almalyk
Veliko-Alekseyevskiy
Slavyanka
Mirzachul'
Altyn-Topkan
Kara-Mazar
Adrasman
Kurusay
Taboshar
Takeli
Kansay
Chorukh-Dayron
Ursat'yevskaya
Begovat
Farkhad Dam
Nau
Yava
Leninabad
Sovetabad
Chkalovskiy
Proletarsk
Great Fergana Canal
Stalin Canal
Obruchevo
Ura-Tyube
Sulyukta
Isfana
Shakhristan
Kalininabad
Terek-Say
Sumsar
Shekaftaf
Alabuka
Karavan
Kassansay
Yangi-Kurgan
Kyzyl-Dzhar
Dzhangi-Dzhol
Tashkumyr
Mayli-Say
Kok-Tash
Uch-Kurgan
Chartak
Ulychi
Chust
Tyurya-Kurgan
Namangan
North Fergana Canal
Pap
Uygur-Say
Dzhamashuy
Balykchi
Chinadar
Naryn
Paytek
Kuygan-Yar
Kokan-Kishlak
Kara-Bar'yan
Aim
Changyrtash
Andizhan
Yuzhnyy
Alamyshik
Voroshilovo
Khanabad
Uzgen
Oktyabr'skoye
Kok-Yangak
Bazar-Kurgan
Dzhalal-Abad
Karasu
Sufi-Kishlak
Kurgan-Tepe
Osh
Nariman
Stalino
Nasretdin-Bek
Yaz'yavan
Khodzhiabad
Leninsk
Bulak-Bashi
Aravan
Markhamat
Tyuya-Muyun
Iski-Naukat
Ashtsu
Dangara
Kokand
Molotovo
Gorskoye
Kirovo
Serovo
Vannovskiy
Margelan
Gorchakovo
South Fergana Canal
Fergana
Palvantash
Kuva
Kuybyshevo
Alty-Aryk
Kamyshan
Shorsu
Kim
Nefteabad
Isfara
Shurab
Batken
Sokh
Khaydarkan
Shakhimardan
Aval'
Kuvasay
Kuzyl-Kiya
Molotovabad
Chimion
Vuadil'
Sovetskiy
Frunze
Chauvay
69
70
71
72
73
41
40

Deep exploratory drilling is being carried out at Papan, Kara-Bulak and Shanatdin.

Tadzhikistan

At Nefteabad - situated 30 kilometres from the old Kim oilfield (Fergana Valley) - the average depth of wells varies between 700 and 750 metres Owing to turbine drilling, these wells are completed within 8-11 days, as compared with 17 to 25 days required by rotary drilling.

C. Natural gas deposits in Central Asia

Several gas-bearing areas are known to exist in Central Asia; these include the Kyzyl-Kum deposit - in the Balkhash depression (Turkmenistan), the Khodzhiabad deposit (Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan), the Lyal'-Mikar area (Surkhan-Dar'ya district, Uzbekistan), and Tumshuk (Tadzhik depression).

Prospecting during the last few years has revealed a new oil and gas-bearing area in the Bukhara-Khiva depression. Six either gas-bearing or gas and oil-bearing zones were discovered here. Gas and oil deposits correspond to cretaceous and jurassic sediments. The Setelan-Tepe, Dzhar-Kak, Karaulbazar and Sary-Tash deposits form the Kagan group of gas-bearing areas situated south of the town of Bukhara. The main productive formations are the twelfth and fifteenth horizons. The twelfth layer is represented by cretaceous sandstone strata striking at depths of 750-900 metres. Gas yields vary between 100 and 2,000 cu.metres per well per day. The fifteenth horizon - represented by jurassic limestone - strikes at a depth of 1,250 - 1,300 metres and yields 100 cu.metres of natural gas per day per well.

The Gazhda and Tash-Kuduk gas deposits are located west of Bukhara. At Gazhda a strong gas gusher was obtained from upper cretaceous strata, at Tash-Kuduk - a powerful gusher with an initial daily yield of 180,000 cu.metres came from the twelfth horizon (lower cretaceous).

In Tadzhikistan, the Kizyl-Tumshuk natural gas deposit will be brought into production by 1960; this will ensure the supply of Stalinabad with cheap fuel.

In Uzbekistan, the Lyal'-Mikar deposit is also to be brought into regular production in a few years.

A special decision was taken by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in December 1956 on "the intensification of geological prospecting for oil and

natural gas in the western part of Central Asia". These operations will include the geological and geophysical search for natural gas and deep exploratory drilling. (GAZOVAYA PROMYSHLENNOST', 1957, No.11, p.12.)

III. Developments in Oil and Natural Gas Producing Areas

A. New producing wells

Turkmenistan

In 1956 the Kotur-Tepe oil-bearing area was discovered. On the 19th July 1957 No.4 well was brought into production at Kotur-Tepe; this well yields 100 tons per day under its own pressure. The first off-shore oilfield in Turkmenistan will be soon put into operation in the Cheleken peninsula. (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 25.7.57 and 20.7.57.) Another oil-flow was obtained at Kotur-Tepe from a depth of about 2,000 metres. (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 20.12.57.)

New oil-bearing areas have been brought into regular production in the Cheleken peninsula and western Nebit-Dag. A large natural gas deposit was found in Kyzyl-Kum and is now being tested. According to the head of the Turkmenneft (Turkmen Oil Authority), P.K. Mravin, crude oil production in Turkmenistan rose more than five times during the last five years.

Kazakhstan

Eighty new wells were brought into production in the Emba region in 1956. Most of these produced oil under their own pressure. The commercial speed of drilling was 1,500 metres per month per rig.

At Karaton a new well was completed in February 1957; it yields 30 tons of oil and 12,000 cubic metres of natural gas per day. (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 23.2.57.) At Khartum one of the new gas deposits, the No.2 test well, yielded a strong gas gusher from a depth of 2,600 metres (up to two million cubic metres of gas a day.) (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 12.7.57.)

Uzbekistan

At Severnyy-Sokh an oil flow was obtained from No.10 well; this was the fourth flow produced in this area last year. Oil-bearing sandstone strata strike here at a relatively small depth. This new field has been put into operation. Four more exploratory wells were completed and several new wells were spudded in in 1957. In the western Pal'vantash area an oil flow was

obtained from No.7 well which was yielding 100 tons of crude oil a day in July 1957. (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 12.7.57.) At Lyal'-Mikar (Surkhan-Dar'ya district) wells Nos.13, 19 and 21 have been brought into production.

Kirgizia

At Kok-Tash (Fergana Valley), only 13 out of 34 new wells drilled in this oilfield have been brought in. A total of 80,000 metres should have been drilled in Kirgizia in 1957. At Changyrtash, also in the Fergana Valley, hydraulic formation fractioning is being practised; in 10 wells out of 12, in which this secondary recovery method was applied, the crude output doubled. A new oil pool was struck and brought in at Maylisu in 1957. Inclined-directional drilling and turbine drilling are now employed in Kirgizia.

Tadzhikistan

At the Kim field Nos.149, 150 and 151 wells were completed in 1957. Crude oil output rose by 40 per cent in the republic in 1956 as compared with 1955. Turbine drilling is now used.

B. Oil and gas pipelines (existing, under construction, or planned)

1. Cheleken - Kotur-Tepe - Belek (Turkmenistan): oil pipeline (under construction). (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 8.10.57.)

2. Azizbekovo (Cheleken peninsula) - Karagel (Turkmenistan): oil pipeline (planned). (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 5.12.57.)

3. Kum-Dag - Krasnovodsk (Turkmenistan): gas line (under construction). (PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, 1957, No.4, p.27.)

4. Kyzyl-Kum - Krasnovodsk (Turkmenistan): 150 km. gas pipeline (planned).

5. Teren'-Uzyak - Karaton (Kazakhstan): 20 km. oil pipeline (existing). (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 22.1.57.)

6. Khodzhiabad - Fergana (Uzbekistan): gas line (under construction), should have been completed in 1957. (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 17.2.57.)

7. Bukhara - Tashkent - Samarkand (Uzbekistan): gas line (under construction). (STROITEL'STVO PREDPRIYATIY NEFTYANOY PROMYSHLENNOSTI, 1957, No.10, p.2.)

8. Severnyy-Sokh - Kokand (Uzbekistan): gas line (planned). (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 17.2.57.)

9. Severnyy-Sokh - Shor-Su (Uzbekistan): gas line (planned). (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 17.2.57.)

IV. Oil Refining

Turkmenistan

A large new refinery exists at Krasnovodsk at which the crude extracted in the Cheleken peninsula, Nebit-Dag and Kum-Dag oilfields is treated. Also a topping plant, which was built in 1936-9, a primary distillatory and a cracking plant completed in 1947-8, are in operation at Nebit-Dag.

Kazakhstan

A refinery was built after the war at Gur'yev where part of the crude produced in the Emba region is being treated, while the rest is being refined at Orsk (Orenburg oblast' ex-Chkalov), which refinery is linked by a 713 km. long crude oil pipeline with Gur'yev. To the main Gur'yev-Orsk pipeline are linked local lines conveying crude oil from various oilfields of the Kazakhstanneft (Kazakh Oil Authority).

A new refinery is now under construction at Pavlodar, which town will be branched to the Tuymaza-Omsk-Irkutsk trunk pipeline. The Pavlodar refinery will operate on the Volga-Ural crude. The plant under construction is situated six kilometres north of the town of Pavlodar. The crude oil will be pumped to the new refinery from the city of Omsk. The main petroleum products to be produced here are to be petrol, kerosene and lubricating oils to supply the reclaimed new lands in the north of Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan

In addition to the old, but modernized, Vannovskiy refinery situated in the Fergana Valley (Vannovskiy railway station), a large new refinery is now under construction in the northern outskirts of the town of Fergana. This refinery once completed will supply with petroleum products Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia. (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 17.2.57.)

Sources

1. Razvedka i Okhrana Nedr, 1957, No.11.

2. Gazovaya Promyshlennost', 1957, No.11.

3. Planovoye Khozyaystvo, 1957, No. 4.

4. Stroitel'stvo Predpriyatiy Neftyanoy Promyshlennosti, 1957, No.10.

5. Central Asian Press.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ORAL ART AND LITERATURE OF THE KAZAKHS OF RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA. By Thomas G. Winner, Assistant Professor of Russian Language and Literature, Duke University. Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1958, 269pp. Price: Six Dollars.

A summary of the contents of Dr. Winner's book was contained in a notice published in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.V of 1957, No.2. The book has now been published and has amply fulfilled its promise of a notable contribution to the study of Central Asian culture.

For many readers the most interesting part of the book will be that dealing with Kazakh literature before it became subjected to Western influences, that is to say, before the appearance of the Russians during the eighteenth century. Owing to the total absence of written literature during this period and to the fact that by no means all of the oral literature has been transcribed, the section dealing with early folklore and the heroic epos only occupies about one-third of the volume. It contains however a wealth of examples from the poems of the traditional bards and forms a fitting introduction to the transitional period when the Kazakhs came under Tsarist rule and a written language began slowly to develop, and thence to the Soviet period when both oral and written literatures became largely a medium for political and ideological propaganda. Dr. Winner deals with both these latter periods with commendable restraint, but he makes it quite clear that present day Kazakh literature is rapidly losing, if indeed it has not already lost, its earlier spontaneity, and is thus being brought into line with the general run of Soviet literature and particularly with that of the other "nationalities".

The biographies of some of the principal figures of the transitional period of Kazakh literature such as Abay, Velikhanov, and Baytursunov are of particular interest, although they appear to be compiled from sources setting forth the orthodox Soviet point of view. It is somewhat surprising that no mention is made of the controversial views which have from time to time been expressed about Abay's "world outlook" or of the serious criticism which was levelled at Mukhtar Auezov for maintaining that Abay was a devout Muslim. The absence of any reference to the new official attitude to Abay expressed in a review of Beysembiyev's book on him contained in KOMMUNIST KAZAKHSTANA No.9 of 1956, is perhaps to be explained by the fact that Dr. Winner's book had gone to press before that date. (See CAR, Vol.V, No.1, p.3.) The biographical

note on Baytursunov is of great interest: this important pioneer of Kazakh prose literature not only "lost his position of literary leadership" but was completely discredited as a national figure. There is a brief mention of him in the first edition of the Soviet encyclopaedia but none at all in the second.

The selection of background historical and cultural material in a book of this kind is always a matter of great difficulty. Dr. Winner's historical surveys are admirably concise and objective. The chapter on the Kazakh culture pattern is also extremely well done. The account of Kazakhstan's economic achievements on pp.136-7 is less satisfactory. It is not true, for instance, that the Emba oilfields are "second only to those in Baku". Many readers would derive the impression that the startling economic achievements are largely, if not entirely, the work of the Kazakhs themselves. It is only added as an afterthought that "there has been a considerable influx of Russian technicians and skilled workers into the area". In fact, however, more than half of Kazakhstan's eight million population is now non-Asian, mostly Russian or Ukrainian. This is a highly relevant fact when considering the future of Kazakh literature, as is also the fact confirmed by Soviet statistics, that 66 per cent of the children in Kazakhstan now receive their education in the Russian language (KUL'TURNOYE STROITEL'STVO SSR, Moscow, 1956).

The book is well documented from both Tsarist and Soviet sources, but the absence of a bibliographical note or indeed of any kind of description of the source material used is regrettable. Either of these would have been of great assistance to students of this little-known subject. As it is, the extent of the sources used is difficult to determine since not all their authors are even mentioned in the index. A notable omission, incidentally, is Kul'teleyev's UGOLOVNOYE OBYCHNOYE PRAVO KAZAKHOV (Moscow 1955) (see CAR Vol.V, Nos.1 and 2), which does not appear to have been consulted at all.

A serious defect in this valuable book is the way in which the author has handled the admittedly complicated problem of the rendering in latin characters of Russian, Kazakh and other foreign words. Russian words are translated according to an inexact system which omits symbols for certain letters. It is by no means clear to what original script the rendering of Kazakh words has been related - to the Perso-Arabic script, to Baytursunov's modified version of it, to the Unified Latin Alphabet of 1930, or to the present cyrillic alphabet. If, on the other hand, a broad phonetic transcription has been intended, it is doubtful if many readers will grasp without being told that 'dž' in Kazakh words represents the English 'j' and that 'j' represents 'y'. There are a number of mistakes in the transliteration of Arabic and Persian words although care has been taken to insert diacritical marks, often quite wrongly (e.g. Firdūsi, 'adāt). A

more satisfactory plan might have been to adopt the same system of transliteration from both Russian and cyrillized Kazakh, using special symbols for the few letters peculiar to Kazakh - q, h, ö etc. In any event, a note at the beginning of the book explaining the system or systems followed is very desirable and it is hoped that one may be added to subsequent editions of this important and scholarly work.

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE WORLD TODAY. Edited by Werner Burmeister. Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1958, 150pp. Price: Seventeen Shillings and Sixpence.

This slim but stimulating volume contains essays by Werner Burmeister on Western Europe, Bernard Lewis on the Middle East, Roland Oliver on Africa, Richard Pear on America, and Hugh Tinker on Asia. Of particular interest to students of Soviet Eastern policies are the essays on the Islamic Middle East and on Asia and India and China. In writing of the Soviet Union's attractions for the peoples of the Middle East, Lewis emphasizes a point which is often lost sight of or misunderstood. He says: "Whatever her (Russia's) behaviour towards Turkish and Persian speaking Muslims of the USSR, she is not compromised in Arab eyes by any previous record of domination or interference in Arab countries". And later: "In the Middle East, as in many other parts of the world, it is authoritarian and not democratic government that is best known, and best understood, and the capricious dictatorship of Moscow has not the strange and repellent aspect that it offers to the Western observer".

Although Hugh Tinker specifically excludes Russian Asia from consideration in his essays, they contain much that is applicable to the state of mind of the Asian population of the eastern part of the Soviet Union.

N E W S D I G E S T

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Beginning with this issue of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW administrative changes in the following appointments only will be recorded: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers and State Planning Commissions, Ministers of Defence. Any other cabinet posts held by non-natives will also be noted.

The present holders of these offices in the republics are as follows:

Uzbekistan

See CAR, Vol.VI, No.1.

Tadzhikistan

Rakhmatov	Chairman of Council of Ministers
Tsvigun, S.K.	Chairman of Defence Committee

Kirgizia

Razakov, I.R.	First Secretary of the CC of the Kirgiz CP
Churkin, V.N.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Kirgiz CP
Dikambayev, K.D.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Ermolov, I.G.	Chairman of Defence Committee

Turkmenistan

Babayev, S.	First Secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP
Durdyyev	Second Secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP
Karayev, D.	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Bannikov, S.G.	Chairman of Defence Committee

Kazakhstan

Yakovlev, I.D.	Second Secretary of the CC of the Kazakh CP
Kunayev, D.A.	Chairman of Council of Ministers
Krylov, N.A.	Chairman of State Planning Commission
Gubin, V.V.	Chairman of Defence Committee

Territorial Changes

Uzbekistan

By decree of 27th January 1958 the urban type settlement Denau, Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast, to be a town of oblast subordination. VVS. 14th February 1958

Turkmenistan

By decree of 12th December 1957, the Vekil'-Bazar rayon, Mary oblast, has been abolished and its territory incorporated into the Mary rayon. VVS. 31st January 1958

Kazakhstan

The settlement Zarya of the Karmachinsk rayon, Kzyl-Orda oblast, to be a workers' settlement and renamed Leninskiy. VVS. 14th February 1958

By decree of 25th February, the settlement im. 28 Gvardeytsev of the Koksu rayon, Taldy-Kurgan oblast, transferred to the category of a workers' settlement and renamed Rudnichniy. VVS. 19th March 1958

AGRICULTURE

Cotton

Cotton delivery targets for 1958 in the various republics are as follows:

Uzbekistan	3,000,000	tons
Tadzhikistan	450,000	"
Kirgizia	150,000	"
Turkmenistan	410,000	"
Kazakhstan	205,000	"

KT. 25th February 1958

Livestock

On 1st January livestock numbers in Central Asian republics were:

	Large horned cattle	Goats	Sheep	Pigs	
Tad.	582,800	629,100	2,098,500	50,700	(KT. 27.2.58)
Kirg.	702,000	402,000	5,043,000	128,000	(SK. 16.2.58)
Kaz.	4,800,000	23,000,000		1,100,000	(KP. 11.2.58)

Рисунок Н. ИБРАГИМОВА
(узбекский сатирический журнал «Муштум»).



В некоторых колхозных агротехнических кружках...

A kolkhoz agrotechnical study group ...

...во время занятий.

... at work.

Reproduced from *Mushtum*.

New Lands

Since the beginning of the new lands campaign in Kazakhstan in 1954, 21,065,000 ha. have been ploughed up. A further 3m.ha. are to be brought under cultivation by the spring of 1959. KP. 19th December 1957

According to a Tass report of 6th February from Alma-Ata, 200 families from Byelorussia settled in the Akmolinsk and Karaganda oblasts in 1957.

In the current year another 1,000 families from the Ukraine, Moldavia and Lithuania are expected to arrive in Kazakhstan.

Since the beginning of the new lands campaign 47,230 families have settled in the republic. KT. 8th February 1958

Sovkhozes

In 1957, 199 new sovkhozes were established in Kazakhstan bringing the total in the republic to 813. The sovkhozes comprise 60 per cent of the land sown to grain and contain over 40 per cent of all cattle.
KP. 25th January 1958

FUEL AND POWER

Coal

Coal output in the various republics in 1957 was:

Uzbekistan	3,234,000 tons		PV. 20th February 1958
Tadzhikistan	770,000 "		KT. 27th February 1958
Kirgizia	3,100,000 "		SK. 16th February 1958
Kazakhstan	30,700,000 "		KP. 11th February 1958

A new mine, the Dzhin-Dzhigan, is being sunk to the north-east of Kyzyl-Kiya. When completed it will produce 450,000 tons of coal per year.
SK. 9th March 1958

Over the past two years the output of coal in the Karaganda mines has gone up by nearly 8,500 tons daily. Tass, 15th January 1958

Coal

Work has been started on the construction of three big mines in the west of the Karaganda coalfield. When completed they will have a daily output of 9,000 tons of high-quality coking coal. This Tenteskiy coal will be used in the blast furnaces of the Karaganda metallurgical plant. There are 40 seams in the area with a total capacity of approximately 4.5m. tons. A 25 km. railway and 15 km. of road are being built to the site and a power-station is under construction. Tass, 16th January 1958

Not far from the settlement Maykain in the Karaganda economic region geologists have discovered coal deposits estimated at one milliard tons. The coal is of very high quality and has a much smaller ash content (zol'nost') than that produced in the Ekibastuz region. It lies near the surface and will be mined by the open-cast method.

Large reserves of limestone, heat-resistant clay, gravel and water have also been found in the area. KP. 22nd February 1958

Electricity

Work has started on the construction of the Alma-Ata hydroelectric station. In 1958 a railway line is to be built linking the site with the Turksib railway. KP. 19th December 1957

On the Chirchik river 19 power-stations have already been built and three more are to be constructed. A water reservoir with a total capacity of 53 milliard cubic feet is also to be built in the Tyan'-Shan' mountains. By 1960 the output of electricity in Uzbekistan is to increase by 50 per cent. (See also CAR, Vol.IV, No.3, pp.269-71.) Moscow Radio, 19th March 1958

A single power grid for Kazakhstan is being developed by the Institute of Energetics of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences in connection with the construction of big new power-stations and the expansion of those already in operation. Electric power output in the republic is to increase tenfold in the next 15 years.

Thus the Altay electric grid, which supplies electricity to the non-ferrous metal industry in the East-Kazakhstan economic region, will be considerably extended and will include new power-stations on the Irtysh and its tributaries.

A number of power-stations are already under construction in the Pavlodar oblast and another big generating plant will be built in the Kustanay oblast

where cheap coal from the Ubagan basin will be used. A power-station is also to be built at Kapchagay on the Ili river; it will supply the Alma-Ata economic region. /Construction of the Kapchagay power-station was supposed to have started in 1956 - see CAR, Vol.IV, No.3, p.274. Ed./

Tass, 20th March 1958

Gas

An automatic gas-filling station (avtogazonapolnitel'naya stantsiya) has been built on the outskirts of Andizhan. It is the first of its kind in Central Asia and will provide compressed natural gas for specially constructed trucks and lorries, the GAZ-51. These can cover 400 km. on one cylinder of compressed gas. PV. 22nd March 1958

In the village of Saykel'dy and Urabashi settlement in the Fergana oblast the first kolkhoz gas pipelines in Uzbekistan are under construction.

P. 11th January 1958

Oil

Oil output in 1957 was as follows:

Uzbekistan	1,115,000 tons	PV. 20th February 1958
Kirgizia	356,000 "	SK. 16th February 1958
Turkmenistan	3,794,000 "	TI. 21st February 1958
Kazakhstan	1,438,000 "	KP. 11th February 1958

Three new oil wells went into production in January and February at the newly discovered Izbaskent deposits; 40 more wells are to be commissioned by the end of the year. Tass, 14th February 1958

INDUSTRY

New Factories

A carpet-weaving factory is currently under construction in Khodzhent. It will be completed by 1960 and will be equipped with the most up-to-date looms. KT. 11th February 1958

Frunze: A recently completed factory has begun the production of pick-up lorries, 4,500 of which are to be delivered to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the republic by the end of the year.

The factory of scientific-medical appliances - the first of its kind in Central Asia - which is still under construction has already gone into production. On 5th March the first centrifuges for the separation of liquids were assembled. It is planned to produce 200 of these by the end of June.

When completed the factory will manufacture a large variety of instruments and apparatuses used in medicine, and in the oil, food and machine-building industries. Among these will be electrophoretic apparatuses for the automatic recording of complex albumen compounds (100 of these are to be produced by the end of the current year) and an electronic level recorder, which, by means of photoelements (fotoelementov), will continually record the level of liquids, and granulated and free-flowing (sypu-chikh) substances in sealed reservoirs where acurate measurements are not possible by any other means. This instrument will be particularly useful in flour mills, and sugar, cement and oil refining enterprises.

Factories for the manufacture of large partition panels and for reinforced concrete are also currently under construction.

Tass, 14th February 1958
SK. 8th March 1958

Metallurgy

In 1957 the Karaganda economic region produced more than 60 per cent of all copper mined in the USSR and 40 per cent of all smelted copper. Under the long-term plan the copper industry will continue to develop rapidly. The prospective copper resources of the Dzhezkazgan area alone exceed the richest copper deposits of South America. (See also CAR, Vol.V, No.3, pp.338-40.) The seven-year plan envisages a doubling of the output of copper ore compared with 1957. New dressing plants are to be set up and smelting works built. The group of non-ferrous enterprises to be built during the next few years will be known as Bolshoy Dzhezkazgan. The capacity of the Balkhash copper smelting works, the biggest in the country, will be increased by 50 per cent.

At Pavlodar, a large aluminium works is under construction for the processing of the Turgay and Akmolinsk bauxite deposits.

For economic reasons it has been decided in future to manufacture within the Karaganda economic region various electric locomotives, winches, lifting gear, electrical equipment, automatic tools and a number of other articles required by the rapidly expanding mining and metallurgical industries there. The manufacture of Donbas-6 mining combines, vacuum and loading pumps, and drying equipment has already been mastered locally. Tass, 31st January 1958
KP. 1st February 1958

Metallurgy

The Ust'-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc combine has started to manufacture tellurium. The Irtysh copper-smelting works since the beginning of the year have been producing high-grade copper. KP. 28th February 1958

In 1957 Uzbekistan produced 230,200 tons of steel.
PV. 20th February 1958

IRRIGATION

The "Greater Naryn" Scheme

The Naryn river drops 3,500 metres between its source in the Petrov Glacier and the Fergana Valley, where its waters represent an enormous source of power. A new scheme for the utilization of this power, prepared by members of the Central Asian Branch of the Institute of Hydrotechnical Installations, envisages the construction of a hydro-electric power cascade on the river and its tributaries. Surveys have already established that twenty power plants with a total capacity well above that of the Kuybyshev plant on the Volga can be built in the Naryn basin. One of the units of the cascade will be built in the Togus-Taraus Gorge at Tash-Kumyr. A dam 200 metres high will create an enormous reservoir the waters of which will feed the irrigation canals of the Fergana Valley and the Golodnaya Step'.

A particularly interesting feature of the scheme is the plan to utilize the alpine lake Son-Kul, which empties into the Naryn, as a source of hydro-electric power. The lake lies at a height of over 3,000 metres above sea level and holds some 2,400m. cubic metres of water. A tunnel 5,700 metres long for drawing off the water, and a turbine tunnel 4 km. long will be cut in the mountains encircling the lake; they will channel the waters and hurl them against the turbine blades at the power plant from a height of one kilometre. This height will ensure the great capacity of the plant and will obviate the need for vast quantities of water.

The construction of the first unit - the Uch-Kurgan hydro-power plant with a total capacity of 112,000 kw. - is already under way. When completed it will supply electric power to the Dzhalal-Abad and Osh oblasts of Kirgizia and three neighbouring oblasts in Uzbekistan. Tass, 13th March 1958

"Baby" suction dredgers manufactured by the Tashkent engineering works have considerably speeded up improvement work in the Khorezm oblast. Small and light they move along canals two metres wide and remove 9,000 cubic metres of silt per month. Tass, 16th February 1958

Work has started on the construction of a reservoir two kilometres from Muminabad. It will cover an area of 250 ha. and will be 35 metres deep; the dam will be 1,360 metres long. It is planned to complete the work by the beginning of 1959. KT. 17th March 1958

The irrigation systems of the Kirgiz Republic are to be centrally controlled by a system of telemechanical installations developed by a group of Kirgiz scientists. Instruments at the control plant will record conditions at the flood gates, the temperature of the air and water, the amount of water entering the canals and its disposal. To prevent the freezing of the flood gates in winter, heating installations set up on the gates will automatically come into operation when the water temperature nears freezing point. Tass, 7th February 1958

Work is to start shortly on the construction of a vast new reservoir with a total capacity of 5.7 milliard cubic metres near Chardara in the South-Kazakhstan oblast. This is part of the plan to increase the water supply to the irrigation systems in the lower reaches of the Syr-Dar'ya. When completed it will irrigate an additional 160,000 ha. of cotton and rice fields, and supply water to 4m. ha. of grazing land in the Kyzyl-Kum desert.

The reservoir is to have an earthen dam 4.8 km. long and 23.5 metres high, and a hydroelectric station with devices for throwing 1,000 cubic metres of water per second. A regulator for the Kyzyl-Kum canal, as well as the Arna-Say earthen dam 7 km. long with devices for throwing 3,500 cubic metres of water per second, are also to be incorporated into the Chardara scheme. KP. 11th January 1958
Moscow Radio, 1st March 1958

The first section of the Bugun' dam of the Arys-Turkestan canal in the South-Kazakhstan oblast has been completed. (See CAR, Vol.V, No.3, p.282.)
KP. 31st October 1957

In west Kazakhstan the Ural river is to be linked with the Kushum. The first 100 km. of the new canal have already been built and as soon as the old dry beds of the Syr-Dar'ya, Zhana-Dar'ya and Kuvan-Dar'ya are linked to the river over 1.5m. ha. of the new grazing land will become available.
Moscow Radio, 1st March 1958

Millions of cubic metres of water lying at a great depth under the bed of the Zeravshan river are to be pumped for irrigation. The first 100 wells are to be sunk this year. KP. 1st February 1958

A group of hydro-geologists of the North-Kazakhstan Geologic Administration have discovered enormous subterranean pools covering an area of 200,000 square kilometres in the Turgay Step'. In the current year 15 deep wells are to be sunk in the area. KP. 25th March 1958

The Kazakh irrigation network covers 1,440,000 ha. and estuary irrigation (limannoye orosheniye) 1.5m. ha. Much of it, however, is in an unsatisfactory condition. KP. 25th January 1958

A map showing the underground water resources in the Golodnaya Step' has been drawn up in Uzbekistan. This shows the quantity of water, its chemical composition and the most suitable spots for sinking artesian wells. A laboratory of Regional Hydrography has been set up under the Uzbek Academy of Sciences to develop research in this field. The laboratory is currently studying the underground water resources of the Fergana Valley and the Bukhara oasis. Tass, 21st March 1958

NATURAL CONDITIONS

On 30th March KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA published a brief article by B. Snegov entitled "PECHORA I VYCHEGDA POTEKUT v KASPIY". (The Pechora and Vychegda will flow into the Caspian.) From this it appears that an intensive study of the various schemes proposed for restoring the level of the Caspian Sea (see CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp.212-15) has shown the Pechora-Vychegda plan to be the most practical and expedient. It will enable the sea to receive every year 41 milliard cubic metres of water (i.e. an equivalent of the annual flow of three such rivers as the Syr-Dar'ya).

The scheme envisages the construction of three dams: one, 80 metres high and 12 kms. long will be built on the alignment of the Pechora in the Ust'-Boy rayon, another on the Vychegda and the third in the upper reaches of the Kama. All these dams will create enormous reservoirs which will be linked by canals. The Kama-Vychegda canal will be 95 kms. long and will have a capacity of 2,800 cubic metres of water per second. The levels in the three reservoirs will be equal, and the Pechora will flow north, the Vychegda west and the Kama south.

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Death of Professor Reysner

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW learnt with regret of the death of the well-known Soviet orientalist and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Igor' Mikhaylovich Reysner on the 7th of February. Reported in PRAVDA, 10th February 1958

Delegations

B. Bul'trikova, Minister of Social Security of Kazakhstan, N. Aldabergenev, Chairman of the Stalin kolkhoz, Taldy-Kurgan oblast, and Mufti Ziyautdin Babakhanov, Chairman of the Moslem Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and a member of the World Peace Council, were on the Soviet delegation which attended the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Cairo in 1957. KP. 19th December 1957
Soviet Union, 1958, No.96

Professors Cyril Blake and Richard Scammon (?) from America, together with the editor of "Fortune", Hedley Donovan, paid a brief visit to Tashkent. PV. 15th March 1958

An Egyptian government delegation of economists headed by the Minister for Industry Aziz Sidki, paid an official four-day visit to Tashkent. The delegates toured the city and surrounding countryside and inspected several textile factories. PV. 22nd, 23rd, & 24th January 1958

A delegation of Persian women composed of university lecturers and social and political workers arrived in Stalinabad on 23rd March on a visit to the republic. KT. 25th March 1958

Education and Research

By the end of 1957 there were 5,800 schools in Uzbekistan with a total of 1,300,000 pupils. In 1958 these figures are to be increased to 6,246 and 1,316,500 respectively. PV. 18th January 1958
20th February 1958

In 1957 over 5,500 specialists of various sorts graduated from the tekhnicums and other higher educational establishments in Kirgizia. SK. 16th February 1958

The Kazakh Council of Ministers has passed a resolution authorizing the setting up of 66 new instructional establishments which will provide one-year courses for graduates of 7 and 10-year schools in the use of agricultural machinery and in the latest techniques. It is estimated that these "schools" will train some 10,000 workers. KP. 16th February 1958

The Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR has organized a new Research Institute of Law and Philosophy. It comprises five departments: Soviet construction, theory and history of law and government, criminal law, civil and kolkhoz-agricultural law, and philosophy. KP. 18th January 1958

The Co-ordinating Council of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR has decided to set up in Gur'yev a branch of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. This will comprise four scientific-research institutes: mining and geology, oil, chemistry and mineral salts, ichthyology and hydrobiology; and three departments: energetics, building and building materials, and economics.

The institute of mining and geology will be mainly concerned with analysing the results of prospecting operations in the oil, coal and ore bearing regions. The oil institute will conduct research into the means of the further exploitation of newly-discovered oil regions, into the technology of drilling deep and extra-deep wells in the conditions obtaining in western-Kazakhstan, and on the introduction of atomic energy into the oil industry. The institute of chemistry and mineral salts will study the composition and properties of oil and develop new and better oil-refining techniques.

The rational utilization of fish reserves of the Caspian, Aral, Balkhash and other basins of the republic will be investigated by the institute of ichthyology and hydrobiology. This institute will also develop methods of increasing the reproduction of fish, and will make a study of fish diseases. KP. 30th March 1958

The Kazakh branch of the all-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences has been reorganized into an Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Kazakh SSR with thirteen scientific-research departments. KP. 25th January 1958

The Kazakh Branch of the USSR Academy of Building and Architecture has been established in Alma-Ata. It incorporates the Institute of Construction and Building Materials of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences and the Central Research Laboratory.

Malgabar Mendikulov has been appointed director.
Tass, 7th January 1958

The Uzbek Hydro-Meteorological Board has begun the construction of a research station for the observation of mountain water flow at an altitude of 2,500 metres in the Chatkal'skiy Range. Tass, 20th January 1958

An Institute of Pest Control and Plant Protection has been established in Tashkent. Tass, 23rd January 1958

Medical

A research Institute of Roentgenology, Radiology and Oncology has been organized in Tashkent.

It is equipped with the latest apparatus (including the teleradium machine GUT-SO-400) and comprises the following departments: experimental, clinical, biochemical, pathohistological, radiometric and an isotopic laboratory.

Besides conducting research the institute will also provide advanced training for suitably qualified scientific workers. Prof. D.M. Abdurasulev has been appointed director. PV. 5th March 1958

Publications

A new Russian-Kirgiz dictionary (Russko-Kirgizskiy slovar'; Gosudarstvennoye Izd-vo Inostrannykh i Natsional'nykh Slovarey), has been published in Moscow. Edited by Prof. K.K. Yudakhin of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, it has 51,000 words and provides many more idiomatic expressions than the previous Russian-Kirgiz dictionary published in 1944.
SK. 9th March 1958

In the last quarter of 1957 the Tadzhik State Publishing House issued a Russian-Tadzhik dictionary of terms used in cotton cultivation (Russko-Tadzhikskiy slovar' po khlopkovodstvu; Tadzhikgosizdat, Stalinabad, 1957). It is compiled by Ya.I. Kalandarov and Kh.M. Maksudov. According to the press review the dictionary is full of errors and inaccuracies and is urgently in need of revision. KT. 15th February 1958

The Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR has issued a bibliography of all its publications for the period 1943-52 (Bibliografiya pechatnykh izdaniy AN/Uzb. SSR za pervoye desyatiletiye eye sushchestvovaniya 1943-1952).
PV. 6th February 1958

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN, 1872 - 80

Among the papers published in the form of collections by the universities of Central Asia, several during the past few years have been devoted to detailed analyses of periods of Afghan history and the relations between Britain, Russia and Afghanistan. These articles are particularly interesting in that they treat their subject in greater detail than do most of the histories available, and throw light on the present line adopted by Soviet historians towards the conflict of interests in the past between Britain and Russia in Central Asia and the Middle East. The following article is an abridged translation of a paper by F. Kh. Yuldashbayeva which was published in 1955 in TRUDY SAGU (Central Asian State University) (History of Eastern Countries), No.LXVIII, and which was entitled "The Russo-Afghan Demarcation and the Intensification of British Aggression in Central Asia and Afghanistan (1872-1880)".

The majority of sources used for this paper are Russian and the most widely quoted is the Central State Historical Archives of the Uzbek SSR; the English sources include Lady Betty Balfour's THE HISTORY OF LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (the most extensively cited), British and Foreign State papers 1872-1873, Habberton's ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN 1837-1907, Parliamentary Papers 1873, and Seton Watson's BRITAIN IN EUROPE.

The Editors of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW have been fortunate in obtaining a commentary on this article from Sir Olaf Caroe, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., who having been Secretary of the External Affairs Department of the Government of India from 1939-45 and Governor of the North-West Frontier Province 1946-47, has an intimate knowledge of the subject. Sir Olaf begins his commentary with the following introductory note. His remaining comments are interspersed throughout the article where ever appropriate.

The theme of this exposé is that during the period 1869-80 the British government's policy in Asia, from its base in India, was to absorb Afghanistan with the object of using that country as a base for aggression against Russia. The Tsar's government is throughout presented as actuated by a sincere desire for peace, and as long-suffering and unaggressive. Except for a side-reference to the occupation of Khiva there is no allusion to what Russia herself was doing inside Central Asia during this period and in the years immediately preceding and following it. Without that background it is impossible to arrive at anything approaching a true assessment. The article is indeed throughout open to the charge of suppressio veri, suggestio falsi.

The case can best be seen in its real perspective by a glance at the accompanying sketch-map. In the middle of the nineteenth century Russia had overcome Kazakh resistance in the steppe, and by 1863 had advanced into the Tien Shan and occupied Chimkent as well as the territories between the Caspian and Aral seas. At this point the Tsar's Chancellor, Gorchakov, felt that the succession of advances culminating in the capture of Chimkent needed justification before world opinion. He therefore in 1864 addressed a memorandum to the governments of the states with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of his message is clear from the following extract: "The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with."

Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads, and locating it at Chimkent in a fertile country with a sedentary population. Thus far, according to him - and his argument, as stated, was not entirely without substance - and no further.

But the very next year, 1865, saw the capture of Tashkent. Samarkand, forcibly detached from Bukhara, followed three years later, in 1868. Another year, and the state of Bukhara itself was overcome, and the Amir reduced to vassalage. (And here it must be remembered that there was no subsequent withdrawal as with the British from Afghanistan. The Russians came to stay, and in 1920, after burning the famous Bukhara library, the Soviets annexed the entire territory, which forms the main part of the present Uzbekistan.) That is the story up to the time when Yuldashbayeva's article opens. It is to be noted that she does not even refer to any of these extensions of Russian imperialism, even the occupation of Bukhara, although in the Russian context that occupation was equivalent to a British occupation of Afghanistan, and preceded British action by ten years. Nor, like the British occupation, was it reversed once the object was secured.

RUSSIAN ADVANCE
IN CENTRAL ASIA
1734 — 1896
100 0 100 200 300Km.
1734
TO
1842
TO
1847
TO
1853
YEDI-SU
AND
ILI
1854
CHIMKENT
1863
L. Balkhash
L. Issik Köl
ARAL
SEA
UST URT
1863
TRANSOXIANA
AND
SAMARKAND
1868
Sir Darya
TASHKENT
1865
KOKAND
1875-6
KHIVA
1877
TRANSCASPIA
1881
MERV
1884
Amu Darya
BUKHARA
1869
PAMIRS
1896
PENJDEH
1886
CASPIAN SEA
PERSIA
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
RUSSIA
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
40
35
J.P.

In 1873 followed the conquest of Khiva, represented in the article as a counter-stroke to anticipate British expansion in Central Asia. But there was no British expansion in or before that year to the north-west. The Khiva conquest followed on the very heels of the 1873 agreement between Britain and Russia. Disraeli, "the imperialist", is used as a stalking-horse in the article, but he did not come to power until 1874. Are we to assume that the Russian chancellory was so alarmed by the "ride" of one man, Burnaby, to Khiva that it decided on annexation?

Later, in the 1877-86 period, followed Skobelev's conquests of the Turkmen steppe, culminating in the Geok-Tepe slaughter and the Panjdeh incident. /See pp.129-30. Ed./ Meanwhile it is not to be forgotten that Tsarist Russia had in the same period hammered the Caucasian tribes into submission, and had been engaged in a deep penetration of the Balkans in the course of her 1877-78 war against Turkey.

It is now possible to assess the arguments and assertions in Yuldashbayeva's article in a rather clearer perspective. At the outset it may be remarked that, faced by the history of Russian action in the 1860-73 period in the context of Central Asia and the Caucasus, it is not surprising that the British in India felt it incumbent on them to look to their defences in the north. They had to take such measures as were open to them to ensure that Persia and Afghanistan did not go the way of Kokand (Fergana), Bukhara, Khiva and the Caucasus.

The period covered by the article stretches from the accession of Sher Ali Khan to the throne of Afghanistan to the accession of Abdurrahman Khan in 1881. Omitting the usual propaganda introduction it starts with a brief description of the situation in Afghanistan after the death of Dost Muhammad and the transference of the throne of Sher Ali.

I. The Situation in Afghanistan in 1868-70 - II. The Creation of a Buffer State - III. Afghanistan's Intentions in Southern Turkestan - IV. British Expansion in Persia and Eastern Turkestan - V. British Attempts at Expansion in Central Asia - VI. Events Leading up to the Second Afghan War - VII. The Second Afghan War - VIII. The Succession of Yaqub Khan and Abdurrahman Khan.

I. The Situation in Afghanistan in 1868-70

With the aim of consolidating his power Sher Ali sought to obtain help from outside. The British were quick to take advantage of this, proof of which is the suggestion of the Viceroy of India John Lawrence, in 1868, that help should be offered to the Afghan Emir on condition that he agreed to the establishment of "British agents"+ in Herat, Kandahar and at other frontier points in Afghanistan. In March 1869 the new Viceroy of India Lord Mayo met Sher Ali in the Indian town of Ambala for talks, during which Sher Ali begged for help in his struggle against his enemies within the country. The main aim of the British imperialists in the Middle East was the weakening of Russia s position; and as it became evident from the Ambala conference, they rried to turn Afghanistan against Russia, frightening her rulers with the bogey of "Russian aggression".

/Russian aggression in 1869 is characterized as a bogey. Yet, as will be clear from what is said above, by that year Russia had occupied all the plains between the Amu and Syr-Dar'yas, all what is now Kazakhstan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Fergana, and had overcome Bukhara by force. Much of this had taken place in the five years just preceding 1869. It is as if Britain had occupied all Afghanistan, Sistan and Khorasan in the same years. Had she done so, would it have been possible to represent her aggression as a bogey? In this light it is difficult to see how Russia can be represented as having desired to resolve the Central Asian problem by "peaceful means" (see below). - O.C./

In 1870 Abdurrahman Khan, who had failed in his struggle against Sher Ali for the throne, fled to Bukhara, and then to Russian Turkestan. He was well informed about the points of conflict between Russia and Britain and hoped that they might gain him the support of the Tsarist government. After his arrival in Bukhara Abdurrahman Khan wrote to the Governor-General of Turkestan, Kaufman, asking for cooperation in the form of money and arms. During his reception by Kaufman in Tashkent he constantly begged for help in his struggle against Sher Ali, in return for which, if he was successful in seizing power, he promised to turn Afghanistan into a Russian bulwark against the British. Kaufman, obeying the orders of the Russian government not to intensify Russo-British differences on account of Afghanistan, categorically refused to help him. After the arrival of Abdurrahman, Kaufman sent a letter to Sher Ali in which he informed him that Abdurrahman had

---

+ Yuldashbayeva here misquotes Lady Betty Balfour whose original text reads "native agents".

arrived on Russian territory, but, as the Russian government did not intend to help the enemy of the emir, it had not allowed him to return to Afghanistan.

II. The Creation of a Buffer State

The Russian government's desire to resolve the Central Asian problem by peaceful means led in 1869 to talks between Russia and Britain. Britain put forward the idea of creating a "neutral zone" between British and Russian possessions to which the Russian government eagerly agreed hoping in this way to calm British fears of Russian penetration of India. On the 7th of March the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gorchakov instructed the ambassador in London to tell the British government: "Afghanistan is entirely outside the sphere of Russian influence. She has no intention whatever of interfering or intervening in any way so as to damage the independence of that state." Besides this the Minister added: "If London, as we hope, holds the same views as ourselves, the wish expressed by Lord Clarendon will be realized; our dominions in Asia will be separated by an independent zone..." Gorchakov in fact suggested including Afghanistan in the neutral zone. The suggestion of the Russian government did not satisfy the British who were reluctant to limit their freedom of action in the Middle East. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Clarendon replied to Gorchakov on the 8th of March that Afghanistan could not serve as a neutral zone as her frontiers were not sufficiently clearly defined, and this might lead to dissension in the future. He suggested creating a neutral zone out of the independent khanates of southern Turkestan. The northern frontier of this zone would follow the upper reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya and would continue from there to Merv and further to the west, losing itself in the Turkmen steppes. Nothing was said about its southern frontiers, doubtless on purpose; for in the future the British counted on subjugating the territory of the neutral zone to themselves and barring the way to Russian penetration of this region.

/The writer here accuses British diplomacy of failing to agree to accept Afghanistan alone as a neutral zone between the two powers, Russia in Asia, and Britain in India. At the same time she cites Gorchakov as having admitted that Afghanistan was entirely outside Russia's sphere of influence. It was surely reasonable that the British should insist that any neutral zone should include not only Afghanistan - obviously within their sphere of influence both by the history of the preceding fifty years and by reason of the Afghans within India in the then Panjab - but other countries. Why not also Bukhara? Why not Khiva? Why not the Turkmen steppe? As regards Bukhara the Russians might have said they had conquered it, but so

had the British Afghanistan in 1838-41. Why should not the Russians have withdrawn from Bukhara as the British had from Afghanistan? And, Bukhara apart, Khiva and the Turkmen steppe were still independent in 1869. Why not include them in a neutral zone? It is not surprising that negotiations broke down on a Russian insistence that the neutral zone be confined to Afghanistan. Such an agreement would have put them in a stronger position than they were under Gorchakov's disclaimer of any Russian interest in that country. - O.C./

Owing to British unwillingness to accept Afghanistan as a neutral zone talks were broken off. But the suspension was only temporary and later the two foreign ministers met in Heidelberg and reopened the question. Lord Clarendon reiterated his former proposal. Gorchakov, rejecting this point of view, pointed out that the ruler of Bukhara laid claim to part of the territory south of the Amu-Dar'ya and its inclusion in the neutral zone might lead to dissension between Russia and Britain. He insisted that Afghanistan should be made neutral territory. In reply to this Lord Clarendon again objected that the frontiers were too vague and added that Sher Ali might attempt to subjugate various khanates which before had been subject to Afghanistan and which Russia considered completely independent (i.e. the khanates of southern Turkmenistan). Gorchakov replied that the Afghan Emir was at liberty to conduct such a policy as long as he did not touch the territory of the Bukharan Emir nor do anything which might be viewed as hostile to Russia. As a result of these and other talks it was agreed that the territory actually under the rule of the Emir of Afghanistan at that moment should form the frontier of Afghanistan, that the Emir must not attempt to extend his dominion over this frontier, that the British government would do everything to prevent him from advancing beyond it, and finally, that the Russian government would use all its influence to stop the Emir of Bukhara from violating the frontier from his side. The territory not actually under the dominion of the Emir, in other words the khanates north of the Hindukush to the Amu-Dar'ya, which at the time the talks were being held were not included in Afghanistan, were, at the suggestion of the British representative, to be included in the neutral zone.

III. Afghanistan's Intentions in Southern Turkestan

In spite of this agreement Britain did not give up her intention of seizing the khanates of southern Turkestan through the agency of the Afghan Emir, presenting Russia with a fait accompli and forcing her to admit that this territory belonged to Afghanistan and was therefore within the British sphere of influence. With this aim the British began to urge on the feudal

leaders of Afghanistan to conquer the Uzbek khanates of southern Turkestan while the British representative was still in Petersburg, so as to give the Russians no chance of thwarting their plans. Sher Ali began seriously to prepare for conquest. The head of the Zeravshan okrug (district) informed Kaufman that two British representatives had arrived in Afghanistan; and that under their leadership Sher Ali had prepared an army of 15,000 strong for a campaign on the Amu-Dar'ya in order to set up a fortress there on the route to Bukhara, not far from the fortress of Akhcha belonging to Kabul and hitherto independent of Afghanistan.

There follows a description of the alarm which this report evoked in Russia and in Bukhara and of the remonstrances sent by the Russian government to Britain.

Evidence of the British intention of delaying talks in Petersburg in order to annex the khanates of southern Turkestan is the following British proposal. On the 20th of May 1870 the British government in India declared that it considered the boundaries of Afghanistan to be those territories which had acknowledged the sovereignty of Dost Muhammad, and which at present were under the dominion of Sher Ali. The real boundary of Afghanistan, in the opinion of British ruling circles, followed the course of the Amu-Dar'ya from the region of Balkh in the west to the extreme east of Badakhshan. From this the British government in India considered that the north-western frontier passed in a south-westerly direction from a point on the Amu-Dar'ya between Khoja Saleh and Kerki and included the provinces of Andkhoi, Balkh, Maimana, and Herat with the dependent territories between the Murgab and the Hari-Rud. The northern frontier was considered to be the Amu-Dar'ya from the same point between Kerki and Khoja Saleh in the east as far as the Pyandzh and Wakhan, and then the river which flows through the Wakhan to the point where the Hindu-kush range meets the southern point of the Pamir steppe. The Russian government rejected this British proposal maintaining that the territory "now subject" to Sher Ali should be considered as the frontier of Afghanistan.

/It was reasonable for the British to claim that the Afghan state should include the territories ruled by Dost Muhammad Khan, and not be confined to those in de facto possession of Sher Ali. Dost Muhammad had died in 1863, and there had been six years of badshahgardi (Afghan Persian, meaning literally 'king-turning', or 'palace revolutions'), during which Sher Ali's elder half-brothers, Afzal (father of Abdurrahman) and Azem, had each held the throne for a period before Sher Ali made good. During this period of strife the Afghan power had begun to disintegrate, and in any case it was in justice to go back to the position before the Russians had taken Chimkent or consolidated their power on the Oxus. Further, this argument is inconsistent with the admission in the 1873 Anglo-Russian

agreement that Sher Ali had by that time reasserted his control as far as Dost Muhammad's boundaries. - O.C.]

The British government continued to support Afghan pretensions to southern Turkestan, and quoting talks held in 1859 between Afghanistan and Bukhara, maintained that the Bukharan Emir himself recognized the power of Dost Muhammad in southern Turkestan. But in fact, during the talks between Dost Muhammad and the Emir of Bukhara the latter only stated that if the Afghan Emir refrained from interfering in the affairs of the Turkmen to the north of the Amu-Dar'ya, the Bukharan rulers would lay no claim to Badakhshan, Maimana and other regions to the south of the Amu-Dar'ya. This, however, by no means meant that the Emir of Bukhara agreed to the seizure of the khanates of southern Turkestan by the Afghans. Falsifying these talks the British maintained that from the time of Dost Muhammad, the Amu-Dar'ya was considered de facto the frontier between Bukhara and Afghanistan. The archive documentation on the situation in southern Turkestan under Dost Muhammad refutes these statements, for all the means of crossing the Amu-Dar'ya were under the control of the Bukharan rulers and since ancient times, Bukharan settlements had grown up at the bridges and fords (Chardzhuy and its surroundings, Kerki and Khoja Saleh). At these points the Bukharan authorities levied taxes on passing trade caravans and payment for their transportation across the river. All these settlements are situated on the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya. Besides this, there is reason to believe that the Afghans asked the Emir of Bukhara to allow them to build their fortress on the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya. The Afghans, therefore, acknowledged the sovereignty of Bukhara over the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya in the region of southern Turkestan.

[Much is made here of an argument that even in Dost Muhammad's time the Afghan frontier had never extended to the Amu-Dar'ya, for Bukhara had controlled the ford and ferry heads on the left (south) bank. Charjui (Chardzhou) and Kerki are given as examples. Actually both these places are in any case beyond any point to which the Afghans could ever reasonably have laid claim, and are further down the river than Khoja Saleh which is the point on the river up to which the Afghan frontier does now in fact go. But Yuldashbayeva's argument is refuted even more strongly by the fact that both Charjui and Kerki are now in Turkmenistan and not in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan roughly stands for Old Bukhara, at any rate in this region. If the Russians were convinced that these places were part of Bukhara, why include them in Turkmenistan? - O.C.]

IV. British Expansion in Persia and Eastern Turkestan

Having failed to create, under the guise of a neutral zone, an anti-Russian base on the Amu-Dar'ya, British diplomacy by no means gave up the struggle. On the contrary, the British expansionists made every effort to create a block against Russia in the Middle East, in which not only the Afghan Emir would participate but also the Shah of Persia and the ruler of Kashgaria.

/This is assertion not argument. Nothing whatever is said of the vast Russian conquests, culminating in the conquest of Bukhara, and advancing the Russian front 500 miles closer to India. The Tsar's ministers are represented as rather naive dupes sitting in Petersburg, trying by trustful methods to argue the ravening British wolf out of the absorption of a Central Asia in which they have an avuncular interest only. - O.C./

To consolidate their position in Persia, especially on the north-eastern and eastern borders, at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies of the nineteenth century the British intensified their economic and political penetration of the country and increased the activity of their agents there. In 1867 they forced Persia to agree to the construction of the so-called Indo-European telegraph, and in 1872 foisted upon them the enslaving Reuter concession, with the help of which they hoped to gain control of the whole economy of the country. During these years the British tried to turn the Persian foreign provinces of Seistan and Khorasan into bases. With this aim in mind, they at first aggravated the Perso-Afghan conflict for Seistan, and then in 1872 sent, supposedly for arbitration, the mission of General Goldsmid, who attempted to weaken the position of both the powers in Seistan and at the same time bring part of the territory of Seistan under British control.

/General Goldsmid was occupied in 1871 not only on the Sistan boundary award between Persia and Afghanistan, but on boundary demarcation further south between Persian Baluchistan and the Baluch tribes feudatory to the Khan of Kalat. The intractability of the Sistan problem is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that even now, after nearly ninety years, the disputes arising in Sistan between Persia and Afghanistan remain unsettled. Afghan claims in this region are a legacy of the break up of the Safavi Empire in the early part of the eighteenth century, when the Afghans not only overran all eastern Iran but for a period ruled in Isfahan. The fact that the Sistan dispute did not lead to war between Persia and Afghanistan is attributable to British mediation in the

seventies of last century. Far from fomenting the difference the Goldsmid mission crystallised it. That it was one of the causes operating on Sher Ali's mind to bring about his estrangement from Britain is true, but is in its turn mainly attributable to Russia's exploitation of that grievance at the time. - O.C./

In 1873 the intrigues of British agents in Khorasan were intensified, and from there the British spies Gill and Baker penetrated Turkmen territory.

/This and previous references to British spies seems to be mere propaganda. Is it to be assumed that the Russians had no "spies" in what were then "uncommitted countries", e.g. Persia and the Turkmen steppe? Why should not British agents visit those countries in 1873? - O.C./

Over a period of two and half years four British military agents appeared on the territory of Khorasan who did not even think it necessary to conceal their task - the detailed study of routes convenient for military movements, from the west to the east, from Astrabad to Krasnovodsk and further. British activities were also intensified in Eastern Turkestan in order to create there a political base from which they would be able to exercise an influence hostile to the Russians on the Muslim population of Russian Turkestan.

There follows a detailed account of the correspondence between the Russian and British governments on the subject of the demarcation of the Afghan frontier. The British held that Afghanistan should include Badakhshan and the part of the Wakhan from Lake Zor-Kul' in the east to the confluence of the river Kokchi with the Amu-Dar'ya, and Afghan Turkestan, i.e. Kunduz, Khul'm and Balkh. The northern frontier was to be the Amu-Dar'ya from its confluence with the Kokchi to the post Khoja-Saleh; the regions of Akhcha, Sarypul', Maimana, Shibirgan and Andkhoy were also to be part of Afghanistan. The main obstacle to agreement was Britain's insistence on the inclusion of Balkh and Badakhshan; the reason given for Britain's obstinacy is that the route from Afghanistan to Eastern Turkestan, which Britain was striving to bring under her control, lay through these areas.

In view of the tense situation in Europe, the Tsarist government decided to make considerable concessions to Britain and settle the Afghan question by peaceful means. On the 19th of January 1873 a note was sent to Britain to the effect that Russia was unwilling to attach excessive importance to details and agreed to the frontier line proposed by Britain. The note expressed confidence that Britain would use her influence with Sher Ali to maintain a peaceful

policy and refrain from further offensive action. With this note the talks between Britain and Russia, which began in 1869 and led to the agreement of 1873, were concluded. The agreement consisted of the following main points:

(1) All the territory actually under the dominion of Sher Ali at that moment was to be considered as Afghanistan; Britain for her part was to use all her influence to persuade Sher Ali to maintain a peaceful policy, and Russia was to act in the same way on the Emir of Bukhara.

(2) The northern and north-western boundaries of Afghanistan were established.

(3) Russia declared again that Afghanistan was outside her sphere of influence.

/The line taken throughout this description of the protracted negotiations between the two governments is that Britain had no real desire for peace but strove at all costs to increase her influence on Afghanistan and southern and eastern Turkestan. Russia on the other hand, who was "fully occupied in consolidating her position in regions of Central Asia already conquered and was confronted with the problem of the conquest of Khiva", played the part of peacemaker. There is no mention in this article of what Russia did in Bukhara which both before and during the Mangit dynasty had been the political and cultural heart of the Muslim civilization of Mawara'onnahr (Transoxiana). - O.C./

V. British Attempts at Expansion in Central Asia

However, the agreement of 1872-73 did not resolve the disagreements between Russia and Britain. The aggressive actions of the British government in the east gravely alarmed the Tsarist government who feared that Britain would expand in Central Asia and in particular in Turkmenistan where British agents were especially active. For this reason by a decisive blow the Tsarist government overcame the khanate of Khiva in 1873 and concluded an agreement of obedience with the Khan. At this time British offensive policy in Central Asia was still further intensified, particularly after the coming to power of the Conservatives led by Disraeli, who encouraged the efforts to achieve the subjection of Afghanistan, and her conversion into a base for an assault on Russia in Central Asia. The British made extensive use of Turkey, whose ruler was considered to be the Khalif of Islam, for the intensification of their subversive activities in the Middle East. British use of Turkish influence particularly increased after Midhat Pasha came to power in Turkey as Grand Vizir. In 1873 the Grand Vizir sent his agent, Munif Effendi, to Teheran to spread anti-Russian propaganda there under the guidance of the

British representative in Teheran - Alison, but these provocative actions on the part of the Anglo-Turkish agents gained no success in Persia since it was known there that Russia had no aggressive aims in her direction. In 1873 the British spy Baker visited Persia; and on the 9th of August 1874 Kaufman was informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the British officer Napier, son of the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Indian army Lord Napier, had arrived in Teheran in the second half of May. He was supposedly preparing to depart for Europe, but suddenly renounced his intentions under the pretext that he hoped to obtain the post of aide de camp to his father and had therefore decided to return immediately to India via Khorasan and Afghanistan. During his stay in Teheran Napier tried to extract information from members of the Russian mission on "the new acquisitions of Russia in Central Asia" and asked whether the Russian envoy in Teheran could give him a letter of recommendation to the Governor-General of Turkestan.

/Napier can hardly have been a very competent spy if he went straight to the Russian mission at Teheran "to extract information and ask for letters of introduction" to Kaufman. - O.C./

The British continued their espionage not only in Persia but in Herat and Merv as well. On the 9th of February 1875 the Russian consul in Astrabad informed Petersburg that Napier had arrived in Meshed and from there was sending his agents to Khorasan, Herat and Merv and was in communication with the ruler of Herat Yaqub Khan (the son of Sher Ali), and the Tekke Turkmens. Through her agents Britain urged Yaqub Khan on to rise against his father and furnished a part of the Turkmens with arms, trying to set them against Russia. However the expansionist intentions of the British were not confined to Afghanistan and the oases of Turkmenistan. Material to be found in the British press itself is witness to this. The paper ARMY AND NAVY GAZETTE reported the journey to Khiva of the British captain Burnaby who visited Central Asia and personally met the Khan of Khiva which hitherto none of the British agents except Abbot and Shakespear had succeeded in doing.

/Burnaby wrote it all down in a book published at the time. So he cannot have been a very competent spy either. - O.C./

A year before this a British engineer had set out for Central Asia with the "scientific aim" of investigating part of the course of the Amu-Dar'ya from the Aral Sea to the fortifications of Petro-Aleksandrovsk.

/These examples are quoted to show that Britain was preparing to attack Russia in Central Asia. "Why else", the article asks, "should she want to investigate the Amu-Dar'ya, maintain secret connections with the Khan of Khiva, continually send spies into Central Asia under various pretexts, supply them with arms and set the Central Asian feudal lords against the Russian authorities?" The answer to this rhetorical question is that Britain was impressed by the sweeping conquests of Russia in Asia, rolling towards the frontier of India and was determined to arrest further advance by such methods as were open to her. These did not include war save in the last resort. Events proved that they did not even include permanent occupation of the glacis of the Indian fortress. - O.C./

VI. Events Leading up to the Second Afghan War

At first the British encouraged the Afghan Emir to seize the independent khanates of southern Turkestan, hoping that she herself would eventually control these khanates together with the whole of Afghanistan. It was no easy undertaking for the Afghans to carry out this plan; but their conquest was helped by the treachery of the feudal leaders and ruling circles of the khanates. The struggle of the population of southern Turkestan against the invaders bore in certain regions the character of a broad popular movement. By the end of the seventies Sher Ali had succeeded in subjugating all of southern Turkestan with the exception of the semi-dependent khanate of Andkhoy(1). At this time the British conducted a treacherous policy with relation to Afghanistan. On the one hand they encouraged the Afghans to seize southern Turkestan, helping them to extend their territory at the expense of the independent khanates: on the other they were working out plans for the destruction of Afghanistan's independence and the annexation of her territory. In 1875 the Viceroy of India, Northbrook, suggested to Sher Ali khan that they should meet in Simla. The Emir accepted this suggestion in principle, but instead of going himself sent a representative. Northbrook began to conduct talks on the establishment of Afghan frontier fortifications and promised to give financial aid, on condition, however, that before the construction, or rather reconstruction, of these fortifications was begun they should be examined by British officers. All work on the "reconstruction" was to be carried out under the observation of British specialists under the pretence that the financial aid offered to Afghanistan by Britain should be controlled by the British representative. Besides this, the British representative demanded Sher Ali's agreement to British diplomatic representation in Herat and Kandahar. His demand was rejected. Sher Ali was addressed with every possible threat and Disraeli demanded that the Viceroy should send an ambassador extraordinary from India to Afghanistan to "explain" to the Emir "the risk which he was running and the dissatisfaction in Britain which he was arousing by his opposition to British plans".

As the Viceroy of India had not succeeded in fulfilling the demands of the British government and in realizing the aggressive policy towards Afghanistan of the British ruling circles, he was obliged to retire, and his place was taken by Lord Lytton who actively set about carrying out British plans with relation to the countries of the Middle East and in particular Afghanistan. Lord Lytton began his duties on the 12th of April 1876 and on the 24th of April he sent a personal letter to the Afghan Emir in which he informed him that he had appointed a British mission consisting of Lewis Pelly, Doctor Bellew and Major St.John, who might at any moment leave for Afghanistan for talks with the Emir. The pretext for the sending of this mission was that a letter containing the information that Lytton had been appointed the new Viceroy of India and that Queen Victoria had taken the title of Empress of India, had to be personally handed to the Emir. However Sher Ali guessed the real aim of the "special mission" sent to Afghanistan and politely but categorically refused to receive it in Kabul saying that if the British wanted to conduct new talks he could send his proxy to any point they would mention. In reply to this, Lytton warned the Emir that he considered his behaviour amounted to the arbitrary isolation of Afghanistan from union with the British government and to the refusal of support on his part.

/It is not surprising that Britain should have adopted an active and positive policy vis-a-vis Sher Ali, given his own attitudes as eventually shown in 1878-79. - O.C./

There follows at this point a description of the British conquest of Baluchistan and an account of the fruitless talks between the Emir's representative, Sayyid-Nur-Muhammad Khan, and Sir Lewis Pelly on the admittance of British officers into Afghanistan.

/The advance to Quetta (Baluchistan) was an elementary precaution. Since 1854 - ten years after the occupation of Sind - the British government had been in friendly treaty relations with the Khan of Kalat, and the advance, under Sandeman's inspiration, was not a conquest, but a negotiated occupation. The answer to Russian criticism must be that it was a measure on an infinitely smaller scale than their own actions in Tashkent, Fergana, Bukhara, Khiva and the Turkmen steppe. - O.C./

In spite of further pressure on the part of Britain the Afghan government categorically refused to accept the proposal that British agents should be allowed into the northern frontier regions of Afghanistan. On the 30th of March 1877 the Viceroy summoned his diplomatic representative from Kabul;

the British began seriously to prepare for war and to concentrate their forces on the Afghan frontier, and in April 1877 they attacked the independent Jawaki tribe on the Afghan-Indian frontier. This tribe, however, showed desperate opposition to the British invaders, and made constant raids on British transport routes in the region of Peshawar. On the 9th of November a punitive expedition was sent against them consisting of about 2,000 men. Measures were first of all taken to isolate the Jawaki from other neighbouring tribes, and then with a powerful stroke their opposition was broken. The Jawaki complained of the British seizure of their territory in a letter addressed to the Afghan Emir: "The government of India has step by step been seizing our land for many years. Desiring to consolidate these conquests the British have built many forts on our territory - but we shall never agree to acknowledge ourselves British subjects or to transfer the government of our country into the hands of British officers. . ." These British moves alarmed the Afghans and at the beginning of 1877 the Emir began to resist invasion. The British, on their part, prepared to crush Afghanistan(2).

/The Jawakis are a small sub-clan of the Adam Khel Afridis of the Kohat Pass. They have about 400 houses in all. Their territory was not then, and never has been since, occupied or administered. They were only punished for raiding the Peshawar district. To suggest that this incident was on an international scale, or influenced Anglo-Russian Afghan policies, is merely ludicrous. The Jawakis represent one-sixth of an eighth part of the Afridis. - O.C./

Events on the Afghan frontier were closely connected with the sharp aggravation of the international situation in eastern Europe and in the Middle East owing to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. Alarmed by the success of Russian arms in the Balkans, the British started talks with Austro-Hungary on the subject of taking joint action against Russia, and the British Mediterranean fleet was sent to the Dardanelles. At the same time the British began to take preparatory measures for attacking Russia's possessions in Central Asia. The signing of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of San Stefano in 1878 did not change Britain's anti-Russian plans(3).

Faced by the united front of Britain, Austro-Hungary and Bismarck's Germany, which secretly supported them, the Russian government agreed to transfer the resolution of the question of the peace treaty with Turkey to the Congress of Berlin in order not to aggravate bad relations. Bearing in mind the threatening position of Britain in Europe and Asia the Russian government made use of the tense Anglo-Afghan relations to undertake a military-diplomatic demonstration against Britain on the Afghan frontier. The Russian government considered that if it threatened Britain in India it would succeed in breaking

her stubbornness and force her to be more tractable during the Berlin Congress, and this would enable the Tsarist government to preserve its prestige and the advantages gained during the course of the successful war with Turkey. The order was therefore given for forces to be concentrated on the Afghan frontier and for a special mission to be sent to Kabul. In fact, these offensive movements of the Russian forces were only a demonstration of military strength and not a serious attack against the British from Central Asia.

/The writer admits a "military demonstration" directed against Britain in India. It is not surprising that not only Britain, but also Sher Ali, thought the Russians meant business. The incident is typical of long-established Russian policy. Checkmate in Europe, threaten in Asia; checkmate in Asia, threaten in Europe. At any rate the writer admits that it was Russia, not Britain, that growled and shewed teeth first. This, accompanied by the Stoletov mission to Kabul, could have no other effect but to convince Britain, and Sher Ali, that the Russians would take Afghanistan under their wing. Given the Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand background, what did this appear to mean? Sher Ali was in no doubt. He is a tragic figure. One can hardly think that the Russian attitude can be defended when the British called their bluff. That it was a bluff Yuldashbayeva admits when she says that "it would have been a stubborn war under circumstances and conditions extremely disadvantageous to ourselves". (See below.) - O.C./

On the day of the opening of the Congress of Berlin the Russian mission headed by Stoletov left Tashkent for Kabul. Stoletov received the following instructions: "When you receive this letter you are to set out for Kabul to the Afghan Emir in order to consolidate our friendly relations with him, to explain to the Emir the advantages accruing to him from these relations and, if possible, to conclude an alliance with him in case of an armed conflict with Britain." The arrival of the Russian mission in Kabul was the desired pretext for the British government to realize its aggressive plans. Unwilling to see Afghanistan as an independent and powerful state, Britain decided to weaken it, break it up and destroy its independence by subjugating it to the British government in India(4).

Already in 1877 the most aggressive group, who looked upon Afghanistan not as a buffer state but as a base for further aggressive activities in Central Asia, had taken control in the ruling circles of Britain. This group was working out plans for a new invasion of Afghanistan during which the British intended to move in three directions: one army from Quetta was to set off for Kandahar, the second was to invade the Kurram, and the third to leave Peshawar for Jalalabad and thence to Kabul. In the forthcoming

campaign 100,000 troops were to take part. The Russo-Turkish war postponed the realization of this plan, but did not remove it from the order of the day. For this reason the arrival of the Russian diplomatic mission in Kabul served the British as the desired pretext for a sudden intensification of the Anglo-Afghan conflict(5).

The article continues with an account of the British mission to Kabul headed by Neville Chamberlain, and subsequent events which led to the second Afghan war. Information contained here may be found in even greater detail in LORD LYTTON'S ADMINISTRATION from which most of the material seems to have been taken.

When it became evident that the British meant to attack Afghanistan, Sher Ali sent representatives to Tashkent for both advice and help, and, according to the Russian Minister of War, General Milyutin, asked if Russia would take Afghanistan under her wing. On the 27th of September 1878 he wrote a personal letter to Alexander II describing the antagonism towards Afghanistan which the Stoletov mission had produced in Britain and the aggressive actions of the British which resulted from it. General Razgonov, who had remained behind in Kabul at the head of the Russian mission after the departure of Stoletov for Tashkent, wrote to the Governor-General of Turkestan on the 26th of October that the Emir had declared to him: "If military fortune betrays me I shall go up into the mountains where I can hold out for a year awaiting Russian help. In the last resort, if Russian help does not come in time, I would rather hand over the fragments of my state to the Russians than enter into any relations with the British." The Tsarist government, however, firmly decided not to interfere in any way in Afghan affairs. At the same time it was decided in Petersburg ruling circles to take diplomatic measures to prevent the British from seizing Afghanistan. "The independence of Afghanistan is fundamentally necessary in order to preserve the political equilibrium of Britain and Russia in Asia", Milyutin wrote in his diary, describing the conference on the Afghan problem which took place in October 1878. The Russian ambassador in London was instructed to strive for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan question with the British government. At the same time the Russian government told the Governor-General of Turkestan to inform Sher Ali politely that in order to avoid war with Britain he ought to bring about a reconciliation. In accordance with this, Kaufman wrote to Sher Ali on the 22nd of October: "The British, as I have been informed, intend to make a new effort at reconciliation with you. For my part, as your friend, and thinking of the future, I advise your Highness to hold out an olive branch if the British, as I am sure they will, take a step towards reconciliation."

After the return of Neville Chamberlain's mission to Peshawar, however the British government began actively to prepare for a military attack on Afghanistan. Evidently the information received by the Russian government to

the effect that the British government was disposed to a peaceful solution of the Afghan conflict was deliberately intended by the British security service in Petersburg to mislead and confuse the Russian government. In spite of the fact that the British were actively preparing to wage war against Afghanistan, the Emir wanted, up to the last moment, to decide the problem by peaceful means. This is clearly proved by the letter of Sher Ali to the Viceroy of India of the 7th of October 1878 in which he expresses willingness to fulfil the British demand that his son Muhammad Yaqub should be freed from arrest. He declares that the Afghan government feels no emnity towards the British government and that the former friendship will remain firm. "If", he says, "following the example of friendly governments, the British government also wants to send to me a friendly temporary emissary with an escort of 20 to 30 men, like the Russian emissary, such an emissary would not be refused and would be received wherever I happened to be at the time." Sher Ali, therefore, partly owing to the influence of Razgonov, agreed to fulfil the main demand of the British - the admittance of a British emissary to the country. The British, however, wanted not peace but war. On the 5th of November 1878 the Viceroy received instructions from London to the effect that if no reply was received from the Emir or the reply was unsatisfactory, the Emir must be treated as an enemy of Britain and military action must be taken on the 21st of November. On receiving these instructions, the British authorities in India gave the order for the Khyber, Kurram and Quetta armies to cross the Afghan border at dawn on the 21st of November, without even waiting for the Emir's reply. The British forces immediately seized Ali Masjid. On the 30th of November an emissary arrived in Ali Masjid and gave the British a letter from Sher Ali. However, in spite of the fact that the Emir agreed to receive the British envoy at Kabul hostilities did not cease. The British government was so desirous of starting a war that it would have considered the answer of the Emir "evasive" and "unsatisfactory" even if it had been received before the 20th of November.

VII. The Second Afghan War

Two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities the Khyber and Kurram passes were entirely in the hands of the British. These successes were achieved, however, only with the help of the Mohmand tribe to which the mother of Yaqub Khan belonged.

/This shows ignorance about the North-West Frontier tribes. The Mohmands did not control the Khyber or the Kurram passes. - O.C./

The poor equipment of the Afghan army, which was entirely unprepared for

war and was unable to defend the strategic positions, also played an important part. This unpreparedness is explicable by Sher Ali's reluctance to wage war. In 1878 General Razgonov wrote to Kaufman informing him that Sher Ali had told him: "I have no desire to go to war with them, neither now nor later, but what should I do when the British invade my country of their own accord; I cannot voluntarily agree to their placing the noose of slavery round my neck."

Although Sher Ali constantly begged Russia for help, the Russian government was determined not to interfere in the affair. On the 6th of December the Minister of War wrote to Kaufman: ". . . A clash with this power /Britain - Ed./ in Asia would be the signal for a stubborn war under circumstances and conditions extremely disadvantageous to ourselves." For this reason the Russian government tried to smooth the conflict between Britain and Afghanistan by peaceful diplomatic means while keeping Afghanistan intact. At the beginning of the talks with the British government on this question therefore, the Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed to the Russian ambassador in London informing him that the Afghan Emir was begging the Russian government for help and protection and that the Emperor wanted to take advantage of this, owing to the exceptional circumstances of the moment, by advising the Emir to try to end the present clash with Britain. The Russian ambassador informed the British government of this. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, however, declared that before agreeing to acknowledge the independence of Afghanistan he considered essential a "correction" of the frontier and the agreement of Afghanistan to the reception of a permanent British embassy in Kabul through which Britain could wield her influence. On the 25th of November the Emir decided as a last resort to release his son Muhammad Yaqub Khan from imprisonment. He evidently hoped by this action to diminish the intrigues and inner conflicts of the country and, having fulfilled one of the British demands, to preserve a little of Afghanistan's independence.

By means of deception the British tried to get the Afghan people on to their side. They freed prisoners of war, gave them arms and told them that thenceforward Afghanistan belonged to Britain, that the whole population was exempt for three years from duties towards the state and need not fear the British, who were fighting not against the Afghan people but only against the Emir. The position in Afghanistan became more and more critical and the Emir decided to go in person to Petersburg for help, and leave the country in the hands of Yaqub Khan. The Russian government, fearing complications with Britain and desirous of maintaining Russian neutrality, did not consider it wise to receive the Emir in the capital, and on government instructions Kaufman wrote to the Emir in the following terms: "I advise you not to leave your country and to conclude as soon as possible a peace treaty with the British government as advantageous to you as you can make it, maintaining

Afghanistan's independence. If your Highness is really unwilling to return for this from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul, I advise you to command your most amiable son Sardar Muhammad Yaqub Khan in the name of your Highness to make peace now." The Tsarist government was in favour of preserving the independence of Afghanistan and making it into a buffer state which would prevent the Russian and British possessions from touching one another. For this reason the Russian government suggested to Britain that she should observe her former obligations concerning Central Asia since they were being fulfilled by Russia.

Unwilling to repulse Sher Ali entirely, the Russian government suggested that he should make his way to Tashkent. Owing to illness, however, the Emir was unable to accept the invitation personally, but he sent two deputies to conduct talks there. During this time the Russian ambassador in London, Shuvalov, unlike Kaufman, who believed that Sher Ali should have been helped and supported, summed up the situation in the following way: "In the future Sher Ali and Afghanistan should no longer be confused; and today we could ask ourselves whether the Emir still represents that country. Events have shown us that he was not the monarch we thought he was - the master of his army and leader of his people." There was therefore considerable disagreement in the ruling circles of Russia on the Afghan question.

The Russian government considered that it would be extremely dangerous if the British attained a dominating position in Afghanistan, and was particularly against the establishment of a permanent British embassy in Herat, for this would give the British government in India the chance of continuously wielding a harmful influence over the Turkmens and would threaten the security of Russia. On the 31st of January 1879 Gorchakov wrote to the Russian ambassador in London that the British government must be made to understand that it was violating the obligations which it had taken upon itself with relation to the position of Russia and Britain in Central Asia, and that the Russian government would, therefore, assume complete freedom of action in Central Asia. But at the same time the Russian government wanted no conflict with Britain. On the same day therefore as Gorchakov sent these instructions to Shuvalov, he gave the following order to Kaufman about Sher Ali: "You must as before advise the Emir, and even insist, that in his own interests he should return to his possessions, so as not to give the British the chance of using his absence to bring about a revolution disadvantageous to himself and to eliminate the possibility of peace talks with him." Such was the complicated position of the Russian government during the period of the Afghan crisis(6).

VIII. The Succession of Yaqub Khan and Abdurrahman Khan

After the British forces had occupied the provinces of Kabul and Kandahar, a national-liberation movement began in the country which considerably hindered the British; for the difficulty of communicating with the rear in India, which provided the army with food and military supplies, and also the precariousness of the lines of communication threatened their military activities with failure. They were helped a little by the death of Sher Ali on the 9th of February 1879 and the transference of power to his more amenable son Yaqub Khan.

On the 26th of May, Yaqub Khan and the British Representative, Cavagnari, signed the Gandamak agreement according to which, among other things, the Emir promised to conduct relations with foreign states only through the British government, and agreed to the present of a permanent British resident in Kabul

The conduct of Yaqub Khan aroused the indignation of many Afghan dignitaries and military leaders, and also of the whole Afghan people. According to Kaufman's envoy, who was sent to Kabul to Yaqub Khan, when the Afghans learned of the conditions of the Gandamak agreement they were extremely indignant at the conduct of Yaqub Khan and loudly expressed their dissatisfaction: "The Emir sold our fatherland to the British in Gandamak. Cavagnari will come and will pay a salary to the officials and to the army for their betrayal of their country." British oppression in the occupied regions provoked, as was said before, a popular rising. Outwardly power remained in the hands of Yaqub Khan but in fact during the revolt in Kabul in August 1879 the masters were the rebellious Afghan forces headed by the military leaders and certain other prominent persons, supported by the town population. According to an eyewitness, Sardar Nek Muhammad Khan, the rising began in Kabul on the 21st of August. On that day the commander of the troops, Abdul Karim Khan, gathered together three battalions of Afghan soldiers and told them that they would not be paid for one month as there was no money. The soldiers mutinied and demanded to be paid for three months saying that if there was no money, the British Resident Cavagnari could pay them. The soldiers then set out for the British Embassay with this demand. Cavagnari went out on to the roof of the Embassy and started to fire on the Afghans and his example was followed by his guard. The unarmed Afghan soldiers rushed to the barracks for arms and began, in their turn, to fire on the British. The British resisted for about two hours and then the Afghans took possession of the Embassy and killed Cavagnari and his retinue.

After describing the renewed military action which was taken after this rebellion and the brutality with which the British dealt with the population of Kabul, the article continues with an account of the rise to power of Abdurrahman Khan.

The turning of Afghanistan by the British into a colony and base from which to launch an attack on Central Asia represented a very serious threat to Tsarist Russia. For this reason at the beginning of 1880 the Russian government gave Abdurrahman Khan permission to return to his native land, evidently hoping that, having seized the Afghan throne, he would not permit the complete dominance of the British in Afghanistan. On arriving in northern Afghanistan, Abdurrahman Khan sent a letter to the rulers of Southern Turkestan and to his friends and relatives in which he said: "I have come to the country in order to free it from the British; if I succeed in doing this by peaceful means - good; if not, we shall have to fight." With the help of various rulers and close friends Abdurrahman collected a considerable armed force, equipment and money and subjugated the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya. Under the flag of a "holy war against the infidels" he moved on Kabul. Exhausted and oppressed by British invaders the Afghan people began to rally round Abdurrahman, expressing their readiness to struggle against the British. Unable to solve the problem of Afghanistan, the British sought a way of coming to an agreement with Abdurrahman. In his turn Abdurrahman feared that the popular war against the British, by uniting the peoples of Afghanistan - Afghans, Uzbeks and Tajiks - might in the end constitute a threat to the position of the Afghan feudal lords, and was therefore also ready to make peace. While Abdurrahman was in Kunduz the British representative, Griffin, wrote to him expressing a desire to know what his intentions and plans were. With the aim of winning the Afghan throne and preserving the dominating position of the Afghan feudal lords Abdurrahman on receiving this letter hypocritically took counsel with the beks, military leaders and soldiers as to what answer should be given to the British in order to avoid the accusation afterwards that he had sold himself to them. For this reason he asked his military leaders to compose an answer for him. In two days time he was brought about a hundred letters in many of which the following sentiments were expressed: "O British! You must leave our country; we shall drive you out or die in the struggle." In spite of this, however, Abdurrahman composed an answer which gave the British to understand that he would not try to struggle against them on condition they guaranteed him power. The British quickly set their course by his and on the 30th of April 1879 Griffin in a letter to Abdurrahman suggested that he should try to march on Kabul and take the government into his hands. After this, talks took place between Abdurrahman and Griffin, and these led to an agreement by which the British government recognized Abdurrahman as Emir of Afghanistan, gave him supplies of arms, granted him a pension and promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. On his part Abdurrahman bound himself to observe the conditions of the Gandamak agreement and not to maintain any relations with foreign states without the permission of the British.

/Almost, but not quite, the writer commends Britain for statesmanship in her dealings with Abdurrahman. A sort of wry admiration peeps out. Any doubt which might be felt of the opinion not only of Sher Ali, but of Abdurrahman, in the matter of reliance on Russia could be set at rest by reading Abdurrahman's autobiography. He does not like the British but he respects them; of the Russians, as he knew them during the ten years in Turkestan, and as he observed them in their dealings with Sher Ali, he has a different opinion.

The real answer to all this is that, had British resistance to the Russian advance in Asia faltered in the 1865-85 period, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and probably India too, would now be part of the Soviet empire, the Russians would be on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf and would control the main world sources of energy and the warm seas. As Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler remarks in his book AFGHANISTAN, "the only thing which could stop this expansion was the upward thrust of some equally powerful empire which challenged and arrested the mighty steam-roller of Russia." - O.C./

The article ends abruptly with a very brief recapitulation of its political argument: ". . . So ended the second Afghan war. In this way during the period under review, British imperialism attempted to subjugate Afghanistan, weaken it and at the same time turn it into a base for the penetration of Central Asia. The government of Russia at this time tried not to worsen relations between Britain and Russia, but at the same time took every measure to prevent the transformation of Afghanistan into an anti-Russian base and its complete enslavement to the British."

Notes

(1) The article describes how Maimana and the khanates of Sarypul' and Shibirgan were subjected; but it is not clear why Afghanistan should need to conquer them when, by the Treaty of 1873, they were recognized as part of Afghan territory.

(2) Here a letter from Lytton to Cavagnari (the British Resident in Kabul) is quoted from THE HISTORY OF LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION by Lady Betty Balfour, London 1899, p.18. /Referred to below as Lady Betty Balfour./

(3) Three letters from the Duke of Argyll, Disraeli and Lord Lytton are quoted here in an attempt to show Britain's aggressive policy with relation to Russia. Lord Lytton's letter, it is maintained, pointed out the necessity of seizing Kafiristan and turning Gilgit into an anti-Russian base. This however is a distortion of the actual text. In the first place far from advocating the seizure of Kafiristan Lord Lytton says: "Their absorption /the chiefdoms of Kafiristan - Ed./ by ourselves is impossible because the British public has vetoed annexation. And, moreover, so long as we can prevent them from being annexed by Kabul or the future Kashgar power, it would certainly not be worth our own while to annex these poor and barren territories." In the second place there is no mention of an anti-Russian base. Lord Lytton's actual plan was to secure a "vicarious but virtual control over the chiefdoms of Kafiristan. . . by their absorption under the suzerainty of Kashmir, our vassal".

(4) A letter from Lord Lytton to Lord Cranbrook is quoted here (Lady Betty Balfour, pp.246-7) in which he says that no chance of weakening and dividing the power of Kabul should be lost, and that in the interests of India it would be best to create a western Afghan state including Maimana, Merv, Balkh and Herat under the power of a prince dependent on the British.

(5) It is evident that the article aims, with the help of specially selected quotations from Lord Lytton's correspondence, to show that Britain was solely preoccupied with the invasion and conquest of Afghanistan, with the ultimate aim of attacking Russian possessions in Central Asia. However, if the whole of the correspondence is taken into account, it will be seen that this is by no means the case. Lord Lytton, anxious as he was that Afghanistan should be dependent or semi-dependent on Britain, regarded an armed conflict with her only as a pis-aller to gaining control. Nor was he any more in favour of war with Russia: "The contemplation of war with Russia in Central Asia has been forced on my mind. . . But the more closely I contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the repugnance with which I regard it. . . I view an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Russia, as a measure which may become unavoidable. . . but which is only to be resorted to in case of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. . . "(Lady Betty Balfour, p.263.)

(6) No reference is made to the fact that Sher Ali had been encouraged in his anti-British attitude by the Stoletov mission, and had been led to expect Russian support in the event of a conflict with Britain, nor that Russia had moved troops to the Afghan frontier in the summer of 1878.

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

RECENT SOVIET PUBLICATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN

IZ AFGANSKOY POEZII (From Afghan Poetry). Published by Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoy literatury, Moscow, 1955. 223pp.

An example of the increasing amount of borderland literature which is being translated into Russian is a collection of Afghan poetry published in Moscow in 1955. The introduction to this collection is written by Nikolay Tikhonov, the well-known Soviet writer. Included are poems by Khushhal Khan Khattak, Rahman-Baba, Abdul Kadir Khan, Abdul Hamid Mohmand, Kazim Khan and a number of anonymous popular poems and songs.

Tikhonov describes as friendly the relations existing between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and gives a brief account of the occupations and general characteristics of the Afghans. "They are a warrior people", he says, "who are accustomed to protect their country from enemies and who endured the heaviest oppression of British imperialism. For more than a hundred years the Afghans struggled for their independence, showing bravery, stubbornness and fortitude." Later a general description of the collection is given in which most attention is paid to the popular anonymous poetry. After stating that the collection consists of seventeenth and eighteenth century poetry, and mentioning briefly four of the poets included, the text continues as follows: "Popular songs with their variety of themes are adequately represented in the collection. War songs and love songs predominate. The heroic songs which tell of battles for the defence of the fatherland, of love for the warrior - the protector of the home, and of freedom, and which extol bravery and daring, give an idea of the national character of the Afghans. In them the Afghan appears as an indomitable warrior, a man true to his word, just, and a fervent patriot for whom death in battle is better than the shame of defeat.

"Another type of verse reflecting the spirit of Eastern poetry contains songs about love, parting, and the happiness or misfortunes of lovers. The heroes and heroines in them are full of hidden passion, restrained and ardent. The briefness of these poems reminds one of the passionate, succinct,

almost compressed, poems and old songs of the poets of Dagestan. . . Possibly this unexpected similarity arises from the reserve common to mountain people.

"In the popular poetry one sees the proud, reserved, independent character of the Afghan. This is particularly evident in those poems where the woman communicates with her hero openly and boldly. Here it is the voice of the woman of the Muslim world which breaks, like a ray of light, through the barriers of custom, and expresses feelings of such strength that they cannot be hidden. The nomad women, following their husbands and brothers, do not wear, and never wore, either yashmaks or paranjas in the nomad camp. From childhood they run freely with the boys, climbing trees and practising throwing stones and shooting. As they grow up they share all the difficulties of nomad life with the men. And those who live in the mountain villages, up among the very clouds, fear neither the dangers of war nor of love. . ."

The imagery of this poetry, continues the foreword, contains flashes of splendour and has much in common with that of other Eastern poetry; but the "severe passion and precision of intonation" take first place over conventionalities.

If the collection transmits to the Soviet reader the richness of a "powerful and graphic poetry", Tikhonov concludes, the work of the translators will be justified and will "continue the road towards a further acquaintance with old and new Afghan poetry. . ."

The poems are grouped according to authors and are well arranged. Names of translators are given in every case in the table of contents at the end.

AFGANSKIYE SKAZKI (A Collection of Afghan Tales). Published by Goslitizdat, Moscow, 1955. 155pp.

In 1955 a collection of Afghan tales, translated from the original by Z. Kalinin, K. Lebedev and Yu. Semenov, was published in Moscow. A detailed review of this collection appeared in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No.3 of 1957, of which the following is an abridged translation.

In order to acquaint Russian readers with typical aspects of Afghan life, the compiler, translators and editors of this collection were presented with the problem of choosing the most original and characteristic examples of the

country's folklore. This has been most successfully achieved by the inclusion in the first part of the collection of Afghan legends, whose genuineness is revealed by descriptions of the people's lives, customs and natural background, and by the mention of certain Afghan tribes and places long inhabited by Afghans (for example the region of Kandahar and Peshawar). In addition, the heroes of the legends (Fateh Khan Barakzai, Shamsuddin, the Mogul ruler etc.) are, according to experts, historical persons.

The inclusion in the second half of the collection of satirical fables, and anecdotes is entirely unjustified, for they are common to all eastern countries and cannot be counted as original examples of Afghan folklore. For example the anecdote about the tiger and the doe-hare is to be found in the Indian collection "Panchatantra" (first centuries A.D.) and also in an Arab variant. Others, in spite of the freedom of translation, are to be found almost word for word in the collection entitled "Indian Tales" recently published by the same publishing house as the Afghan collection.

The translators also had to solve the problem of transmitting the text of the original as accurately as possible and preserving the literary peculiarities of the Afghan story. As a rule, terseness of language and the absence of superfluous adornment are characteristic of Afghan tales and legends (as of the majority of eastern folk tales). They neither describe picturesque landscapes nor go into detailed accounts of the mental states of the heroes. Yet at the same time the language of the tale is extremely graphic and idiomatic. In addition verse is often introduced in the form of a song. And Afghan tales and legends, like those of other peoples, also have their traditional beginnings and endings, remarks addressed to the hearers etc. All this should be expressed by the translation. The following comparison of the original text with the translation will give the reader some idea of how the translators have dealt with their task.

Original p.47

One day Shakho thought to herself: "Let me climb into this tree and look if I can see anybody." (It was the same tree the trunk of which formed her bed.) She climbed up and saw that a caravan was passing in front of the castle. She looked for a long time at the caravan. The caravan passed by, but there was no sign of Dalyay. And she poured out her heartfelt grief in a song:

The Collection p.77

One day Shakho climbed into a willow to see where her lover was hiding. She climbed higher and higher up the trunk of the powerful tree and at last an unfamiliar and beautiful picture met her eyes: into the distance, as far as eye could see, there stretched a valley. Its edges were lost in blue mist. And still further, right in the distance, rose the mountains bearing their snowy summits

"As I sat with my friends
I broke my little earring.
Their lovers come to the others,
But where is my dear one, where
can he be?"
And Shakho climbed down once more.

to the skies. Nodding their heads to the setting sun camels were proudly traversing the valley. Shakho followed the caravan with her eyes for a long time, thinking sadly that perhaps one of the drivers might see her lover.

Shakho climbed down from the tree in tears.

As is evident, a truly "unfamiliar beautiful picture", taken from no-one knows where, or for what reason is included in the text of the tale, while the song expressing the sentiments of the heroine, characteristic of the Afghan method of story-telling, is omitted. One more example of the translation:

Original p.26

And now Zarif Khan and Khidri with the caravan were treading on Indian soil. They looked, and there before them was a deep river. Nowhere was there a ford. There was a bridge and people were crossing it. When the caravan attempted to cross, the bridge-guard blocked their way.

The Collection pp.31-32

The caravan travelled for many days across deserts and mountains, and across raging torrents. And, at last they reached a country where everything bloomed and caressed the eye. It was India.

On the distant road everything delighted Zarif Khan: the new places, the unfamiliar people, and the hot sun. But Khidri rode along gloomy and angry thinking all the time how he could get rid of his nephew.

After several days of travelling the glassy surface of a river gleamed before Zarif Khan. In the muddy water crocodiles clicked their teeth, swimming up to the very bank.

The caravan went down to the bridge. But as soon as the first camels had mounted it from nowhere there jumped out a little man with a small cap on his shaven head, who waved his arms and stopped the caravan.

Obviously the simple, terse narration of the legend seemed too poor and so it was adorned with "crocodiles in the muddy water" and persons with "shaven heads".

This was evidently done on the principle that exotic descriptions lend local colour.

Such a version of an Afghan legend certainly cannot be called even a free literary translation. Even if at the start a translation was made, it was later obviously subjected to a radical literary transformation. As a result a considerable part of the text was omitted and equally large bits were invented and added. On the title page of the collection the inscription appears "Translation from the Afghan" and the names of the compiler and translators are given; but the name of the person responsible for the literary transformation is not mentioned. The translators presumably therefore busied themselves with the literary invention themselves. Consequently they, and also the State Publishing House of Literature, are responsible for the publication of such a translation.

Evidently in order to add local colour the heroes address each other (not as in the original) in the following grandiloquent phrases: "O, most powerful of khans" (p.11); "Shadow over my head!" (60); "You son of a jackal and a hyena!" (51); "Mangy cur" (p.32), etc. In some tales the following chef d'oeuvres appear for no apparent reason: "Palefaced - for women, dark - for battle" (p.99); "But the glitter of gold rejoices the eye" (p.31); "You know, the prayers of a suffering heart sometimes reach the Almighty" (p.23).

A few words on Yu. Semenov's introduction to the collection under review. Why are the Afghan sources from which the translation was made not indicated in the introduction? It is not here merely a matter of convention. If the sources had been indicated the reader would have known, for example, that the beginning of the tale "Adam Khan and Durkhanyy" is taken from one source and the middle and end from another, for the latter is a literary rehash and is, in fact, the work of Munshi Ahmad Jan.

The first sentence of the introduction might leave the reader with the erroneous impression that the history of the struggle of the Afghan people for freedom and independence began only in the middle of the eighteenth century, i.e. from the moment when an independent Afghan state was formed. But the freedom-loving traditions of the Afghan people were formed over the centuries in their struggle with the numerous foreign invaders. The introduction makes no mention of the reflection of these traditions in Afghan literature and folklore, in particular in legends. This should have been remarked upon first of all. And it certainly was not by chance that the introduction omits all reference to the artistic peculiarities and use of metaphor of the Afghan tales, in which, obviously, the translators were little interested.

A few words on the decorative scheme of the collection. In our opinion it does not help, either, to make the reader familiar with the national culture of the Afghans. On the cover, and in numerous pictures, people are depicted in striped or patterned khalats (ceremonial robe - Trans.) such as the Uzbeks or Turkmens wear but which are never worn by Afghans.

We cannot therefore agree with the statement of the author of the introduction that the collection "acquaints the Soviet reader more closely with the literature of the Afghan people" (p.8). It would be truer to say that the collection gives the Soviet reader an incorrect idea of the literature of the Afghans, treating this literature, and the confidence of the reader, too freely.

AFGANISTAN (EKONOMICHESKIY OCHERK) (Afghanistan : An Economic Outline). By M. Pikulin, Tashkent, 1956. 301pp., bibliog.

This comprehensive survey of Afghanistan gives a good general picture of the country as it is today, together with a short sketch of its geography and history and a detailed analysis of its economy. The chapter headings are as follows:

(1) A general description of the geography and natural conditions;
(2) a brief historical sketch;
(3) the state system and administrative divisions;
(4) population;
(5) economy, agriculture and industry;
(6) communications and transport;
(7) differences in the economy of various regions of the country;
(8) domestic and foreign trade;
(9) finances;
(10) Afghanistan and the capitalist countries;
(11) Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; bibliography.

This Russian survey covers much the same ground as a similar work published in America and also entitled "Afghanistan"+, but there are certain

---

+ AFGHANISTAN. Edited by Donald Wilber. Country Survey Series, New Haven, Connecticut, 1956.

differences in the material incorporated and the approach adopted which it is interesting to note. The sections on the history of the country reveal for example marked differences; for whereas the American version gives a brief sketch of Afghan history from the first millennia B.C. as well as a more detailed account of twentieth century events, the Russian version only begins with the formation of the Afghan state in 1747. The Russian concentrates mostly on the formation of class divisions, British "aggressive policy" in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century and developments in the early twentieth century. The difference in attitude between the two accounts is evident from the following example: in the Russian version the nationalist movement in the early years of this century is attributed to the influence of the first Russian revolution 1905-07; the American version makes no mention of the Russian revolution but merely remarks: "The rise of nationalism in Asia following the Russo-Japanese war did not by-pass Afghanistan." Again, practically no mention is made in the American version of the October Revolution, while the Russian is at pains to show that "the liberation of the peoples of the former Russian Empire. . . inspired the peoples of the countries of the East, among them Afghanistan, to fight for their national independence. . ."

The Russian work is necessarily less detailed than the American since it is very much shorter (298pp. as compared with 460pp.); it does not mention for example the problem of the Pathan tribes in Pakistan. In the Russian chapter on Afghan trade useful tables are included showing the amount of different produce exported in certain years, but there are no tables to correspond with those provided by the American version showing what proportion of goods were exchanged with which countries in a given year. It is worth noting here that the trade figures of the two versions frequently do not tally.

The chapters on population in the two works cover very much the same ground but the Russian does not give such a detailed historical background as the American, presumably again through lack of space.

The penultimate chapter in the Russian book ("Afghanistan and the Capitalist Countries"), attempts to show that relations between the backward Afghanistan and the more developed capitalist countries were, and still are, of an imperialist and rapacious nature. The British in the nineteenth century, it is claimed, "constantly unleashed predatory wars against the peoples of Afghanistan, attempting to turn the country into a colony and a springboard for aggression against Central Asia and Persia". Further, the depredations of the British are supposed to have left Afghanistan in such a condition that, after winning her independence, she was left completely dependent economically on other more highly developed countries, and became a "source of raw materials and a market for industrial goods" for the

imperialists. In the thirties, it is maintained, Germany began to penetrate Afghanistan "increasing, during the period of preparation for the Second World War, her economic and political expansion in the countries of the Near and Middle East. . . At the same time militarist Japan attempted to consolidate her economic position in Afghanistan." However, most of the chapter is devoted to economic relations between the United States and Afghanistan. These relations are condemned for their disastrous effect upon Afghanistan's economy. In 1942 the "insistent, systematic penetration of American imperialism into Afghanistan, which aimed at the economic enslavement of the country, began in earnest". In addition, it is maintained, the Americans, instead of selling the Afghans machine-tools or cotton fabric which they badly needed, gave them "chemical preparations, toilet articles, shabby clothing, cigarettes". Further, "Afghanistan was fettered to the American market, and was forced to buy mainly in the USA at prices dictated by the American monopolists".

The activities of the Morrison Knudsen company are condemned, and it is held that the "exorbitantly inflated expenditure" of the company absorbed any gains which accrued to Afghanistan from her trade with America. As regards the Afghan-American agreement on the irrigation of the Arghandab valley, the Soviet writer opines that the company's specialists "busied themselves with surveying the locality, prospecting for minerals, and many other affairs, but not with the construction of irrigation works in the valley of the Arghandab, as projected in the agreement". As a result of American interference in the economy of Afghanistan, it is claimed, "the foreign trade of the country is seriously damaged. Year by year exports drop which results in a curtailment of imports". Afghanistan's loss of much of her gold reserves which "transferred themselves to the safes of the American monopolists", the disproportionate issue of paper money, and the shortage of consumer goods "is bringing about a further diminution in the value of the Afghani, and a steady rise in the market price of consumer goods."

Having laid the blame for Afghanistan's economic difficulties on American shoulders the Russian survey ends with a glowing account of Russo-Afghan relations. This includes a description of Russia's support of Afghanistan "during the hard years of her fight with the British imperialists for her freedom and independence", the development of friendly relations between the two countries, and various agreements and trade treaties. "Economic relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union promote the independent development of the economy of the country." The signing of a trade agreement in 1950 evoked angry reactions in America, it is claimed. "In their efforts to consolidate their position in this country American monopolists took and take great pains to impede the development of normal relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union."

The argument of these two chapters is summed up as follows: "The advantage for Afghanistan of trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union becomes all the more appreciable if one takes into consideration the considerable economic difficulties which arose and developed here as a result of the one-sided trade with the USA and the so-called 'help' of the American monopolists". However, few details are given of trade between Afghanistan and the USSR.

Although it was published in 1956 the work goes no further than 1953 and the author admits in his preface that "in so far as the contents of the book do not embrace the last few years, some of its conclusions are not based on events which have recently taken place". The book contains a number of photographs, maps and tables.

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

NEWS DIARY :

AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, PERSIA

The following diary includes items from newspapers and periodicals received during the period January-March 1958 inclusive. In view of the variety of sources from which the information has been collected some contradictions are inevitable; no responsibility can be taken for the accuracy of the information given, but the source is quoted for each item.

The following abbreviations have been used throughout:

FET	Far East Trade
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
OM	Oriente Moderno
P	Pravda
T	The Times

AFGHANISTAN

1958 January — 8th. An oil prospecting contract is signed at Kabul by the Afghan Ministry of Mining and Industry and representatives of Technoexport, the Russian import-export organization. The contract covers northern Afghanistan, and under its terms Russia will supply equipment and other materials. (FET. Feb. 1958)

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union sign a treaty regulating their common frontier. (T. 20.1.58)

February — 13th. A protocol on trade between the USSR and Afghanistan in 1958 is signed in Kabul. The USSR will supply machinery, oil, cotton cloth, sugar etc.; Afghanistan - cotton, wool, leather, dried fruits etc. (P. 15.2.58)

A luncheon was given by Mr. Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, for Abdul Hakim Shahalami, the Afghan Ambassador, on the 37th anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan friendship agreement. (Tass, 27.2.58)

INDIA

1958 January

A 2,500,000 ton blooming-mill is due to arrive in India from the Ural Heavy Machinery Works, which is also building two other mills for India - a rail and structural-steel mill and a continuous-action billet mill. (FET. Jan. 1958)

3rd. Mr. Siroky, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister arrives in Delhi for a 12-day State visit to India at the beginning of a tour of south-east Asia. (T. 4.1.58)

A trade agreement of March 1954 between India and Rumania, modified in January 1957, is extended to June 30th by an exchange of letters in New Delhi on 20th January 1958. Two-way trade, negligible before 1954, increased rapidly following the signing of the agreement to Rs 4,100,000 (£307,500) in 1956-7. Rumania's exports to India include ships, locomotives, oil-prospecting and drilling equipment, and cement, in return for cotton textiles, cotton-seed oil, hides and skins. (FET.April 1958)

Indian peace supporters and delegates to the Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference who have been staying in the Soviet Union leave for home. (P. 22.1.58)

23rd. A meeting is held in Moscow in honour of India's Republic Day. (P. 24.1.58)

24th. The première of the Soviet-Indian film "Afanasiy Nikitin" is held in Moscow (see CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, p.99). (P. 25.1.58)

An exhibition of works by Soviet artists on India opens in Moscow. (P. 26.1.58)

Geophysical parties from the Soviet Ministry of Geology and oil have completed a survey for oil in East Panjab and Hoshiapur (sic). (P. 31.1.58)

Fifty children in the Moscow boarding school No.23 are now learning Hindi and Urdu. (P. 31.1.58)

February

The Indian government has decided to set up two public sector refineries to exploit oil found in a 500 square mile area in Assam, and is to receive Rumanian and Russian help. India will also receive technical assistance from Russia in exploiting the lignite deposits of southern India and developing the Korba coalfields in central India. The agreement is part of a £45m. credit from the Soviet Union for industrial enterprises (see also CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, pp.95,97). (FET. Feb. 1958)

6th. Dr. Ho Chi-minh, President of North Vietnam, arrives for a 10-day visit to India. (T. 7.2.58)

Bombay is to have a Communist mayor for the first time during the year beginning April 1958. (T. 18.3.58)

12th. Representatives of Air India arrive in Moscow for talks with the Soviet Directorate of Civil Aviation about establishing regular flights between Moscow and Delhi. (P. 13.2.58)

12th. A Soviet radio delegation returns to Moscow from Delhi. (Tass, 12.2.58)

14th. A delegation from the Supreme Soviet leaves Moscow for India. (P. 15.2.58)

A five-year trade agreement signed between India and Russia in 1953 is extended by one year. Zinc and ammonium sulphate have been added to the list of commodities available for import into India. The list of exports from India now includes: coir products, dyeing and tanning substances, woollen carpets, and woollen hosiery. (FET. Feb. 1958)

March

9th. Delegation of the Supreme Soviet returns from India. (P. 10.3.58)

The President of the Council of Ministers of Rumania, Kivu Stoyka, conducts talks with Nehru. A joint Indo-Rumanian declaration is signed in Delhi. (P. 20.3.58)

Five Soviet delegates take part in the Universal Peace Council in Delhi. (P. 22.3.58)

PAKISTAN

1957 December — With imports amounting to 36,400 bales, Russia topped the list of importers of jute from Pakistan during the fortnight ended December 31st 1957. (T. 14.1.58)

1958 January — 13th. A Soviet parliamentary delegation arrives in Karachi from Moscow for a 14-day visit at the invitation of the Pakistan National Assembly. (T. 20.1.58)

February — 3rd. At a press interview I.A. Benediktov, head of the Soviet Parliamentary delegation, said that the Soviet Union was ready to give Pakistan economic and technical aid either on the basis of a bilateral agreement or through UNO. He also suggested more frequent exchanges of parliamentary, technical and cultural delegations. (OM. Feb. 1958)

5th. Soviet delegation leaves Karachi for home. (P. 6.2.58)

PERSIA

1957 December — A group of Tadzhik singers and dancers visits Persia. (KT. 19.12.57)

1958 January — 20th. A new Soviet-Persian rail agreement is signed to supersede the 1940 agreement. As from the 6th of June 1958 there will be a direct sleeping-car running between Moscow and Tabriz. (P. 21.1.58)

February — 26th. Mostafa Sam'i, the Persian Ambassador, arrives in Moscow. (Tass, 26.2.58)

March — 10th. The Persian Ambassador presents his credentials to the President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Voroshilov. (P. 11.3.58)

A delegation of Persian women visits the Soviet Union. (P. 29.3.58)

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF KAZAKHSTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TADZHIKISTAN, KIRGIZIA AND TURKMENISTAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.

Chelyabinsk
Troitsk
Magnitogorsk
Kartaly
Tobol
Kustanay
Petropavlovsk
Omsk
Kokchetav
Shchuchinsk
Stepnyak
Makinsk
Pavlodar
Barnaul
Kuybyshev
Mikhaylovka
Rubtsovsk
Leninogorsk
Ust'-Kamenogorsk
Zyryanovsk
Zaysan
Semipalatinsk
Akmolinsk
Arbasar
Yesil'
Chkalov
Uralsk
Orsk
Aktyubinsk
Kandagach
Temir
Turgay
Irgiz
Temir-Tau
Karaganda
Karkaralinsk
Ayaguz
Stalingrad
Rostov
Tikhoretsk
Stavropol'
Astrakhan'
Gur'yev
Dossor
Chelkar
Baykonur
Dzhezdy
Dzhezkazgan
Mointy
Balkhash
Aralsk
Kazalinsk
Dzhusaly
Kzyl-Orda
Taldy-Kurgan
Tekeli
Kul'dzha
Panfilov
Alma-Ata
Frunze
Kant
Tokmak
Rybachye
Issyk
Przhevalsk
Chulak-Tau
Dzhambul
Talas
Turkestan
Chimkent
Lenger
Naryn
Kok-Yangak
Dzhalal-Abad
Tashkent
Namangan
Andizhan
Kokand
Fergana
Osh
Kashgar
Yarkend
Mirzachul'
Leninabad
Isfara
Dzhizak
Ura-Tyube
Gizhduvan
Bukhara
Kagan
Kattakurgan
Samarkand
Penzhikent
Navabad
Garm
Shakhrisyabz
Regar
Stalinabad
Kulyab
Kurgan-Tyube
Nizhni Pyandzh
Murgab
Khorog
Chardzhou
Karshi
Amu-Darya
Kerki
Bosaga
Termez
Ashkhabad
Mary
Bayram-Ali
Tedzhen
Iolotan'
Kushka
Kungrad
Chimbay
Nukus
Khodzheyli
Takhia-Tash
Tashauz
Urgench
Turtkul'
Khiva
Krasnovodsk
Nebit-Dag
Kazandzhik
Kyzyl-Arvat
Yerevan
Nakhichevan'
Baku
Tbilisi
Batumi
Dzaudzhikau
Groznyy
Kizlyar
Fort Shevchenko
Tabriz
Meshed
Tehran
Herat
Kabul
Yarkend
Kashgar

KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
KIRGIZIA
TADZHIKISTAN
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
TURKEY
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
KASHMIR
CHINA

Borders of the U.S.S.R.
Limits of Union Republics.
Capitals of Union Republics.
Railways.
Canals.
Canals under construction or projected.
Sands.
Main arterial road with pass.

J. P. 1956.

Published by the Central Asian Research Centre – 66, King's Road, London, S.W.3. – 1956.



INTER-REPUBLICAN FRONTIERS

Sketch-map showing the inter-republican frontiers of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia, and the interlacing of their territories in the neighbourhood of the Fergana Valley region.

The above map shows the area covered by CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW in relation to the rest of the
The total extent of the area is about 1½ million sq. miles. According to the latest available figures the total po
is 20,900,000 of whom about 13 millions are estimated to be indigenous.

The total area of what is generally regarded as Soviet Asia i.e. the Urals Region, Eastern and Western Siberia
Soviet Far East, is approximately 8 million sq. miles and the population about 37 millions of whom about 7 mil
estimated to be indigenous. Thus, whilst Central Asia and Kazakhstan together occupy less than one fifth of the t
of Soviet Asia, their indigenous population amounts to about two thirds of the total indigenous population of th
of Soviet Asia.

Published and Duplicated by the Central Asian Research Centre, 66 King's Road, London, S.W.3.